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ABSTRACT 
KRASIMIRA FILCHEVA: The Ineffable and Its Many Manifestations: A Neo-Kantian 
Approach 
(Under the Direction of Thomas Hofweber and Alan Nelson) 
 
In this dissertation, I argue that the idea that there could be aspects of reality ineffable 
for us human beings should not be articulated in terms of the possibility of ineffable facts or 
truths. The thesis that there could be truths whose propositional form or structure is in principle 
unrepresentable by us human beings, in particular, is shown to be incoherent. The view that 
safeguarding the natural realist picture of the relationship between mind and world requires the 
possibility of ineffable facts is also shown to be mistaken. I argue that the natural realist picture 
requires the rejection of the possibility of any ineffable truths or facts whether their source of 
ineffability is unrepresentable logical structure or content. The idea that there could ineffable 
aspects of reality should instead be preserved by construing it in terms of the possibility of an 
ineffable insight into a non-conceptual or non-propositional feature of reality. Using Kant’s 
Theory of Reason, I argue that the explanation of why anything should exist at all is one such 
ineffable feature of reality
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Introduction 
 
“The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible” 
(Albert Einstein) 
 
“Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot 
decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every 
faculty of the mind.” 
(Immanuel Kant) 
 
 
My focus in the present work is the question whether there could be truths or facts 
about external reality that are in principle unrepresentable by us human beings, perhaps in 
virtue of limitations in our representational abilities given certain fundamental features of the 
human mind. My goal in what follows is to introduce this problem and distinguish it from other 
related ones and to summarize my main contentions in this work, indicating along the way how 
the picture that emerges here is to be understood with reference to three intellectual orientations 
on the broader problem of the relationship between mind and world we can identify.  
i. Three intellectual orientations 
The following picture emerges from a broad overview of the philosophical 
preoccupations of modern metaphysicians and the problems that engage them. We can observe 
the development of three major intellectual orientations identified through the most 
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fundamental concerns that shape the work of the canonical early modern figures in philosophy, 
which we inherit more or less modified today. I would like to suggest that these three 
intellectual orientations are shaped by deep concerns over the intelligibility of the external 
world, its mind-independence, and, finally, over the role of the epistemic subject in our most 
systematic attempts at description of the fundamental nature of reality as it is and the 
limitations to these efforts that may arise from reflection on our own representational and 
epistemic capacities. 
I do not mean to suggest that these intellectual orientations are mutually exclusive or 
exhaustive. Insofar as one accords equal significance to the concerns that shape these 
intellectual viewpoints one could be ascribed the respective viewpoints. The rationalist 
idealists in the early modern period, for instance, despite a predominant concern over the 
intelligibility of reality shared with Descartes and other realists a preoccupation with the mind-
independence or mind-dependence of the external world, and no systematic philosopher at the 
time entirely neglected concerns over our cognitive faculties and what they allowed us to know, 
to what extent, and by what means. These viewpoints are not likely to be exhaustive, either, 
but I take it to be fruitful to focus on the patterns that emerge from the philosophical work we 
inherit from the early moderns, which can, arguably, be illuminated through such a 
classification. There is a case to be made, for example, that the distinguishing mark of idealist 
philosophy is precisely its roots in the fundamental concern over the intelligibility and 
knowability of the world of our experience, which takes precedence over any demand to 
preserve the mind-independence of reality at any cost, skeptical or other. 
Idealism, arguably, presents the clearest example of a philosophical position motivated 
at its core by the need to safeguard the image of the external world as a world “for us,” to 
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borrow a helpful phrase from John Foster. The intelligibility of external physical reality is 
secured for us once the physical is grounded, in all the various ways different idealist 
philosophies propose, in the mental or, more specifically, when the features of reality are bound 
to align with what is possible for us to experience or think in virtue of some reductionistic or 
identity relation between the mental and the physical. It is not hard to see how the philosophical 
systems of Leibniz and Berkeley, for instance, given the root of the former in a sweeping and 
wide-ranging application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and given the clear emphasis in 
the latter on counter-acting skepticism in all its guises reflect this orientation.  
Fundamental concern with the mind-independence of reality whose intrinsic nature and 
structure is there for us to uncover, especially in the guise of scientific realism, may appear as 
a late-comer on the philosophical scene. But the pattern can easily emerge once we turn 
attention to Descartes’ and Locke’s philosophical systems. Descartes’ strong insistence on the 
mutually irreducible nature of the two basic kinds of substance at the core of his metaphysics 
and Locke’s basic distinction between nominal and real essences attests to this preoccupation 
with the true nature of reality as it is independently of minds like ours. The point of division 
between the two systems is to be located in the disagreement over what emerges once we take 
the strictly epistemological viewpoint, mostly sharply delineated by Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy but certainly present in the early modern problematic. Locke’s empiricist 
commitments and, on some interpretations, the representational realism central to his system, 
imply significant limitations in our ability to represent the true nature of things in the external 
world and, arguably, form the scaffolding for a skeptical philosophy that Berkeley was 
especially concerned to reject. Descartes’ appeal to God famously guarantees him the 
intelligibility of external reality, despite is independence from us. 
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Finally, there is a distinctive intellectual viewpoint from which the attempt to theorize 
about how reality truly is in itself appears as mistaken. There could be no systematic 
philosophical effort to describe the external world that does not recognize the latter as only one 
part of an inextricable mind-world pair or one that does not acknowledge that reality is to be 
thought solely in its relation to us. In other words, the strictly epistemological standpoint, 
solidified through Kant’s transcendental philosophy but already present in its nascent form in 
empiricist theorizing, prioritizes reflection on reality as it can be known and represented in 
thought or language by beings like us, endowed with specific cognitive and perceptual abilities.  
There is one feature that these philosophical orientations share. They are all premised 
on the same underlying problematic – how to think about the relation between mind and world. 
The differences stem from which aspects of this underlying problem are set as most prominent 
and which concerns are accorded fundamental importance. The present work is intended as a 
contribution to this problem in its extended form, also encompassing the concern over the 
relation between language and the world, where, for the purposes of my discussion, I assume 
that there can be no gap between what we can think and what we can express in language. To 
be sure, a substantive debate can be had over the possibility of ineffable thought, i.e. thought 
that cannot in principle or even, more weakly, in practice, cannot be given linguistic 
expression. But I intend to sidestep such debates and so I will be making this explicit 
assumption.  
ii. The Main Problem 
Ordinary thought about the world involves an implicit faith in the powers of human 
reasoning to grasp the fundamental structure of reality. Where there is skepticism about our 
epistemic abilities, it typically stems from evolutionary considerations about the possibility of 
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cognitive limitations characteristic of creatures whose cognitive architecture has evolved 
subject to processes of natural selection or from considerations about contingent limitations 
such as technological capabilities, temporal resources and so on. Current scientific thought 
betrays such old faith in our power to assume the God’s eye point of view no less than untutored 
reason, as evidenced by controversies surrounding the claims of fundamental physics to answer 
questions typically taken to be the province of metaphysics or religious revelation such as the 
question of why anything should exist at all. Contemporary research in physics also betrays 
this epistemic optimism in the pursuit of a grand unified theory of physical reality which 
centers on questions that, again, would have been conceivable to ask, in previous centuries, 
only in the context of religious and philosophical debates such as the question of the origins of 
space and time. 1 Historically, some philosophers have even found it intelligible to ask about 
the origins of seemingly necessary principles of human reasoning and corresponding necessary 
truths such as the truths of classical logic. Descartes, for instance, found it intelligible to ask 
about the origins of the so called “eternal truths,” e.g. the law of contradiction, appealing to 
God’s will in his explanations.  Such tendencies of human reasoning – to push and extend the 
domain of questions that we can intelligibly ask and hope to answer – constitute the target of 
this research. 
I question the extent to which we can reasonably hold on to this faith in the powers of 
human reason to grasp reality in its totality. However, I do so not by way of investigating any 
                                                          
1 Add Hoffman, idealism and realism as scientific questions. Not clear should be called epistemic optimism. 
Analogy between causal arguments for realism in the early modern period and contemporary arguably idealist 
arguments from evolutionary considerations (not evident it makes sense to consider alternative “theories’ like 
realism and idealism to be scientific in nature (“science has discovered there are no real colors out there” – 
sense?). kantian connection. “discovery” our perceptions are not of reality as it is. What would it mean for it to 
be? Would involve the need to provide a description of reality in radically subject-independent way and have 
the conceptual vocabulary for that to be possible. Putnam’s metaphysical realism appearing in a scientific 
context.  
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possible limits of what can be known about reality but by way of a more basic investigation 
into the possible limits of meaningful thought and language or conceptual representation, and 
hence the limits of sense. My concerns are thus thoroughly Kantian and Tractarian in nature, 
receiving their most thorough historical treatment in Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic. 
The idea that there may be limits to human conceptual representation or, 
correspondingly, that there may be ineffable for us truths about reality arises naturally when 
we reflect on a range of actual and hypothetical cases. First, less evolved creatures such as 
most animals to which we can attribute the capacity to represent facts about their environment 
are incapable of representing the complex truths we can represent such as truths of fundamental 
physics or mathematics. Nothing seems to guarantee us that our cognitive capacities, which 
are subject to the same evolutionary processes of natural selection as those of other animals, 
can allow us to capture all the truths about reality that there are. It may well be, as some argue, 
that we are in the same position relative to some actual or hypothetical alien beings with 
superior representational abilities that other non-human animals are relative to us. If there were 
such beings with a language of their own capable of representing these ineffable for us truths, 
they would be incapable of communicating them to us in principle.  
In the present work, I examine the very coherence of this idea, as well its implications 
for a set of broader issues such as how we ought to think about the relationship between the 
logical structure of language and thought and the structure of reality, how to conceive of 
“logical form,” the relevance of considerations about ineffable truth to the realism vs. idealism 
debate, and the possibility of languages adequate for the representation of reality which do not 
share the logical forms in our natural language.  
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My approach is neo-Kantian in the sense that two core Kantian ideas systematically 
structure my discussion and stand at the foundation of the main arguments I construct in 
defense of my conclusions. But as will become clear in what follows I depart from Kant 
significantly in my concluding, main positive proposal as to how to preserve something of the 
idea that there could be ineffable for us aspects of reality. Even though I take as my starting 
point the common assumption that the way to articulate and develop the idea that there may 
be, for all we know, ineffable for us aspects of reality in terms of the possibility of ineffable 
truths or facts and hence in terms of propositional thought about reality, the closing chapter of 
the dissertation suggests a different way to preserve the idea of ineffable aspects of reality. 
There, I set aside the common assumption in favor of a proposal to think of the ineffable in 
non-propositional terms. I propose a certain case study or example which gives us reason to 
think that there may be one particular aspect of reality, namely its very existence or, more 
carefully, the explanation of its very existence, which cannot be, in principle, grasped in 
propositional terms but only through some form of non-conceptual or intuitive insight. This 
constitutes my most significant departure from a Kantian framework of thought on the main 
problem at hand.  
The two main ideas that make this project Kantian in inspiration are logical form as a 
condition of the possibility of any representation at all, either in thought or language, and the 
principle of the Unity of Reason or unity in our representations of reality, which sets it as a 
rational requirement to seek unification in our systematic descriptions of the world, whether 
scientific or metaphysical.  
The Kantian and Tractarian conception of logical form frames my discussion in the 
first three chapters. In the first chapter, I focus on the very coherence of the idea of ineffable 
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truths of one specific kind that I call structurally ineffable truths. How we think about the very 
possibility of ineffable propositional structures has bearing on a very important, broader issue 
in metaphysics. This is, as noted above, the problem of the relation between thought and reality 
in general or the logical structure of thought and the logical structure of reality. I argue that we 
cannot make sense of the idea that the logical structures of truths about reality can outstrip 
what we can in principle represent and, hence, that the idea of structurally ineffable truths is 
incoherent.  
In the second chapter, I consider the idea of a mismatch between the logical structure 
of the world and our thought from a different direction. I focus on feature-placing languages. 
These appear in the debate over ontological nihilism and the question of the very possibility of 
a language that can adequately characterize reality. That is because they are sometimes thought 
not to share any of our seemingly essential logical structures such as the subject-predicate form. 
Ontological nihilism is the view, according to which there are no objects in reality and hence 
no objects having properties. It is thought essential to this view that we can coherently entertain 
the idea of a representational vehicle, i.e. a language, which can represent such an object-less 
reality in virtue of featuring sentences with none of the typical subject-predicate structure of 
the kind that characterizes the sentences of our natural languages, sentences containing only 
so called feature-placing expressions modelled on examples such as “It is raining.” It is also 
frequently thought that Quine’s predicate-functorese formal language provides a model for 
such a feature-placing language and thus puts on a secure footing the speculative idea that 
ontological nihilism, if not the correct view of reality, is, nonetheless, a coherent metaphysical 
position. If such feature-placing languages were a genuine possibility, we would have a case 
in point for the view that our familiar logical forms or propositional structures in language and 
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thought admit of genuine alternatives, if not by way of the possibility of alien logical forms 
inexpressible for us, then by way of the possibility of feature-placing languages that lack what 
we assumed to be essential logical structures such as the subject-predicate structure.  
I argue that there could not be such languages and I locate the misguided assumption 
that there could be such languages in a mistaken conception of the logical form or structure of 
our thought and language. The core of the argument is that if one accepts what I call the 
Minimal Structuralist Conception of Language, according to which sentential meaning is 
possible in virtue of the logical form of sentences that underlie their formal entailment 
relations, then one is soon led to the conclusion that the expressions of the so called feature-
placing languages do not meet this basic condition for the very possibility of meaning or 
linguistic representation and so cannot be considered genuine linguistic expressions. This is 
the conception of logical form which I contend should be accepted by most analytic 
philosophers and I take it to be largely implicit in views about language that would be shared 
by all parties to the debate over ontological nihilism.  
The mistaken conception of logical form that gives the idea of feature-placing 
languages some initial plausibility and may be taken to tacitly inform the discussion over 
ontological nihilism, I want to suggest, also explains the result of the previous chapter. That is 
because the assumption that the logical structure of the world is something completely 
independent of us in a very strong sense, i.e. being metaphysically prior to our thought and 
language, or just that it is there for us to match in thought or language leads us astray. Instead, 
if we understand logical form or logical structure in Tractarian terms as a condition of the 
possibility of any thought or language, without, however, subscribing to its metaphysics, what 
should emerge is that we cannot coherently entertain the idea of a mismatch between the logical 
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forms of our thought and language about the world and the form of the world taken as a totality 
of truths.2 In other words, there can be no truths with logical forms alternative to our own. 
In the third largely historical chapter, I consider the main problem of structurally 
ineffable truths in the context of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. I seek to reconstruct what 
is, according to me, an important Kantian strand of argument against the idea of structurally 
ineffable truths or, in Kant’s terms, alien logical forms of judgment. This strand of argument, 
interestingly, anticipates an influential contemporary Davidsonian-style of argument against 
ineffable truths. I argue that the place to look for Kant’s strongest grounds for rejecting 
structurally ineffable truths is not where one would initially expect, i.e. his Metaphysical 
Deduction of the Categories where Kant asserts the completeness of the table of judgments. 
Rather, it is the Paralogisms chapter that contains the foundation for a Davidsonian-style 
argument because reflection on the conditions of the possibility of representing other minds 
yields the conclusion that we ought to assume any alien thinkers must be using our forms of 
judgment. Otherwise, they could not to be recognizable as thinkers in the first place. Notably, 
a full defense of this Kantian strand of argument requires consideration of another key Kantian 
principle, namely the unity of representations of reality or the Unity of Reason. It is this 
principle which first makes it necessary to reflect on how our forms of judgment and the 
putative alien forms relate to each other.  
The principle of the Unity of Reason appears in another guise in the core argument of 
the fourth chapter where I explore the connection between considerations about ineffable truth 
                                                          
2 The view that the Tractatus advances metaphysical theses is controversial and I do not mean to be endorsing 
it. If one considers this view mistaken, then the claim above just amounts to saying that if the Tractatus is taken 
to advance a particular metaphysics, then, still, one can preserve the crucial insights into logical form without 
adopting that metaphysics. 
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and the realism vs. idealism debate. It is frequently thought that considerations about ineffable 
facts or truths have a direct and essential connection with the realism and idealism debate. The 
possibility that there are some truths about external reality which in principle outstrip our 
powers of conceptual representation is thought essential for safeguarding the natural picture 
we have of the relationship between our thought and reality. If reality is to be mind-independent 
in a particularly strong sense, i.e. independent of our representing it in any given way in either 
perception or thought, then, one might argue, we ought to admit the possibility of truths we 
cannot in principle represent.  
I argue that careful reflection on a key aspect of our concept of reality – the view that 
reality is essentially one - should reveal this intimate relationship between considerations of 
ineffable truths and the realism vs. idealism debate. I maintain that if we are going to see reality 
as essentially one or unified, then this mandates the possibility of coming to a unified and 
systematic representation of it in thought or language – what we can call the principle of the 
unity of reality and the corresponding principle it makes necessary, i.e. the principle of the 
unity of representations to which Kant’s theory of Reason gives the clearest expression. But if 
we take these principles seriously, I argue, then the result we obtain is that we cannot 
coherently entertain the idea that there could be ineffable for us truths in the sense elucidated 
above. In other words, we cannot coherently imagine the possibility that alien thinkers or 
language-users can represent truths that are inexpressible for us but still share one and the same 
reality with us. It should be noted that this argument, if correct, carries much stronger 
implications that any of the aforementioned arguments as it casts into doubt not only the 
intelligibility of the idea of structurally ineffable truths but of any kind of ineffable truths. 
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Finally, in light of the essentially negative results of this investigation into the 
coherence of the notion of ineffable truths about reality, I consider to what extent we can leave 
room for the intuitive idea that there are or must be some ineffable aspects of reality even if 
we cannot develop this thought in terms of corresponding ineffable truths or facts about reality, 
i.e. something essentially propositional in nature. I argue that we can articulate this thought in 
terms of the possibility of an ineffable but non-conceptual insight into reality for which there 
is, moreover, principled ground, in one particular case. This is the case of the so called question 
of existence, i.e. why there is anything at all or why there is something rather than nothing. I 
argue that on a proper interpretation or an appropriate re-interpretation of this long-standing 
metaphysical issue within the framework of Kant’s theory of Reason and the Tractarian saying 
vs. showing distinction, we can come to appreciate that the question of existence already 
suggests a unique but non-traditional answer. Rather than looking for some necessary being or 
other to ground the explanation of why anything should exist or admit a brute fact, we should 
conclude, instead, that Reason already points beyond itself or indicates its own limits in this 
particular case. In this way, what can constitute an “answer” to this demand of explanation, 
once the nature of the question is appreciated, is only some form of intuitive, non-conceptual 
insight into reality taken as a whole, an insight that should be in principle available to us.  
The argument for this conclusion essentially rests on taking seriously the idea that the 
question of existence represents the strongest expression of what Kant calls Reason’s concern 
with and search for the Unconditioned. This is an idea of pure Reason which has many crucial 
manifestations and further elaborations such as the pure ideas of “absolutely necessary 
existence” and the idea of “the sum total of All reality,” all of which bear centrally on the 
interpretation and resolution of the metaphysical issue of existence. I argue that locating the 
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ineffable in this context has one very important advantage. It provides us with an insight into 
the possibility of an ongoing critique of pure Reason of the type Kant initiated. This critique 
reveals that to safeguard the unity of Reason against the threat of any incoherent or 
contradictory demands that it places on itself when trying to think the Unconditioned we should 
admit as a theoretical postulate the possibility of an ineffable answer to the question of 
existence in the sense articulated above. This answer comes in the form of an intuitive, non-
conceptual insight which can, nonetheless, perform the cognitive function that a more familiar 
propositional answer to the question can perform.  This function is to make the demand for any 
further explanation misplaced and to reveal the necessity that the world should exist, even 
though this necessity cannot be grasped conceptually. It is thus a result of this critique of pure 
reason that the answer to the question of existence can only come in the form of a non-
conceptual insight into the necessary existence of the world.  
The overall view presented here then amounts to the following. There is an important 
sense in which the basic intelligibility of reality is preserved as it is incoherent to suppose that 
there could be a mismatch between the logical structure of thought and reality. Call the view 
according to which there can be no gap between the kinds of thoughts we can entertain and the 
way reality can be the no-gap picture. This is, in effect, one of McDowell’s main theses in his 
Mind and World. He takes this view to be truistic and in this respect in need of no substantive 
justification. Yet, it is not uncommon to suppose that the truth of the no-gap view stands in 
need of explanation. Idealism can provide one type of explanation as it makes the logical 
structure of reality mind-dependent and guarantees the truth of the no-gap view. Within a 
realist framework, the no-gap view may be hard to establish in its present formulation if what 
is in question is the possibility of a mismatch between the logical structure of reality and 
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thought and language. Even though a de facto alignment between the two may be established 
via a substantive metaphysical account, perhaps relying on evolutionary considerations, this 
would still leave open the possibility that there could be such a mismatch.  
The present view, as I argue in more detail in the fourth chapter on idealism and realism, 
remains silent on the question of the mind-dependence or independence of external reality. 
Thus, even though this work evolves out of an appreciation and deep sympathy for the 
intellectual orientation that takes the intelligibility of the world to be of primary concern, I do 
not think that the way to safeguard this intelligibility is to erect a metaphysical system on the 
basis of which one can explain how and why reality is guaranteed to be representable by us. I 
take it that no idealist conclusions follow from rejecting the possibility of structurally ineffable 
truth or any type of ineffable truth for that matter. But neither am I assuming a metaphysical 
realist position. At most, I argue that if we accept the natural realist picture that minimally 
follows solely from our concept of reality, we ought to reject the coherence of the idea of 
ineffable truth. For similar reasons, I also reject transcendental idealism insofar as the latter is 
motivated by a perceived need to explain the truth of the no-gap view. No substantive 
explanation is necessary or possible.  
The continuity between the Kantian system of thought and the perspective that informs 
the current work emerges most clearly in the final chapter. There, the epistemological starting 
point is especially evident in that the core of my argument for ineffable aspects of reality, 
which are, however, elusive to conceptual representation, relies on the assumption that the 
transcendental theory of Reason is largely correct. But it is precisely the attempt to take 
seriously this conception of Reason and the associated demand to think the Unconditioned 
which, perhaps surprisingly, leads to the rejection of any substantive limitations in our ability 
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to grasp reality in its totality. It may seem that once we allow room for ineffable aspects of 
reality at least in the sense of features of the world that cannot be captured in conceptual 
thought, then instead of admitting limitations in what truths about reality we can represent we 
should admit limitations in our understanding of the world where this encompasses both 
conceptual and non-conceptual means of making sense of it. Thus, reflection on the question 
of existence may seem to lead us to the very same conclusions that the transcendental 
perspective leads us to, i.e. significant limitations in our ability to make the most general sense 
of how things are. But the main contention of the last chapter is that following the demand of 
Reason to think the Unconditioned requires that we admit as a theoretical postulate that it is at 
least possible to attain some non-conceptual insight into the existence of the world. From the 
present perspective, to say that the world can be thought only as one part of an inextricable 
mind-world pair is to say nothing more than that if we are concerned with how reality is and 
the relationship between mind and language and reality, our starting point should be internal 
to our most basic principles of thought and our ways of making sense of reality. Tracing out 
the implications of the Kantian theory of Reason in application to this particular problem is 
only one example of this broad orientation which informs the present work. 
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1. Can there be ineffable propositional structures? 
 
“The logic of the world is prior to all truth and falsehood.” 
(Ludwig Wittgenstein) 
1.1. Introduction 
Consider the following two general questions. Can there be any aspects of reality we 
humans could not in principle represent? Are there in fact any such aspects of reality? The first 
question concerns the coherence or intelligibility of the idea that some aspects of reality could 
be beyond our powers of conceptual representation. The second one clearly presupposes the 
idea’s coherence and invites one to consider what reasons there could be to believe there are 
actually such aspects of reality. In this paper, I will engage solely with the first question. Since 
reality, we can assume, consists in the totality of truths or facts that obtain, we can take the 
initial question to be about unrepresentable or ineffable truths or facts. In effect, I want to 
consider whether it is coherent or intelligible to suppose that there could be ineffable truths or 
facts.  
The sense of ineffability that is operative here is what we can call essential ineffability. 
We can capture this sense of ineffability through a familiar test that philosophers who write on 
this topic often resort to. This is the essential incommunicability test. To say that some truth 
or fact X is essentially ineffable for us human beings is just to say that if there were any 
differently organized intelligent beings, say, some aliens or gods, who were able to represent 
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X, they would not be able to communicate X to us. Since my target question has to do in 
particular with human representational limitations, the sense of ineffability in question is 
ineffability relative to us human beings.  
There are several assumptions I will make. For my purposes, I will assume that there 
is no gap between what can be thought and what can be said in language. So, the question I 
will be concerned with should be taken to be equally about the limitations in the linguistic 
representations we could form and the cognitive representations we could form. I will also 
assume that there is no significant difference between talk about facts and talk about states of 
affairs. For the sake of simplicity, I will keep to the formulation of the target question in terms 
of facts and truths but the issue of ineffability can equally well apply to states of affairs.  
My focus in this paper will be narrower than suggested above. I want to consider 
whether it is intelligible to suppose that there could be a particular class of truths or facts. In 
order to bring out the particular class of truths or facts that I will be concerned with, I need to 
introduce the following familiar distinction between sources of ineffable truths. Philosophers 
often think in terms of a content vs. form distinction in thought and language. The content of 
thought is often taken to be concepts or, at least loosely, the corresponding objects of thought 
in reality, i.e. properties, relations, events, objects, etc. So, one might think that there could be 
aspects of reality we cannot represent because there are certain properties, relations, events or 
objects that are inaccessible to us. This would imply content limitations on what truths about 
reality we can represent. Alternatively, one might wish to put the point in terms of the 
corresponding concepts that could represent the relevant properties, relations or objects. There 
could be some concepts, which could be in principle inaccessible to us (Nagel 1986).  
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On the other hand, the form or structure of propositional thought and linguistic 
representation might be thought to constitute a distinctive source of inaccessible aspects of 
reality, namely those that can be represented only through structure that is in principle alien to 
creatures like us. One might think that there are facts or truths about reality that have structural 
features radically different from the familiar predicative and relational structures in our thought 
and language or any other kinds we can represent. We represent the world, paradigmatically, 
with representations in subject-predicate form. In other words, we represent objects having 
properties. We also represent things standing in different relations, e.g. p causes q or p stands 
in the causal relation to q. But there may well be truths with other propositional structures that 
are radically different from these ones. Such radically different structures could be in principle 
inaccessible to us. In this case, the source of the ineffability will be structural. 
So, we might say positions on the question of ineffable aspects of reality could be 
distinguished on the basis of what kinds of human representational limitations they either 
accept or reject – content limitations or structural limitations. In this paper, I will be solely 
concerned with the possibility of structural ineffabilities. Thus, the truths or facts that I will 
focus on are those truths or facts whose propositional structure is ineffable for us. I will call 
the thesis that there could be such truths or facts a weak structural ineffability thesis (weak SI 
thesis). The stronger thesis that there are or we have good reason to believe that there are such 
truths or facts I will call the strong SI thesis.3 
                                                          
3 I formulated the initial question both in terms of truths, i.e. true propositions, and facts. But there are obviously 
certain assumptions about the nature of facts and propositions that have to be in place in order for one to raise 
the question of the possibility of ineffable propositional forms in the first place. There are, for example, some 
accounts of the nature of propositions, according to which propositions are not complex or structured entities 
at all. These are the familiar accounts of propositions as sets of possible worlds or functions from possible worlds 
to truth values within the framework of possible worlds semantics. Some accounts of the nature of facts actually 
identify facts rather than propositions with sets of worlds (Restall 2004). Here too, facts will not be taken as 
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I argue below that the weak SI thesis has to be rejected. We cannot make sense of the 
idea that there could be truths or facts whose propositional structure is ineffable for us. But 
before I present my main argument for this thesis, I want to first further clarify the nature of 
the weak SI thesis and introduce some assumptions I will make for the purposes of this paper, 
and then I want to motivate the weak SI thesis.  
1.2. Some Clarifications 
The modality in question 
The modality in question here is that of conceptual possibility. The weak SI thesis 
amounts to the view that it is at least conceptually coherent or intelligible to suppose there are 
structural ineffabilities. “Conceptual possibility” will be used in a fairly broad sense where to 
consider ineffable facts to be conceptually possible is to find it conceivable on a priori 
reflection that there are such facts. The reader can also take the relevant modality to be that of 
                                                          
complex, structured entities in a way that is necessary for the question of ineffable structure to arise in the first 
place since facts are not the sort of things that have such propositional structure. The views on the nature of 
propositions and facts that will allow one to make sense of my target question, as initially formulated, are ones 
on which facts, for example, are complex entities that have as their constituents objects, properties, and 
relations bound in some particular structure. On some neo-Russellian views of propositions as structured 
entities, propositions too have objects, properties, and relations as constituents bound in some structure. On 
yet further views of facts as true propositions, the possibility of ineffable propositional structure will depend on 
the nature of propositions.  
Nonetheless, one need not rely any particular account of the propositions and facts as structured 
entities in order to consider my target question legitimate in the first place. If one’s views about propositions 
and facts do not allow for these to have any structure, the original question can still be entertained on the level 
of linguistic representation. One can take the reference to truths to be reference to true sentences of some 
possible natural language and sentences are clearly structured entities. In other words, proponents of the 
possible worlds analysis of facts and propositions, for example, can take truth and falsity to apply to sentences 
of some possible language and ask whether there could be any true sentences in that language essential parts 
of which we cannot understand, sentences that have ineffable for us sentential structure. The equivalent to the 
possibility of ineffable propositional structure we are considering will be the possibility of ineffable sentential 
structure in that alien language. Speakers of that alien language will then not be able to use such sentences to 
communicate with us. So when the proponent of the weak SI thesis asserts that there could be truths with 
ineffable for us structure, he or she can be taken to assert the possibility that there could be true sentences in 
a possible language with a sentential structure we are in principle incapable of expressing. 
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epistemic possibility, if he or she considers conceptual possibility to be problematic for some 
reason. In both cases, I take it that the idea of ineffable propositional structures will be 
intelligible and coherent if and only if it is possible that there be truths or facts that have 
ineffable propositional structures in the relevant sense of possibility. In effect then, my target 
is the weak SI thesis. 
Structure 
What is the relevant sense of structure in the target question? There are at least two 
different kinds of structure one might have in mind. There is Boolean structure and what we 
might call subsentential or non-Boolean structure. The first kind refers to the structure that 
sentences, propositions, and facts might have in virtue of containing the familiar class of 
logical constants, the sentential connectives like “and,” “or”, etc.4  
For the purposes of this paper, I will set aside this kind of propositional/sentential 
structure. What I want to consider is just the subsentential, non-Boolean structure such as 
subject-predicate structure that I referred to in the beginning of the paper.5 There is one 
additional kind of structure that is not, I am assuming, logical in nature in the strictest sense, 
but can be relevant to the problematic of the paper. There are, some philosophers argue or 
assume, irreducibly mathematical facts about physical reality, that is, facts that cannot be 
represented in any but mathematical language. Perhaps, on a largely Russelian view of facts, 
                                                          
 
5 The relationship between the structure of linguistic representations like sentences, on the one hand, and the 
structure of what a lot of philosophers take to be worldly things, such as propositions and facts, on the other 
hand, is not necessarily straightforward. Not all philosophers would assume that there is a clear mirroring 
relation between the structure of sentences, for example, and the structure of the corresponding facts that 
make them true. But I do not need to deal with these complicated issues here. If one takes it to be a category 
mistake to speak of subject-predicate structure in facts or propositions, for example, one can always transpose 
the discussion in terms of the structure of ineffable sentences in some alien language.  
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these would be facts that have the magnitudes of particular physical quantities/properties as 
constituents. Even if one does not take the relevant sense of reality in the target question to 
include various abstract objects and so facts about the nature, properties and relations of such 
abstract objects, like numbers, say, one might think that physical reality, especially certain 
relationships between the observable properties of objects, is characterized by irreducibly 
mathematical descriptions of the kind that high-level mathematical physics uses, i.e 
paradigmatically mathematical equations. There will, correspondingly, be facts about these 
parts of physical reality, which have an irreducibly mathematical character.  
Mathematical nominalists who are skeptical of the arguments for the reality of numbers 
relying on premises about the indispensability of mathematics to physics will deny such facts 
since they will imply the existence of numbers. Suppose that they are wrong, however. Then, 
if there are any irreducibly mathematical facts about physical reality, then one might have to 
consider an alternative source of structural ineffabilities. It could be that there are ineffable, 
distinctively mathematical structures, i.e. propositional structures of mathematical truths that 
we are not capable of representing, e.g. truths that will not have the form of equations. 
Arguably, entertaining such a possibility requires the truth of mathematical Platonism. But 
whether this possibility is intelligible or not is also not something I can consider here, even 
though the question is interesting in its own right. So, ineffable mathematical structure is also 
not the relevant kind of structure that I will be concerned with. Finally, if one considers the 
existential and universal quantifiers as sources of distinctive structure, then I will also be 
excluding quantificational structure from consideration.
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Reality 
What do I mean by “reality” when I ask whether there could be truths or facts about 
reality with a propositional structure in principle unrepresentable by us? It may be that issues 
one has to deal with will naturally depend on what one counts as reality. If, for example, one 
takes reality to include not just the physical world but also a world of abstract objects, then one 
would have to deal with the possibility of ineffable abstract objects, such as numbers, their 
relations and properties, and perhaps truths about these abstract objects with propositional 
structures that are ineffable for us. If one takes reality to include all the modal facts, in addition 
to facts about the actual world, then it could be that structural ineffabilities are possible in 
another sense. It might be that there are ways in which the actual world could have been which 
we could not in principle represent. It might be the case that there are possible worlds 
characterized by facts or true propositions whose structure is in principle unrepresentable by 
us, even though the actual world is not characterized by such facts or truths.  
In what follows, I will assume that reality consists only in the totality of facts that 
characterize the actual world and, as noted above, I will not deal with distinctively 
mathematical facts and the reality of numbers or modal facts. I do not think that any of the 
arguments I will offer will depend for their plausibility on the exclusion of modal and 
mathematical facts from the totality of facts that constitute reality. Even though I think that the 
arguments I will offer are completely general to apply to any kind of facts or truths, I want to 
set aside the mathematical case for now in case there are complications that are peculiar to this 
case. It could be, for example, that the form vs. content distinction in the case of mathematical 
propositions is not as straightforward as in the case of non-mathematical language. For this 
reason, I will set aside the mathematical case for now. 
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Finally, I will assume that our basic ontology consists of objects, properties, relations, 
events, among other categories of things. I will thus exclude ontological nihilism as a correct 
view about the nature of the world for the purposes of this talk. The question is whether there 
are other ineffable facts about the world in addition to ordinary facts about objects having 
properties or standing in relations or force-interactions and so on. 
1.3. Motivating the Weak SI Thesis 
There are two related lines of argument that could be extracted from the literature 
intended to support some version of the weak structural ineffability thesis.  
First, one might argue that it is actually philosophically suspect to deny that it is even 
possible for there to be truths with structure we cannot in principle represent. Why should we 
believe that all the truths and facts there are can be represented with structures that are 
accessible to us human beings? Even if as a matter of fact it turns out that all the truths can be 
represented in familiar to us propositional structures, this is surely not something we can know 
a priori, so to speak. There is nothing that seems to guarantee us that we have available all the 
propositional structures necessary to represent reality, barring any kind of objectionable 
idealism. Only if it is somehow an essential feature of facts and truths that they be in principle 
representable by minds like ours can it turn out that it is not even coherent to suppose there 
could be ineffable for us structures. But, most of us will certainly do not want to maintain a 
view of this kind. It would be incredible and certainly suspicious if we thought ourselves 
privileged in some way when it comes to our powers of representation. Denying the possibility 
that reality could outstrip our structures of representation would be tantamount to attributing 
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to ourselves angelic powers.6 If that is the case and we want to avoid such acommitment, then 
surely we can at least accept the coherence of the possibility of ineffable structures. In order to 
do that we just need it to be the case that nothing guarantees us a priori that the structure of all 
truths has to conform to the human mind and the structures in which it can represent the world. 
But this is just to say that there could be, for all we know, some ineffable propositional 
structures. A very similar line of argument is, for example, given in Nagel’s discussion on 
idealism and realism (ps. 90-99).7 
The second argument is an argument from analogy. There are creatures that cannot 
represent complex truths of the kind we can represent. Take the following due to Hofweber 
(11-2). A honeybee can presumably represent all kinds of facts about its environment, e.g. 
where there is nectar to be found and so on. But it cannot represent the fact that there is an 
economic crisis happening in Greece, for instance. So, the argument goes, it is plausible that 
just as there are some facts ineffable for these simpler organisms so there could be facts 
ineffable for us. From the perspective of a superior intelligence, we can be equally limited in 
                                                          
6 The argument that we attribute to ourselves angelic powers in the epistemic domain unless we recognize 
human cognitive closure occurs in Chomsky. For clear presentation and elaboration of that argument, see 
Collins, John. “On the Very Idea of a Science Forming Faculty.” Dialectica 56.2. I have adapted the argument to 
address more clearly the issue of representational as opposed to merely epistemic limitations since it seems to 
me that the very same considerations that would lead many philosophers to argue for epistemic closure transfer 
to the case of representational closure. See, for example, Kukla (ps. X).  
7 Hofweber motivates the position that there could be structural ineffabilities by a line of argument somewhat 
similar to the one given above. But he also centers his discussion on the observation that there are other 
propositional structures, e.g. p because q, which we use to represent facts about reality besides subject-
predicate structure, which naturally raises the question why we should believe that we can capture all the facts 
that there are within the subject-predicate forms of language and thought. We have good reason to believe 
there is more to reality than objects having properties and, at the same time, no immediate reason to believe 
that we have all the representational resources beyond subject-predicate structures, to represent all there is to 
represent about reality (Hofweber 19-20).  
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our representational abilities. We can be in the same position relative to some possible higher 
intelligence that these simpler organisms are relative to us human beings.8 
Nagel imagines a somewhat different case that features people with a permanent 
cognitive age of nine. They cannot represent some features of the world that we can represent, 
for example, Maxwell’s equations or Godel’s theorem. Alternatively, we can conceive of a 
different species of beings who have the same cognitive set-up as the nine-year-olds. Next, we 
can clearly conceive of alien intelligences that are superior in their representational abilities 
relative to us in just the same way that we are superior to the nine-year-olds (95-7).  
There is, however, a missing step in these arguments. It is not yet clear why we should 
interpret the cases in the arguments from analogy as cases of structural ineffabilities for these 
simpler creatures. It could be that all the limitations in question are limitations in the nature of 
the contents that simpler creatures can represent. But such a possibility is easily removed. We 
can just consider the case of the honeybee again. Surely, the proponent of the arguments of 
analogy can argue, the honeybee cannot represent truths with any explanatory form like p 
because q. Even if the honeybee can represent truths with subject-predicate structure, it surely 
cannot in principle represent explanatory structures given its cognitive set-up. Hence, for the 
honeybee, there are structural ineffabilities. But, now the argument from analogy can be 
reconstructed in this new form, it is surely plausible that there could be another differently 
organized intelligence that can recognize truths with structures that are in a similar way 
                                                          
8 This argument is mostly used for reaching a much stronger conclusion than the one I am targeting. Such an 
argument from analogy is used in favor of the much stronger thesis that we have good reason to believe there 
are in fact ineffable truths. But evidently such an argument, if successful, will also support the weaker thesis 
that ineffable facts are at least a coherent epistemic possibility. 
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ineffable for us. We can be in the same position with respect to these alien intelligences that 
the honeybees are with respect to us.  
One may object that the honeybees can represent even explanatory forms like p because 
q since they seem able to engage in causal reasoning of some kind. No clear example of 
structural ineffabilities for the honeybees has yet been given. Still, one may argue that even if 
we grant these simple organisms the ability to reason about causal relations between events 
this would not amount to granting them the ability to represent structures like p because q. The 
latter represent relations between propositions whereas the causal relation obtains between 
events.9 We can assume for current purposes that there is at least a case to be made for the 
claim that there are structural ineffabilities for these simpler organisms, and so the argument 
from analogy goes through. 
1.4. The Main Argument Against the Weak SI Thesis  
Overview and general argumentative strategy 
In this section, I argue that the weak ineffability thesis, however plausible it may appear 
in the light of the above presented arguments, is indefensible. I seek to show that in fact the 
claim that there could be some ineffable propositional structures is unintelligible or incoherent. 
I show this by exposing the self-stultifying or self-defeating character of the claim. I articulate 
the specific way in which the weak SI thesis can be shown to be self-defeating by introducing a key 
concept – the purely formal or logical concept of an object or thing (PFCO). Let me first introduce 
                                                          
9 This point is due to Hofweber (conversation). One might also try to change the example at this point by 
appealing to the cognitive capacities of even simpler organisms that could make the case of structural 
ineffabilities for these organisms appear more plausible. I suspect, however, that the simpler the type of 
organism one showcases, the less plausible the assumption that they are capable of propositional 
representation of their environment will appear to us.  
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the essential characteristics of this concept, which will be relevant for my subsequent 
discussion, especially the second characteristic. I can then formulate my main thesis before I 
give a sketch of the argument to follow.  
We often use a very general, some would say maximally general, concept to refer to 
and then talk about some subject matter in thought and language. It is the concept of a “thing” 
or, equivalently, what we might call the pure concept of an object. This is not the concept of 
an object as a persisting physical or mental substance or a thing as a spatiotemporal occupant. 
Rather, it is a fully general concept that seems to apply, universally, to anything that can be an 
object of thought or reference. So, we can and do call numbers, properties, model-theoretic 
interpretations, and events “things.” Insofar as they can be subjects of predication, things about 
which we can reason and talk about by characterizing them in a different way, all of these 
things can be what we might call “logical subjects.” To call these things logical subjects is just 
to say that they can be represented through the subject-concept of a statement in subject-
predicate form. There is thus an intimate relation between the fully general concept of a thing 
or a purely logical concept of an object and the subject-predicate form of judgment or thought. 
To be a thing or purely logical object of thought is to be a logical subject or, more accurately, 
to be represented through some concept that can figure in the subject place of a subject-
predicate form of judgment.  
Characteristics of PFCO: 
There are thus several characteristics of the pure, formal concept of an object or thing that can 
be isolated at this point, but only one of which will be important for my purposes. I will first 
assume that the essential characteristic of the purely formal concept of an object is simply its 
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absolute generality or universal applicability.10 The second assumption I will make, as 
mentioned above, is that this formal concept is connected to the use of subject-predicate 
statements. To be a thing or purely logical object of thought is to be a logical subject or, more 
accurately, to be represented through some concept that can figure in the subject place of a 
subject-predicate form of judgment. Correspondingly, if X is some thing about which one can 
make true or false claims in subject-predicate form, a thing that can be thought or talked about 
in that subject-predicate form, then X can be called an object in our sense. Alternatively, the 
logical concept of an object or thing can then be applied to X. In short, here is a way to capture 
the relationship between the pure concept of an object and judgments in subject-predicate form. 
For X to be an object in the relevant sense, then it must be possible to formulate thoughts or 
statements about X in subject-predicate form. In case one finds this formulation objectionable 
since it makes reference to speakers or thinkers, one can adopt an alternative formulation.11 
                                                          
10 This could be controversial, though. One might argue, for example, that to call any one thing an object in this 
sense is to assume it to be “one” or a “unit.” If that is the case, it might be that there are complications in the 
neighborhood here since it is not clear that anything we can refer to should be taken as a unit or “one” thing. 
Irreducibly plural quantification, for example, the kind that seems to characterize statements about stuffs like 
“All water is salty,” does not involve quantification over units or entities that could be counted in that way. So, 
if the purely formal concept of an object is to be characterized essentially in terms of the “oneness” of the things 
that it applies to, it might seem that this concept is not universally applicable to absolutely everything we can 
refer to. But, for my purposes, I will assume that the purely formal concept of an object is universally applicable 
to anything that can be an object of reference. It does not seem necessary to characterize it as applicable to 
“units” or “individuals” taken in the numerical sense in a way that would be problematic in light of the semantic 
investigations of non-count nouns and plural quantification, for example. I take the essential characteristic of 
the relevant concept to be its universal applicability. So, even stuffs like “water,” are logical subjects or purely 
formal objects in our sense, even though, all the water in the world cannot be reduced to reference to all units 
of body of water or anything along those lines. This latter observation does not seem relevant. Only if one ties 
the application of the purely formal concept of a thing or object to the workings of singular reference, so that 
to say X is an object or thing in the relevant sense is to denote it by means of a singularly referring expression, 
can it seem problematic to accept the absolute generality of that concept. But it is not at all plausible to tie the 
purely, formal concept of an object to the possibility of singular reference. Far from being essential to it, this 
feature seems like a theoretical addendum. Some of these issues are discussed in Laycock, Henry. Object. SEP 
entry (August 2010). < http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object/> 
11 One might argue, for example, that in case there are truths or facts that no thinkers or speakers of languages, 
whether human or not, can represent, it may still be the case that these truths or facts are in subject-predicate 
form and so are about some things to which the pure concept of an object can be applied. Even though I do not 
find this possibility intelligible, I will not prejudge the matter at this point.  
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For X to be a purely logical object, there must be some truths or facts about X in subject-
predicate form.12 
Philosophers have reserved special attention to this, seemingly universally applicable, 
concept. It seems to express the idea that whatever can be referred to and quantified over in 
language, whatever is a value of our variables in logical symbolism, can be referred to by 
means of this purely formal concept of an object or thing. This is what Timothy Williamson 
asserts in the context of his discussion of unrestricted quantification. The possibility of having 
a fully unrestricted domain of quantification seems to be just the possibility of having a domain 
of objects or things where “object” and “thing” are taken as purely formal concepts in that 
absolutely anything, e.g. fictional things, numbers, events, properties, etc., can be taken as such 
an object or thing and thus enter our unrestricted domain of quantification (Williamson 7-9). 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, too, seems to advance a similar claim: 
the variable name ‘x’ is the proper sign of the pseudo-concept object. Wherever the word 
‘object’ (‘thing’, ‘entity’, etc.) is rightly used, it is expressed in logical symbolism by the 
variable name. (1922: 4.1272) 
As noted above, the logical concept of an object seems to be intimately tied to the 
possibility of unrestricted quantification. Proponents of structural ineffability like Nagel, for 
example, appeal to the concept of “everything,” the concept of an absolutely unrestricted 
quantifier, to defend the intelligibility of ineffability theses. We can refer in thought and 
                                                          
12 One may object that the pure concept of an object is a concept that has no application to things in the case 
in which speakers or thinkers are entirely missing from the world. Our grip on the concept is just the grip we 
have on a possible object of linguistic or cognitive reference. But that cannot be right. Surely, even if we suppose 
that there were never any speakers or thinkers in the world, properties like “spin” would still be things or objects 
in the sense that one can truly say “X’s spin is ½” and so “spin” can be a logical subject. As long as there are 
truths in this propositional form independently of the existence of any thinkers or speakers, then the relevant 
formal concept is applicable to things in the world. In this way, the relevant concept is no different from other 
concepts that we insist must be applicable to things in reality independently of the existence of any thinkers or 
linguistic speakers.  
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language, according to Nagel, even to those aspects of reality that are not at all representable 
by any human concepts (Nagel 92).  
Now, if some hypothesis identifies a set of things and attributes some properties to 
them, whatever the ontological categories to which such things belong, whether familiar 
substantial things, numbers, events, properties, languages, possible worlds, and so on, these 
objects must at least be denoted by means of our most general, purely logical concept of an 
object. This is required for the intelligibility or coherence of the hypothesis. The requirement 
stems, in particular, from the feature of absolute generality that belongs to this concept. As 
Williamson puts it in clear terms: 
Whatever is abstract or concrete or neither is a thing. Whatever is basic or derived, simple or 
complex is a thing. Whatever can be named is a thing; so too is whatever cannot be named. 
Any value of a variable is a thing, and everything that is the value of a variable under at least 
one assignment (Williamson 9; emphasis added).  
In other words, whether or not we can represent some thing X through any other concepts of 
ours, i.e. whether it is otherwise ineffable or not, the X has to be at least a purely formal object, 
an entity in our unrestricted domain of quantification to which we can apply this absolutely 
general concept. So, if a thesis or hypothesis implies that whatever it claims to exist cannot be 
denoted by means of this fully general concept of an object or thing, then that theory or 
hypothesis is unintelligible. If the hypothesis has to be interpreted as claiming the existence of 
some X, construed at least as a purely formal object, but implies, at the same time, that the 
purely formal concept of an object cannot be applied to X, the thesis would be self-stultifying 
or self-defeating. This is the way in which it will be strongly unintelligible.  
In what follows, I want to argue that the weak SI thesis is precisely such a thesis.  
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Main thesis: I argue that the weak SI thesis is incoherent because it posits the existence of some 
ineffable things to which the PFCO must be applied and, at the same time, implies that the PFCO cannot 
be applied to these ineffable things. To establish my main claim I give an argument in two stages. 
Stage I: I seek to establish that the weak SI thesis can only be maintained on the assumption that 
the allegedly SI contents are contents about some ineffable X(s) which are unrepresentable by any 
of our familiar categories of things (objects, properties, relations, events, sentences, model-
theoretic interpretations, etc.).  
 Stage II: I show that, given the conditions needed to maintain the weak SI thesis I argue for in the 
first stage of the argument, one cannot legitimately apply the PFCO to the ineffable X(s). But, to 
be understood at all, the weak SI thesis must be seen as implying, at the same time, that the PFCO 
can be applied to these ineffable X(s).  
Conclusion: The weak SI thesis is, therefore, self-defeating.  
The Argument in Detail  
First Stage of Argument 
Recall that, according to the proponent of the weak SI thesis there could be some truths or facts 
(alternatively some sentences in ineffable for us languages) with a propositional structure we 
cannot in principle represent. Suppose that there are such facts or truths. I will, for the sake of 
simplicity, just talk about “contents” whether these are contents of truths, facts, or sentences. 
Suppose, also, that there is a class of humanly representable categories of things, where 
“categories” is broadly construed to include all kinds of things we would pre-theoretically 
judge to be distinct in type, e.g. properties, forces, events, spacetime points, languages, possible 
states of affairs, sentences, words, syntactic rules of transformation, etc. In short, “categories” 
is not a theoretically loaded term. It is meant to refer to the different kinds of things we are 
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prepared to recognize. Then, here are three possible views about what these SI truths are about or 
what the corresponding facts involve: 
(1) CE: The SI contents are about our familiar categories of things such as objects, properties, relations, 
events, languages, sentences and so on.13 
*SI sentences in an alien language must feature terms analogous to our terms representing these familiar 
categories of things, e.g. singular terms and general terms. So, SI sentences will be categorially effable 
on this view (CE). 
(2) CI: The SI contents are about something X, we know not what, which cannot be represented with 
any of our familiar categorial terms (neither object, property, relation, nor event, force, etc.) 
*SI sentences in alien language do not feature terms that are anything like our familiar singular or 
general terms. SI sentences will be categorially ineffable on this view (CI). 
(3) Mixed view: Some SI truths are about our familiar categories of things. Other SI truths are about 
something X completely unrepresentable with any of our categorial terms.  
I want to argue that adopting CE is unsustainable. This is the task of this first stage of 
the argument. In the second stage of the argument, I show that CI is unsustainable too. It will 
immediately follow from this result that the Mixed View is indefensible too. The argument 
against CE goes as follows.  
First, I will assume that there must be some inferential relations between SI ineffable 
contents and effable for us contents. This is most easily seen by resorting to the hypothesis of 
alien language users who can represent facts with structures we cannot in principle represent, 
                                                          
13 For now, I will assume that these things are nonetheless ineffable for us, even though they are the sorts of 
things that belong to familiar humanly representable categories. So, on this option, the propositional contents 
that are ineffable for us will have to feature analogous terms but ones that are structurally related in a way that 
is ineffable for us. 
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i.e. facts with structures that these language users cannot communicate to us. Surely, in the 
language that these language-users speak, there must be well-established inferential relations 
between sentences with familiar to us propositional structure and the alien, SI ineffable 
structure. For a language is, plausibly, just a set of sentences with well-defined inferential 
relations.14  
Alternatively, consider briefly, what exactly we are imagining when we imagine that 
there are some alien language-users who cannot communicate some propositional contents to 
us. They surely recognize, given the larger representational resources we are taking them to 
have, that there are some truths with structure we cannot get to by simple transformation of 
sentences with subject-predicate or explanatory structure, for example. There are no effable 
for us inferential relations and concepts that could allow us to grasp the alien propositional 
                                                          
14 I am assuming that these language-users can indeed represent facts with familiar to us propositional structure. 
To suppose otherwise is to suppose something incomprehensible. Assume that these language-users represent 
the world mostly accurately. Either they could be failing to represent any facts about reality through subject-
predicate forms because there are really no facts with such forms or they are in principle incapable of doing so. 
The first option is hardly intelligible. I am dismissing ontological nihilism as a correct view of reality at this point. 
This view is often thought to represent one kind of position on which we can coherently think of reality without 
at the same time representing it in terms of objects having properties. I do not find this view intelligible so I will 
just assume that there are facts or truths with subject-predicate structure that correctly represent reality. The 
second option is then hardly intelligible too. If we are supposing that the aliens represent the world mostly 
accurately, we are thereby also supposing that they can represent truths or facts with subject-predicate 
structure, given how many such truths and facts we assume there to be. It is not clear we can even understand 
the scenario in which some alien intelligent, language-users, state truths about the world without stating, at 
least some of the time, truths about the kinds of things we find there to be in the world – objects, stuffs, forces, 
particles, events, etc. But to state truths about such things is again to state truths in subject-predicate form (if 
the aliens could in principle represent contents with subject-predicate structure, and there are corresponding 
facts in reality, then there must be some intelligible transformation relations between contents with structure 
they represent and contents with our familiar subject-predicate structure to account for that possibility. This 
option clearly shows that there must be inferential relations between contents with our propositional structure 
and alien propositional structures the aliens actually use; it is just that these inferential relations may be evident 
in a more indirect way, i.e. first one has to suppose there are inferential relations between contents with 
structures the aliens actually use, call them A-structures, and which are related to contents with structures they 
could come to use, i.e. subject-predicate structures, and then one has to suppose that the aliens understand 
contents that are SI ineffable contents for us, by hypothesis, which will have to be inferentially related to the A-
structures they use. But even through such an indirect way, the aliens can be shown to employ contents with SI 
ineffable structures which are related to ones with familiar subject-predicate structure).  
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structures, i.e. get to them from our representational base. But in that recognition of our human 
limitations, these aliens at least understand that there is some definite thing, some set of 
inferential relations between SI contents and humanly effable contents that we are limited from 
grasping. So, first step is to acknowledge that there are some inferential relations between SI 
contents and, for example, contents with familiar to us subject-predicate structure.  
Second, I submit that these inferential relations must actually be expressible by us and 
that this follows from assuming CE, i.e. view that the allegedly SI contents are about the very 
same categories of things effable contents are about. Once we grant that the SI propositional 
contents are about the very same categories of things that we talk about, then these SI contents 
will have to sustain at least some intelligible for us inferential relations to effable propositional 
contents with familiar to us propositional structures. In effect, under CE, we have to accept 
that SI contents are inferentially related to effable for us contents in a way that we have to 
recognize. The inferential relations have to be effable for us.  
Notice first that we are assuming here that the SI contents feature familiar kinds of 
terms for the same categories of things we represent, e.g. singular terms for objects and events 
or general terms for properties. It is just that these terms are related or propositionally 
structured in a way we cannot represent. Next, suppose “e” is the name of some ineffable 
physical object, and there is some fact about the object “e” whose structure we cannot 
represent. We can imagine that the aliens give us their way of symbolizing the corresponding, 
true SI proposition which includes the name for the event E. Their way of symbolizing the 
proposition is, for example, E****B, where E is the singular term for the given event, the 
“***” stands for some structure we cannot represent, and “b” is some unspecified term. But 
this suffices for us to claim that it is possible for one to infer the existentially quantified 
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statement that there is some thing X such that X is an object and X is physical. Moreover, we 
can existentially generalize directly since we are assuming that there is no Boolean or 
quantificational structure in the alien sentence. We can existentially generalize for to recognize 
“E” as a name for an object in the alien proposition E****B is to recognize that E is the sort 
of thing that can be replaced by a variable in an existentially quantified statement and the sort 
of thing that denotes an object in a domain of existential quantification. 
So, there is some content about the ineffable physical object E that we can represent, 
namely an existentially quantified one of the form “there is some X, X is an object and X is 
physical.” But once this is granted, we see that, in effect, we have to allow an effable inferential 
relation between the allegedly SI content that represents the object E and humanly effable 
contents, namely, the relation of existential generalization. At this point, the assumption that 
we are dealing with SI contents collapses. We can make sense of effable inferential relations 
obtaining between given propositional contents only to the extent that we can take the given 
contents bearing the relation to have structures that are intelligibly related, i.e. structures that 
are both effable by us. These structures will be, in this case, either subject-predicate or 
relational structures. Thus, option CE does not work. The proponent of the SI thesis must 
accept that the SI contents are not about any of the familiar, humanly representable categories 
of things. They are about neither properties, objects (whether physical or mental), nor events, 
languages, model-theoretic interpretations, sentences, etc. Correspondingly, the relevant 
linguistic devices in an alien language cannot correspond to our names, general terms, etc.  
This result is fully general. If we are supposing that the SI contents are about our 
familiar categories of things, then we are also supposing that whatever these contents are, they 
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will always feature singular terms which represent these categories of things. This will in turn 
guarantee the availability of existential generalization.  
Notice that the foregoing line of reasoning also helps answer a related question. It 
allows us to understand whether it makes sense to suppose that effable contents can figure 
within ineffable structures, where by effable contents I mean effable concepts for things in 
reality that we can represent. For example, one may initially wonder whether it is possible for 
there to be a fact about the table in the corner and any of its effable properties, which is neither 
in subject-predicate form nor in any other effable propositional form. But the very same line 
of reasoning that led us to deny that ineffable propositional structures could be structuring 
ineffable for us content which is, nonetheless, characterizable in our familiar categories, can 
also show that ineffable propositional structures cannot structure effable contents, e.g. SI truths 
involving the table here and the relations in which it stands to surrounding objects. 
Result: One cannot maintain CE. SI contents cannot be about the humanly representable categories of 
things.  
Second Stage of Argument 
Assume CI. 
So, let us take option (2). The SI truths or facts will then not be about any of the familiar 
constituents of reality. They will have to involve some other constituents, some ineffable X(s), 
which we cannot even in principle represent with any of our categories, i.e. they are represented 
in some possible language by terms that are not at all analogous to our singular or general 
terms, for example.  
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At this point, the following question can arise. Can there be, in addition to the SI truths 
about the ineffable X, any truths which have effable propositional structure, in particular, truths 
with subject-predicate structure? In other words, will there be contents with subject-predicate 
structure in the aliens’ language that represent facts about the ineffable X? This question allows 
us to formulate a dilemma, one that will help us to uncover the incoherence hidden in the weak 
SI thesis.  
Either there can be propositional contents about the ineffable X that are in subject-
predicate form or there cannot be. Suppose that there are such contents. Then, it follows that 
the ineffable X must be, after all, representable in human categories such as “object,” and 
“property.” To say that there is some proposition about the ineffable X that is in subject-
predicate form is thereby to presuppose that the X must be either an object or a property. But, 
as we saw above in in the first stage of the argument, one cannot coherently maintain that the 
SI truths or facts are about the familiar constituents of reality we capture in our human 
categories. To suppose that the ineffable X is either an object or a property is to suppose that 
there can be no SI propositional contents about it for the above articulated reasons. So, this 
option cannot work.  
Consider the other possibility, then. There can be no propositional contents about the 
ineffable X that are in subject-predicate form. If there are to be any SI contents about the 
ineffable X, then there cannot be, at the same time, any contents with subject-predicate 
structure. But what does that denial amount to? Recall the relationship between judgments or 
propositions in subject-predicate form and the purely formal concept of an object, i.e. the 
concept of a logical subject. To be a thing or purely logical object of thought is to be a logical 
subject or, more accurately, to be represented through some concept that can figure in the 
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subject place of a subject-predicate form of judgment. So, if X is a thing about which one can 
make true or false claims in subject-predicate form, then X can be called an object in this 
logical, formal sense of object. In other words, the logical concept of an object or thing can be 
applied to X. To deny that there can be any propositional contents in subject-predicate form 
about the ineffable X is thus to deny that the purely formal concept of an object can be applied 
to X. But that is incoherent.  
If a given hypothesis implies that whatever it claims to exist cannot be denoted by 
means of the fully general concept of an object, then that theory or hypothesis is unintelligible. 
Since the hypothesis has to be interpreted as claiming the existence of some X, construed at 
least as a purely formal object, but implies, at the same time, that the purely formal concept of 
an object cannot be applied to X, the thesis is self-stultifying or self-defeating. This is precisely 
the character of the weak SI thesis. We saw that in order to maintain the possibility of structural 
ineffabilities, one has to admit the possibility of some ineffable X that is representable in no 
human conceptual categories. So the weak SI thesis in a way asserts that it is possible for there 
to be some ineffable stuff X about which there are structurally ineffable propositions and, yet, 
implies, that the purely formal concept of an object cannot be applied to X. It attributes 
properties to the ineffable X by identifying it as something about which there can be ineffable 
propositional contents and at the same time, denies that it can be so identified. This makes the 
thesis unintelligible because self-stultifying.  
We can now see that The Mixed View cannot work since neither (CI) nor (CE) can 
individually work. 
I conclude that the weak SI thesis is indefensible. 
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1.5. Objections: 
Before I consider some key objections to the main argument, I want to make clear why 
a very natural move one might try to make to block the entire reasoning of the last section will 
prove unsuccessful.15 It could be that the weak SI thesis seems indefensible only when its 
proponent is forced to articulate what the structurally ineffable truths are about. We have seen 
that on any possible position on this question, the weak SI thesis is indefensible. One cannot 
articulate coherently, under the assumption of CI, for example, what the SI contents are about. 
But this may just show that the proponent of the weak SI thesis should not seek to formulate 
the thesis in a way that appeals to some possible existents X, represented in the SI contents. 
Rather, he or she must only refer to facts, truths, or propositions, without any further mention 
of what these are about. The weak SI thesis is then exhausted by the claim that there could be, 
for all we know, some structurally ineffable truths or contents.  
But this kind of response is implausible. The proponent of the weak SI thesis is 
legitimately forced to further articulate the thesis by choosing among the alternative positions 
CE or CI. The main argument is based on a fairly minimal assumption that should be accepted 
by everyone. If X is some truth, then there must be something that X is about. This immediately 
raises the question of what kinds of things X could be about and sets the stage for the foregoing 
argument by elimination. One may even argue for the stronger claim that this sort of point is a 
good candidate for a conceptual truth about “truth.” Truths are about something. Now, one 
may resist this kind of claim by appeal to, for example, logical truths, which do not necessarily 
seem to be about anything. At least, they render the above argument suspicious.16 
                                                          
15 I thank Rob Smithson and Alan Nelson for very helpful criticism of the main argument of the paper. I address 
some of their objections below.  
16 Thanks to Ram Neta and Thomas Hofweber for raising the issue of logical truths.  
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One may well grant the point that logical truths need not be about anything. I cannot 
here enter into the debate over the nature of logical truths. Even if logical truths cast doubt on 
the foregoing claim that there is a conceptual truth about “truth” that sustains the set-up of the 
main argument, this kind of observation does not help the proponent of the weak SI thesis 
much. 17After all, he or she likely wants the alleged SI truths to be about real aspects of reality, 
where “reality” is robustly understood so as not to deal solely with the formal characteristics 
of thought and language, which are the province of logic. Moreover, if we assume that there 
can be a lot of these SI truths, it will be bizarre to suppose that so many of the truths that there 
are happen to be about nothing.18 This should be sufficient to consider the demand to articulate 
what the SI truths are about legitimate. 
Next, I want to consider objections to key claims in the first stage of the argument. It 
may not be obvious that by granting the availability of effable inferential relations between 
allegedly SI contents and humanly effable contents, the proponent of the weak SI thesis must 
also admit that this undermines the assumption that we are dealing with SI contents in the first 
place. There are three distinct objections here. To show how these objections arise, I need to 
further emphasize what I was presupposing in the above argument. Once we grant that we can 
make an inference of existential generalization either directly or indirectly from a given 
symbolic formula, I was suggesting, we are also granting that the formula in question must 
have subject-predicate or relational structure, rather than some ineffable for us propositional 
                                                          
17 I suspect that to the extent one is inclined to say that logical “truths” are about nothing, there will be good 
grounds for suspicion that the concept of “truth” is used rather differently in the case of logic and there is no 
univocal sense of “truth” being used to talk about both empirical propositions and logical ones. Keeping one 
sense of “truth” fixed, it should not be that controversial to think that it is a conceptual truth that “truths” are 
about something. But I cannot defend these points here.  
18 Thanks to Thomas Hofweber for suggesting this interesting way for blocking the foregoing objection.  
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structure.19 This is because our only grip on what the rule of existential generalization amounts 
to is just our grip on the kinds of logical forms from which one can existentially generalize and 
in this case, these forms are subject-predicate forms or relational forms.  
There are three ways in which one could resist this assumption, however, and argue 
against the view that it is unintelligible to suppose there could SI contents and effable contents 
that are effably related. First, one might say that I just gave an example of a case in which it is 
possible for us to make a legitimate inference of existential generalization from the SI content 
the aliens gave us, even though the SI content does not have a subject-predicate structure or 
relational structure. Why should we accept that the original content E***B must, after all, have 
subject-predicate or relational structure? This is not at all clear. Why not suppose that 
existential generalization is available, even though the alien formula has some structure we 
cannot represent? 
The second objection one could raise against my argument goes as follows. Suppose 
the proponent of the SI thesis grants that the original alien formula E***B has subject-predicate 
structure or relational structure, needed to sustain the inference of existential generalization. 
Why can’t it be the case that the formula has, at the same time, some additional structure, which 
is, however, ineffable for us? For all that I have said, we can both grant an effable inferential 
relation between the SI formula the aliens gave us, namely existential generalization, and still 
insist that the additional structure that this formula has is relevant to the ineffable inferential 
relations that this formula has to other SI contents, relations which only the aliens can grasp. 
Thus, we might have some minimal inferential grip on this alien formula insofar as we can 
                                                          
19 If the inference is indirect, then the formula must have subject-predicate or relational structure in addition to 
some other structure that makes it necessary to add premises to make the existential generalization 
subsequently (for example, conditional structure).  
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make at least one inference from it, but that exhausts our understanding since its other ineffable 
structure is entirely inaccessible to us. 
Finally, one might just deny that the inference of existential generalization can indeed 
be made. One can accept what I take to be a conceptual truth about existential generalization, 
i.e. that such an inference can only be made from contents with subject-predicate or relational 
structures. So it does not make sense to suppose that one can existentially generalize from the 
alien formula and still maintain it is structurally ineffable. But then one can just deny that it is 
legitimate to existentially generalize from it. We are supposing that the alien content is, after 
all, structurally ineffable for us. So, it is to be expected that one cannot existentially generalize 
from it. 
1.5.1 Response to Objection 1:  
Notice first that the objector does not dispute the legitimacy and availability of the 
inference of existential generalization in our case. The objector just assumes that the only 
ground we need to sustain the legitimacy of an inference of existential generalization from the 
alien formula is the assumption that the formula features a singular term, i.e. the sort of thing 
that can be replaced by a variable in an existentially quantified formula. But it is quite 
implausible to suppose that this assumption suffices to sustain the inference. It is implausible 
to suppose that we understand what it is for a rule of inference to be legitimately applied to a 
given formula without presupposing that the formula has a particular propositional form. Our 
understanding of a rule of inference, what it is and how it is to be applied, consists in our 
understanding of the kinds of propositional forms from which one can make the relevant 
inference.  
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In order to see more clearly the implausibility of this objection, take the case of another 
rule of inference – modus ponens. Can we coherently suppose that we can legitimately apply 
the rule of modus ponens to two formulas, for example, which the aliens give us, without 
thereby presupposing that at least one of these formulas is in conditional form? We do not 
understand modus ponens and when it can be legitimately applied unless we know what kinds 
of propositional forms it can be applied to. Similarly, unless we presuppose that a given 
formula has some arbitrary name or variable and a certain property of that name or variable, 
we cannot understand how an inference of universal generalization can be made here. Why 
should we think that the rule of existential generalization is any different here? If part of our 
grip on the other rules of inference is constituted by an understanding of the propositional 
forms to which they can be applied, then what would justify us in claiming that the matter is 
different in the case of existential generalization? It seems to me that the conditions for 
understanding when rules of inference are legitimately applied make it necessary to admit that 
once the allegedly SI formula of the aliens can be effably related to existentially quantified 
contents, we have to give up the assumption that the formula was structurally ineffable after 
all. It must have subject-predicate or relational structure. Moreover, there is good reason to put 
the claim in stronger terms. The meaning of an inferential rule is given by the propositional 
forms which serve as its application base. So, this is a conceptual truth about existential 
generalization, namely that it applies to subject-predicate and relational forms directly, which 
the objector must deny. This discredits the objection.  
1.5.2 Response to Objection 2: 
The second objection may be somewhat harder to defuse. The objector could just grant 
that the alien formula has subject-predicate structure or relational structure, but insist that there 
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is additional structure, which is ineffable for us. Let us then work on the assumption that there 
is additional structure. I think we will eventually see that this objection is unsustainable too. 
What is the relationship between the effable for us subject-predicate or relational structure and 
the additional ineffable structure? There are three options here.  
i. They can be conjoined, disjoined, etc. 
ii. The effable structure can embed the ineffable structure 
a. The subject-predicate structure can embed the ineffable structure 
b. The relational structure can embed the ineffable structure 
iii. The effable subject-predicate or relational structure can be embedded within a larger 
ineffable structure 
Recall that we are here excluding Boolean structure. So the two structures cannot just 
be conjoined or disjoined, etc. So, we can dismiss (i) above. Notice also that the effable 
structure cannot be embedded within universally generalized structure since this would be 
effable for us, and I am excluding ineffable quantificational structure from consideration in the 
paper. It also does not make sense to suppose that the subject-predicate structure of the alien 
formula embeds further structure. At least, if we are to maintain our understanding of what 
subject-predicate is, we cannot coherently maintain that they can embed further structure. So, 
if the alien formula has a subject-predicate structure, it must be embedded in further 
propositional structure. So, we can also dismiss (ii.a) above. So, we have two possibilities left, 
(iii) and (ii.b). Showing that adopting (iii) cannot allow us to sustain the assumption that there 
is additional ineffable structure will also show that (ii.b) cannot work. So, I will deal with the 
case of (iii), which will suffice to cover both cases. 
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Now, the effable structure in the alien formula is presumably standing in some kind of 
non-Boolean relation either to some other contents with different structures or to some familiar 
kind of term, singular or general term. Consider the first possibility, namely that the effable 
structure stands in some relation to a propositionally complex thing, i.e. another propositional 
content. So, we know one of the relata within the overall propositional structure, namely 
something of the form Fx or aRb. But now the other relatum in this additional propositional 
structure must presumably still feature or bind together, so to speak, the same kinds of terms 
that our familiar structures bind since we are working under that hypothesis. The SI contents 
are contents about the familiar humanly representable categories of things. So the other relatum 
in this ineffable propositional structure must also be subject to existential generalization (direct 
or indirect) for the same kinds of reasons that we initially gave for the claim that the original 
alien formula must be subject to that effable inference. Hence, again for the same reasons 
articulated above, the other relatum must also be in either Fx or xRy form. 
So, what we have here is a propositional structure that binds together two or more 
contents in either subject-predicate or relational form (we are excluding other effable forms 
like universally generalized ones since these are not strictly speaking, subsentential, and we 
are not concerned with such propositional structures in the paper). In effect, the allegedly SI 
formula represents some relation between states of affairs or propositions, which are in turn in 
familiar to us propositional structure. And propositional contents are just the sorts of things of 
which one can also predicate properties and judge them to stand in relations. Now, at this point 
we can see that the formula must, contrary to initial assumptions, just represent a basic 
relational form that takes as relata propositional contents or sentences representing states of 
affairs. This is an effable for us form. It may well be the case that the particular relation in 
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which the represented states of affairs in familiar propositional structures stand is an ineffable 
for us relation but that kind of ineffability is content ineffability, i.e. it does not represent a 
structural source of ineffability in our sense. 
One may object that representing the alien formula as a basic relational one that takes 
as arguments propositional contents conflates propositional with non-propositional relations. 
The relation between the two or more propositional contents in the alien formula is not just 
another relation like the spatial relation between objects. It is an irreducible propositional 
relation, which is different in kind. Consider, for instance, an example of a propositional 
structure in English which does not seem to be reducible to aRb, the basic relational form, 
namely a structure like p because q. Just as we do not seem able to capture sentences of this 
form in English in the basic aRb form, we cannot capture the alien formula with that form and 
so show, contrary to initial assumptions, that it does, after all, have an effable for us structure.  
But this line of argument is unconvincing. It might well be true that we cannot represent 
a sentence like p because q in the familiar relational form xRy construed in the usual way. But 
that will be because the variables here range over objects in the domain rather than states of 
affairs or propositions. So, one might accept that we cannot represent such sentences in our 
best formal system for English, i.e. first-order logic. But that is not to say that such sentences 
do not have a basic relational form. It is just a relational form different from the familiar one 
that binds together variables ranging over and singular terms standing for individuals. In some 
formal system yet to be developed, such sentences will after all be represented in terms of a 
relational propositional structure. It is just that such a structure may bind variables ranging 
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over and names standing for, say, states of affairs or propositional contents.20 Most 
importantly, such a conceivable formal system will display fully effable forms. It may well be 
the case that the alien formulas embedding subject-predicate and relational structures within 
larger ones represent some ineffable for us relation between states of affairs or propositions. 
But that is not to say that these formulas are therefore structurally ineffable. They are just in 
some basic relational form which we certainly can grasp. Accordingly, we can also make 
effable for us inferences from such a formula, i.e. existentially generalize and this is to be 
expected since states of affairs and propositions can, of course, be logical subjects. 21 
If, on the other hand, we suppose that the larger structure of the alien formula involves 
something not propositionally complex, then it must the same sort of thing as our singular and 
general terms, by hypothesis. So, we will have, on the one hand, something like Fe***a, where 
“a” is a name for some object, say. But that just represents another relation between an 
individual and a content in subject-predicate form. This kind of structure is certainly effable 
for us. It is also in relational form. It is just that one of the relata is a propositionally complex 
thing and the other one is an individual.  
                                                          
20 One may argue that on the best analysis of our quantification over propositions, propositions must also be 
taken as objects in our domain of quantification along with other objects. But I take this to be controversial and, 
in any case, the sentences with a form like p because q can be seen as representing some relation between 
states of affairs rather than propositions, and states of affairs can hardly be understood as individuals in our 
domain of quantification.  
21 A complex issues that arises on the basis of the foregoing discussion is to what extent the argument of this 
section might be proving too much. After all, the very same grounds on which I try to argue that the new alien 
formula must be in an effable for us form also seem to show that “because” does not represent any irreducible 
propositional structure in a proposition like “p because q.” If the latter is also in a basic relational form, even 
though it relates propositions (or states of affairs), then the explanatory relation here belongs to content. But 
some would want to dispute this result. This could be a fair critique. To complete the argument of the section, 
I will have to give principled grounds for excluding such candidates for additional, irreducible propositional 
structures like p because q. In a forthcoming work, I deal with the more general issue of how to provide criteria 
for distinguishing between form vs. content in controversial cases. The results in that work will clearly bear on 
the discussion in this section.  
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Finally, we can see why it cannot help the opponent to adopt (ii.b) above. Suppose that 
the allegedly ineffable structure in the alien formula is embedded within a relational form. We 
are dealing with a case in which one of the relata is just the individual e. So we have eR******. 
The other relatum is supposed to be some propositional content. But, by hypothesis, whatever 
structure that content has will have to involve the same kinds of terms our sentences involve, 
e.g. names for individuals. But the same argument we gave for the claim that the original alien 
formula must be in subject-predicate or relational form, can be given now. The other relatum 
in eR**** must also be in an effable for us form. One could of course make the same move 
here and grant some effable structure within that relatum while insisting at the same time that 
there is additional ineffable structure. But this just sets a vicious regress since we can rehearse 
the same arguments given above and show that none of the options about how that additional 
structure can be related to the effable one can help sustain the assumption that we have a SI 
content here.  
1.5.3 Response to Objection 3: 
Finally, as noted above, one may choose to deny that the inference of existential 
generalization from the alien formula E****B can be legitimately made. But this move is even 
more implausible than the former ones. Since the opponent is granting that the alien formula 
features a singular term designating an event or, alternatively, some object, he or she must deny 
another conceptual truth. What it is for some “a” or “b” to be a singular term is just for it to 
be the sort of thing that can be replaced by a variable in an existentially quantified formula or, 
equivalently, to represent some thing in the domain over which one can existentially quantify. 
So either one must deny a conceptual truth about how the inferential rule of existential 
generalization is legitimately applied or one must deny a conceptual truth about singular terms 
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in order to block the argument in this first horn of the dilemma. But both of these moves are 
implausible.   
1.5.4 Final Objection 
Finally, one might try to resist the main argument of the paper in a somewhat different 
way than the above objections suggest. One might resist it by blocking the very first 
assumption of the argument that there have to be some inferential relations between the 
ineffable and effable for us contents. There could be some parts of the alien language that bear 
no inferential relations to other parts of the language. After all, one might argue, we do seem 
to have an example of this in our language. It is often thought that there can be no inferential 
relations between the descriptive and evaluative, for example. No inference can be made from 
the descriptive to the evaluative. So perhaps the SI contents could be like the descriptive and 
the effable contents in the alien language could be like the evaluative.22 
If the plausibility of the foregoing argument rests entirely on the analogy with the 
evaluative and descriptive in our language, then, I want to argue, the argument is not 
convincing. Notice that what explains the fact that there are no inferential relations between 
the evaluative and descriptive, at least when one moves from the descriptive to the evaluative, 
is content rather than structure. It is in virtue of the particular content of descriptive and 
evaluative statements in the language that one cannot make the relevant inferences. So in order 
for this analogy to support the case for the weak SI thesis, it must be the case that the allegedly 
SI contents cannot bear inferential relations to effable for us contents because of their content 
rather than structure. But then the very coherence of the idea of structurally ineffable contents 
                                                          
22 Thanks to Thomas Hofweber for suggesting this kind of response.  
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would depend on the assumption that the contents of the relevant distinctive parts of the alien 
language somehow make it impossible in principle for there to be any inferential relations 
between them. This would be a strange result, if what is at issue is the proper way of blocking 
the argument for the incoherence of SI contents. So the very coherence of the idea of SI 
contents would depend on a seemingly contingent factor, namely what the aliens happen to be 
talking about or what facts obtain in the actual world. This should raise suspicion. In order for 
one to undermine the first assumption of the argument, what would be needed is an actual 
example of parts of language that do not bear inferential relations to other parts of language 
but where the source of the inferential isolation of the relevant parts of language, so to speak, 
is structural. But we do not seem to have such an example. The analogy seems unsuccessful. I 
conclude that there are no good grounds on which to object to the main argument of the paper. 
The weak SI thesis is indefensible.
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2. Logical Form and Feature-placing Languages 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In his Individuals (1959), P.F. Strawson explores the idea of a feature-placing language, 
a language comprised of sentences that lack the traditional subject-predicate structure exhibited 
by a large class of sentences familiar to us from actually spoken natural languages. These 
feature-placing sentences are modelled on existing sentences of natural languages such as those 
that speakers use to report current weather-conditions, for example, “It is raining” and “It is 
snowing.” Such sentences do not seem to be asserting that there is some thing that is raining 
or snowing, i.e. they do not seem to be predicating any properties of any thing or things.23 
Rather, they seem to be reporting features of the environment without implying any 
commitment to actually existing things exemplifying particular properties. As such, they seem 
                                                          
23 This is not uncontroversial. It could be that expressions like “is raining” require a semantics which makes them 
predicates of places. Even though the “it” in constructions like “It is raining” may be semantically empty as far 
as syntax is concerned (see Seppanen 2002: 445-453), the semantics could assign a location slot to such 
constructions filled in by context yielding the kind of predication we get in explicit representation such as “It is 
raining in Johannesburg,” i.e. the logical form of such sentences could include a location variable whose value 
is given by the context (see discussion in Stanley 2000:  416-18; cf. Turner 2009: 30, fn 27).  This issue is 
implicated in a more general controversy surrounding alleged examples of “non-sentential assertion,” i.e. 
seemingly subjectless utterances exhibiting no clausal structure (i.e. containing at least a noun phrase and a 
verb phrase). Such subjectless sentences, nonetheless, seem to count as genuine assertions. Examples might 
include “water” in English when uttered alone or unembedded in a sentence or “corre” in Spanish, which can 
be used to assert that some man runs, as specified by the context of utterance. It is not clear there are genuine 
examples of non-sentential assertion, however, or, at least, the matter is controversial (see discussion in Stanley 
2000; Stainton 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998). I will set aside such worries about the availability of genuine examples 
of subjectless utterances and the proper analysis of feature-placing sentences in the following discussion. I want 
to grant the possibility that there are a few genuine examples of feature-placing “sentences” in natural language 
and consider whether it is conceivable that an entire language could be comprised entirely of such sentences. 
My contention is, in effect, that even if we grant that some sentences of a natural language are indeed genuine 
examples of feature-placing sentences that does not guarantee us the conceptual possibility of a feature-placing 
language. The goal of this paper is to argue for this conclusion.  
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to be ideally suited for representing an intriguing possibility, namely, a language that lacks the 
subject-predicate logical structure that seems to be deeply embedded both in our thought and 
our language. This possibility is in effect the possibility of a language that is conceptually or 
logically prior to the languages we actually speak in that it allows for no resources to represent 
a world of objects having properties, if, that is, we can make sense of the idea of such a 
language. 
Analytic philosophers have elaborated and extended the basic idea of a feature-placing 
language to various ends. In a seminal paper from 1971, Quine introduces his predicate-functor 
logic or a formal language meant to dispense with the quantifier and variable apparatus of first-
order logic. The language comprises only a universe of predicate letters, predicate-forming and 
sentence-forming functors or operators and retains the expressive power of first-order logic. 
Quine’s goal in that paper, however, is not to demonstrate the conceptual possibility of a 
feature-placing language but to investigate the nature and role of bound-variables in first-order 
languages by way of investigating the consequences of eliminating them from these languages.  
In contrast, more recent philosophical work on this topic has taken up Strawson’s 
original idea for markedly metaphysical purposes. Ontological nihilism, the view according to 
which reality as it is in itself cannot be perspicuously represented as consisting of objects 
having properties, has intrigued a number of philosophers. Their principal way of defending 
the coherence of the view is to deploy the resources of a feature-placing language with the 
Quinean predicate-functorese language as the feature-placing language of choice (Hawthorne 
& Cortens, 1995; Turner 2009). Such a language is supposed to be free of existential 
commitment to any objects and properties and yet retain the expressive power of at least a large 
part of our actual language. This is especially true for that part of language which seems to 
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have the best claim of representing the reality behind appearances, namely the language of 
well-established scientific theories (Turner 2009). Feature-placing languages have thus been 
deployed in the service of a distinctively metaphysical position such as ontological nihilism.  
My goal in this paper is to determine whether the idea of a feature-placing language is 
coherent. Here, by a “language” I will mean, minimally, a system of symbols that can be used 
by speakers to represent the world, where this could be the world of ordinary objects we 
experience, which is Strawson’s concern, or the world understood as the fundamental reality 
behind the appearances, which is the concern of more recent metaphysicians. The basic 
coherence of the idea and, correspondingly, the coherence of ontological nihilism, buttressed 
by the conceptual possibility of a feature-placing language, are usually taken for granted in the 
literature on this topic. However, I want to argue that we can make no sense of feature-placing 
languages and, hence, of the idea of a language that does not share the basic subject-predicate 
structure that is present in actually existing natural languages. If I am right and one grants that 
the subject-predicate logical form or structure is at least one of the most basic forms or 
structures of sentences in our language, then the outcome of this inquiry is to show that this 
structure does not admit of alternatives.  
One important caveat is in order, however. Discussions of emotivist or broadly 
expressivist positions on the nature of moral language in the metaethical literature might seem 
to suggest a clear example at least of a substantial fragment of a language that does not exhibit 
the subject-predicate structure. If we can meaningfully speak of an emotivist language, for 
example, a moral language comprised solely of emotive utterances such as “Hurrah for A!” or 
“Boo, A!,” utterances expressive of emotional attitudes to their respective objects, then we 
seem to have an immediate counter-example to the claim that anything we can admit as a 
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natural language must conform to the basic predicative model. In a purely emotivist language, 
for instance, no moral properties will be predicated of objects, actions, characters and so on. 
Certainly, contemporary expressivists are concerned to show how moral utterances can 
function as genuinely assertoric and assume the full trappings of genuinely representational 
and predicative language we have in other regions of discourse despite the deeper non-
cognitivist analysis of moral language. It remains the case, nonetheless, that a purely emotive 
language is a genuine possibility. After all, the underlying logical, semantic structure of moral 
sentences which, on the surface, express predications of moral properties to various objects is 
given precisely in terms of such a language.24 
 For the purposes of the following discussion, however, I want to restrict attention to 
genuinely assertoric languages. So the claim that we cannot make any sense of the idea of a 
language which does not share the basic subject-predicate structure of our natural languages 
should come with the qualification that the languages in question are assertoric. I take it that 
this qualification will not diminish the intrinsic interest of the claim. Moreover, it will certainly 
not affect the force of my conclusion in the context of the underlying argument against 
ontological nihilism on offer in the present work. After all, what the ontological nihilists need 
in order to buttress the conceptual possibility of their position is an example of a fully 
descriptive, assertoric language which does not exhibit subject-predicate structure, a language 
useful for the purposes of representing objective reality as it is in itself. The possibility of a 
non-descriptive language with the relevant features will not help their case.  
                                                          
24 Citations to Gibbard and Blackburn needed and perhaps a few other ones. Thanks to Geoff Sayre-McCord 
for bringing to my attention the relevance of the expressivist analysis of moral language to this topic.  
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Before I develop my argument in detail, however, it may be useful to present it in brief 
outline so as to highlight some of the key assumptions I will make in the body of the text.  
2.2. Basic Assumptions and Outline of Main Argument  
The argument I advance relies on some very general features of our concept of a natural 
language and our corresponding concept of linguistic meaning. Relatedly, it also relies on a 
certain very broad notion of logical form that is, I think, implicit in standard philosophical 
thinking about linguistic meaning.  
A language capable of representing parts of reality should be first and foremost a 
logically articulated system. By a “logically articulated system” I mean a set of sentences that 
are systematically related through inferential patterns or entailment relations. The focus on 
sentences instead of subsentential units of meaning should be uncontroversial here since 
whether one finds sentences or subsentential expressions to be the primary units of meaning, 
it is sentences that represent reality in the sense of “representing reality” that we are concerned 
with here, namely representing the facts or truths about reality or perhaps, instead, its 
constituent states of affairs.  
The claim that a language has to be first and foremost an inferential system should be 
seen as an expression of a conceptual point about what we mean by “language.” This claim 
explains why we cannot make sense of the idea of a single sentence atomistically representing 
any fact about reality. It is only in relation to other sentences of a language which stand in the 
appropriate inferential relations to it that any given sentence can be taken as a meaning-bearer 
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and thus as representing facts about reality. In slogan form, it is only in a system that a sentence 
has any meaning at all. This much should be uncontroversial.25 
Closely related to the point about the inferential systematicity that a language has to 
exhibit is the point that sentences, in order to have any meaning at all, should have a logical 
form. The logical form of sentences in a language is that in virtue of which they have any 
meaning at all. There are certainly many distinct notions of logical form one can find in the 
philosophical literature depending on the goals, projects and motivating research programs that 
stand in the background. There is, for example, a closely related but importantly distinct notion 
                                                          
25 Notice that I am not making any claim about the meaning of subsentential expressions such as names and 
predicate-expressions. One might be resistant to the idea that names, for example, have meaning only in virtue 
of being part of a system. As long as one is resistant to the idea that the sentence is the primary unit of meaning 
and names have meaning only as they are used in sentences, one will be resistant to the idea that names cannot 
represent outside of a system of other meaningful symbols. Any theorist who prioritizes reference over truth in 
a theory of meaning, for example, can be resistant to the idea that meaning requires a system. I intend to 
sidestep debates about which parts of a language should be taken to be the primary units of meaning or what 
is the correct order of semantic explanation – moving from sentential meaning to an explanation of the meaning 
of subsentential expressions or vice versa. Also, I do not mean to be prejudging the issue at stake between so 
called representationalist and inferentialist views of meaning where the former take meaning to be properly 
explained in terms of the notion of representation while the latter take it to be properly explained in terms of 
some notion of inferential role or conceptual role. This is why I put the above point in the way I do in the body 
of the text, i.e. I make a claim both about what grounds sentences’ having any meaning at all and what can be 
taken as a condition of the possibility of any representational character that sentences might have. Systematic 
inferential relations to other parts of a language may be a necessary condition for any kind of representation at 
all, a point one could grant and still insist that it is in virtue of having a representational role at all that any 
sentence of a language has meaning. The difference between a representationalist and inferentialist about 
sentential meaning would then be explained in terms of the point of entry for these considerations about 
inferential relations in their respective explanatory projects. According to the inferentialist, the inferential 
relations between sentences are what directly grounds their having any meaning at all. According to the 
representationalist, it is only in virtue of being conditions of the possibility of linguistic representation, the key 
notion one should use in the explanation of sentential meaning, that inferential relations can, indirectly, stand 
as necessary conditions for sentential meaning. 
 Alternatively, it could be that for sentences to be truth-evaluable at all, which is essential to having any meaning 
and being capable of representing anything, according to a truth-conditional theory of sentential meaning, is 
for them to have some logical form or another. If logical form is understood in terms of its role, the inferential 
relations it makes possible, then, indirectly, again, one can see how even a representationalist about meaning 
can grant the point that a sentence has any meaning only within a system. Moreover, there is here still room 
for disagreement about the proper explanation of the meaning that any particular sentence can have, i.e. it may 
be explained by its representational character (for example the states of affairs for which it “stands”) or its 
inferential role. Nothing that I say here should prejudge this issue.  
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of logical form urged by theoreticians working, broadly, within the tradition of Davidsonian 
truth-theoretic semantics for natural languages, according to which the logical form of a 
sentence is its semantic form, i.e. the recursive structure that one would have to specify for it 
in giving a compositional truth/meaning theory of the language of that sentence, a structure 
that explains why the sentence has the particular meaning that it has as a function of the 
meaning of its components (e.g. in Ludwig & Lepore 2001). This is an importantly distinct 
notion of logical form and its use is controversial.26 The notion of logical form as a condition 
of the possibility of having any meaning at all, on the other hand, should be a notion more 
readily accepted by mainstream philosophers. It has been prominent in the analytic tradition 
stemming from Wittgenstein, Carnap and the other Vienna Circle members. It also seems 
implicit in current standard philosophical thinking about logical form.27 
The following brief remarks should help to make explicit the connection between 
standard philosophical thinking about logical form, on the one hand, and the above articulated 
points about the conditions of the possibility of sentential meaning, on the other. The logical 
form of sentences, it is frequently said, is what allows us to see how they can be related as 
premises and conclusions in deductively valid arguments and hence stand in deductive 
entailment relations. Such relations are a matter of logical form and the corresponding 
inferences are in this sense said to be formally valid. So the notion of logical form at play here 
is explicated in terms of the role that logical form plays. It grounds entailment relations. But 
now if it is in virtue of having a logical form that sentences can stand in inferential relations of 
this kind and inferential relations to other sentences are what the inferential systematicity of a 
                                                          
26 Other notions of logical form deployed in the literature are:….[Harman 1972; Larson and Ludlow 1993; 
Ludlow 2002; Higginbotham 1986]. Perhaps mention skepticism about logical form.  
27 References to TLP and Logical Syntax of Language needed. Minimally.  
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language consists in, then, given that inferential systematicity is a condition of the possibility 
of sentential meaning in the first place, it should be clear how having logical form is what 
grounds the possibility of any sentential meaning. In other words, logical form is that in virtue 
of which sentences get to have any meaning at all. This point, I take it, should thus also be 
uncontroversial given that it seems to naturally follow from certain widely accepted views 
about meaning and the nature of language given above together with a thoroughly familiar 
view of logical form. Given these connections, the notion of logical form as that in virtue of 
which sentences have any meaning at all and that in virtue of which sentences are inferentially 
related in a systematic way seem to be equivalent.  
Call the conception of meaning, language, and logical form articulated above the 
Minimal Structuralist Conception.28 It is meant to capture the idea that (1) logical form is 
defined as that which allows sentences to stand in an inferential system or a larger structure, 
(2) it is a condition of the possibility of sentential meaning that sentences can form such an 
inferential system, and (3) to be a language is to be a logically articulated system or structure. 
I call this a “minimal” structuralist conception since it is meant to be different from other 
potentially stricter structuralist views about meaning such as those mentioned above, according 
to which it is in virtue of having a particular logical form that a sentence in a given language 
has the particular meaning that it has. The Minimal Structuralist Conception should, instead, 
                                                          
28 I owe this particular articulation of the conception of meaning at issue to Livingston [give references].  
This conception of language and sentential meaning may not be entirely uncontroversial since there are some 
authors, skeptical of the notion of logical form as an objective feature of sentences, who would deny the 
above articulated conception, e.g. Etchemendy 1988; Lycan 1989.  
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capture at least some of the necessary conditions for being a language or the conditions of the 
possibility of sentential meaning.29 
I take it that this Structuralist conception informs much general thought about meaning 
and language that most analytic philosophers would endorse prior to any argument for more 
specific views about how natural language semantics should work. So I want to argue that this 
Structuralist Conception can be used to show that the so called feature-placing languages do 
not count as genuine languages. They fail to meet the demands of the Minimal Structuralist 
Conception because they fail to exhibit the requisite kind of inferential systematicity, i.e. their 
alleged “sentences” do not hang together in the right way for any system to be possible. Since 
a language is a logically articulated system in the sense elaborated above, their alleged 
“sentences” do not hang together in the right way to make a genuine feature-placing language 
possible.  
This contention directly contradicts the position of the authors who have been 
concerned with the evaluation of the ontological nihilist view (e.g. Hawthorne & Cortens, 
1995; Turner 2009). These authors have taken the predicate-functorese language, the most 
developed form of a feature-placing language, to be inferentially systematic in some sense.30 
Moreover, they have not given the considerations over the inferential systematicity of feature-
placing languages their proper place. At most, these authors seem to be assuming that to show 
that the nihilist’s preferred language lacks inferential systematicity is just to show that the 
                                                          
29 Again, the caveat I offer in the introduction to this paper is meant to apply here. The “language” in question 
is understood as assertoric or descriptive language.  
30 Whether the sense in which they take predicate-functorese to be inferentially systematic is the sense in 
which it ought to be to qualify as a genuine language is the issue I will be addressing in the body of the paper.  
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nihilist must bear a theoretical cost. According to this view, this is, nonetheless, a cost that 
does not render the very idea of having a feature-placing language unintelligible.  
I think this is mistaken. The issue with the ontological nihilist view isn’t that it has to 
posit brute necessary inferences between the sentences of its preferred language but that in 
such a case it will remove the conditions of the possibility of having any language at all. The 
ontological nihilist needs a language that is inferentially systematic in the right way not in 
order for us to be in a position to assess her view favorably but in order for us to grant that it 
is a meaningful view in the first place. I want to argue that the ontological nihilist position is 
not intelligible as it stands since the idea of a feature-placing language it relies upon is 
unintelligible. Insofar as one accepts the minimal structuralist conception, as I think most 
analytic philosophers do, one should find the whole idea of feature-placing sentences 
incoherent.  
2.3. Feature-placing languages are not genuine languages 
The demands placed on feature-placing languages, if the latter are to provide the 
necessary support for the ontological nihilist position, can vary. One might think that feature-
placing languages should include paraphrases of first-order sentences from scientific discourse 
since it is especially sentences like these that have a claim to capture the important truths about 
reality, even though they do it in a way that is not perspicuous (e.g. in Turner 2009).31 Others 
may want to include sentences that somehow aim at truths about the ordinary objects of our 
experiential encounters, too. The goal in both cases is to present feature-placing languages as 
capable of accommodating a large part, if not all, of the expressive power of first-order 
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languages. Feature-placing languages should thus include paraphrases of first-order sentences, 
which carry no commitment to objects but only to features. Quine’s predicate-functorese is 
usually taken to be such a language, making use only of a class of predicate letters, a small 
number of predicate-forming and sentence-forming functors or operators and entirely 
dispensing with bound variables.32 To deal with quantification, the language features only the 
devices of functional abstraction, functional application, and identity (Quine 1971). 
Accordingly, the predicate-functor language has seemed the proper tool for the ontological 
nihilist.33 
It is worth mentioning at this point that Ontological nihilists have a choice to make with 
respect to the proper treatment of ordinary discourse that seems to carry ontological 
commitment to objects in virtue of its quantificational apparatus and ubiquitous subject-
predicate sentences. One might want to say that ordinary discourse is, strictly speaking, false, 
even though it points, somehow, at important truths about the world or, alternatively, that it is 
true to the world of appearances that we aim to represent when not dealing with metaphysics 
and ultimate reality. The fundamental truths about reality as it is in itself, however, on this 
proposal, would not be correctly captured in a language that is ontologically guilty, e.g. a first-
order language that carries commitment to objects. The sentences of such a language, if aimed 
at ultimate reality, would have to be false (Cf. Turner 2009; Hawthorne and Cortens, 1995). 
Whatever the target discourse that poses a problem for the ontological nihilist, the strategy that 
                                                          
32 The Quinean predicate-functor language may seem as an even more attractive candidate since it seems not 
only capable of translating all first-order claims we want to make but has its own sound and complete logic. See, 
for example, (Kuhn 1983) and Bacon (1985). 
33 Jason Turner argues that even though the predicate-functor language is the only viable option for the 
ontological nihilist, it is really a self-defeating one since the predicate-functor language, if it is able to 
accommodate the important first-order claims we want to make, does not escape ontological commitment to 
objects since its own predicate functor ∆, which combines with predicates of the language to form sentences, 
really means “There is” and so shares its meaning with the that of the existential quantifier (p. 40-1).  
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is generally used is to show how a feature-placing language of the appropriate expressive 
power can provide paraphrases of first-order sentences, paraphrases which carry no existential 
commitment to objects. Such paraphrases can then capture whatever truth the target sentences 
seem to be “pointing at” or “grasping at” (the language used to explain the relationship between 
the truths or facts that there are, on the one hand, and the problematic first-order sentences, on 
the other, does not get any less vague than this).  
Even though I cannot pursue this point here, it should be noted that there is a major 
conceptual difficulty at the heart of the usual paraphrase strategies offered by ontological 
nihilists. Since there is no good sense in which the paraphrased first-order sentences and the 
paraphrasing sentences of the favored feature-placing language share a logical structure, it is 
not clear in what way there could be such a semantic relationship between the two sets of 
sentences. It could be that a paraphrase of a sentence is supposed to capture its real logical 
structure as opposed to its surface logical structure in the process of eliminating troublesome 
commitment to metaphysically suspect entities, which is the typical motivation for offering 
various paraphrasing strategies in a metaphysical context in the first place (e.g. paraphrasing 
away talk about composite objects, holes, shadows, etc.). In such a case, one might be able to 
intelligibly maintain the structural mismatch between paraphrased sentences and paraphrasing 
ones. This could be because the paraphrasing sentence is somehow supposed to provide the 
“real” as opposed to the superficial logical form of the paraphrased sentence. But the 
ontological nihilist and any proponent of feature-placing languages do not offer their 
paraphrases as a logical analysis of the real, deep structure of the problematic first-order 
sentences they target. So, it is not clear how there can be any semantic continuity at all between 
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sentences that do not even share a logical form or stand in a relation of superficial vs. real, 
underlying logical form.  
Alternatively, it is not clear how one can plausibly assume that sentences which 
radically misrepresent the real propositional structure of the truths or facts about reality can, 
nonetheless, point to those truths while being, strictly speaking, false. One might think that in 
order for sentences in subject-predicate form to even qualify for truth or falsehood, they should 
at least share the logical structure of the facts or truths about reality that there are, i.e. those 
truths or facts that they “unperspicuously” represent or somehow “point at” while remaining 
false. If that is not the case, then the ontological nihilist would have to maintain that these 
sentences are really meaningless instead of false for they do not share logical structure with 
any real truths or facts that there are.  
Now, this point may only apply to those views about sentential meaning which locate 
it in the representational nature of sentences, as opposed to their inferential role, for example. 
But since such a view about sentential meaning is quite widespread among philosophers, this 
would be sufficient to show that there is something very wrong with the ontological nihilist 
position. It is hardly intelligible to claim that those sentences that seem to be in subject-
predicate form or carry existential commitment to objects are meaningless. One should thus be 
suspicious of this move to generalize the typical paraphrasing strategy metaphysicians use to 
deal with other cases and to apply it to the case at hand. For here one has introduced a very 
important disanalogy between the typical cases in which such a strategy is used and the present 
case. When it comes to the view that the ultimate truths about reality do not have the logical 
structure we might suppose them to have the nature of the game has changed precisely because 
one might have removed the conditions for assuming our ordinary discourse to be meaningful 
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at all. The automatic extension of these typical paraphrasing strategies to this case is thus highly 
questionable. 
Let us, however, set aside these issues about the coherence of the nihilist’s paraphrase 
strategy and turn to the main argument of the paper. Most authors have argued that feature-
placing languages can be shown to be inferentially systematic in a way that is necessary for 
the ontological nihilist to capture the inferentially systematic relations of first-order sentences. 
He or she will thus be able to avoid incurring the costs of positing brute necessary connections 
between sentences of the language, as noted above. The inferential systematicity in question is 
here understood in terms of the availability of an explanation of what it is in virtue of which 
sentences are inferentially related or what underwrites these inferences. This in turn requires 
positing some kind of structure in the sentences that are to stand in these relations or, arguably, 
the semantic values of these sentences.34 Turner, for example, argues that the predicate-functor 
language is inferentially systematic in the requisite way, having its own sound and complete 
logic, since for any entailment relations between sentences φ and ψ of a first-order language 
where φ entails ψ in that language, the paraphrase of φ entails the paraphrase of ψ in the 
predicate-functor language. These entailment relations are, presumably, underwritten by the 
meanings of the complex predicates built out of simpler ones in the predicate-functor language. 
The latter’s sentences thus encode semantic structure sufficient for underwriting the inferential 
systematicity of the language (Turner, p. 40).  
Hawthorne and Cortens also argue that feature-placing languages can accommodate 
the validity of a large number of inferences we can make in first-order languages. They try to 
                                                          
34 Cf. Turner p. 24-6.  
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show this by introducing, for example, devices such as adverbial modifiers of predicates such 
as those in “It is catting angrily” or “It is raining heavily” and by making use of substitutional 
quantification to accommodate the presence of generality in the first-order languages that have 
to be paraphrased. Thus, they argue that feature-placing languages can accommodate an 
important number of the quantificational inferences we can make in first-order languages. 
Given the availability of such devices, feature-placing languages can allow us, for example, to 
infer from sentences such as (**) “It is catting here” sentences like (*) “It is catting 
somewhere” or to infer from (*) “It is catting angrily” the corresponding (**) “It is catting.”35 
However, I want to argue that, contrary to this established view, the feature-placing 
language of choice for the ontological nihilist and feature-placing languages in general do not 
have the right kind of inferential systematicity to meet the demands of the Minimal 
Structuralist Conception of language and meaning articulated above. They do not meet a 
necessary condition for being a language and their alleged “sentences” are no meaning-bearers 
at all. To see this clearly, let us focus on the atomic sentences of a candidate feature-placing 
language, i.e. sentences that do not contain any of the truth-functional sentential connectives 
or logical operators that add further structure (e.g. modal or truth-operators). After all, if the 
alleged atomic sentences of the language cannot be shown to be genuine meaning-bearers, they 
cannot be used to form other more complex meaningful sentences with further structure which 
can, in turn, underwrite additional entailment relations.36 
The argument that the alleged atomic sentences of the feature-placing language cannot 
be genuine meaning-bearers is quite simple. These sentences do not have sufficient logical 
                                                          
35 See Hawthorne & Cortens, pgs. 149-54. 
36 Entailment relations that the propositional calculus can capture, for example.  
 66 
 
structure that can be used to explain how they can stand in the right kind of entailment relations 
that are a necessary condition for any sentential meaning to be possible. This is because the 
right kind of entailment relations are formal or deductive in nature. To stand in inferential 
relations that are a condition of the possibility of having any meaning at all, such sentences 
need to have a logical form that underwrites formally valid inferences. But they do not have 
such a logical form. If they can stand in entailment relations these are merely material in nature 
where by “material” I mean, as it is standard in the literature, entailment relations that 
essentially depend on the meanings of the subsentential constituents of the relevant sentences. 
This is, in fact, what Turner, as one proponent of the view that the nihilist’s feature-placing 
language can be inferentially systematic, is arguing. It is in virtue of the interrelations between 
the meanings of the various complex predicates in feature-placing sentences that the latter can 
stand in inferential relations. The semantic structure of the predicates explains the inferential 
relations in question. But the inferential relations between the atomic sentences of the feature-
placing languages cannot be only material in character or based on the meanings of the 
complex predicates in question. They have to be formal. Hence, feature-placing sentences do 
not stand in the right kind of relations to underwrite the logically articulated structure that a 
language needs to have.37 
                                                          
37 Consider an example of a formal inference in ordinary language that is not available in the feature-placing 
language, which has a corresponding non-formal, material inference. Take the sentence “The cat is black.” This 
sentence allows one to infer, on purely formal grounds, that there is something such that it is a cat and also that 
there is something such that it is black. The corresponding feature-placing sentence would be “∆ (Cat & Black)-
ing”, i.e. “It’s (Cat & Black)- ing.” Now, one can infer that “It’s Blacking” or “It’s Catting” from this sentence. But 
the inference will not be formal. It will depend on the interrelations between the meanings of the feature-
expressions, namely the complex one “(Cat & Black)-ing” and the simpler ones “Catting” and “Blacking.”  
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2.4. Objections 
There are two ways to resist the foregoing argument. First, one can argue that, contrary 
to my contention, there is nothing illegitimate in the claim that so called material inferences 
can underwrite the inferential systematicity of the feature-placing language and so meet the 
necessary condition for the possibility of any sentential meaning. Second, one might deny that 
the atomic sentences of the nihilist’s feature-placing language stand only in material entailment 
relations. In fact, they also stand in formal entailment relations and exhibit the logical structure 
necessary for the possibility of sentential meaning. The demands of the Minimal Structuralist 
Conception of meaning are in fact met as opposed to rejected. 
2.4.1 Response to First Objection 
Consider the first counter-argument. In fact, it is unintelligible to suppose that material 
inferential relations between atomic sentences alone can underwrite the requisite kind of 
inferential systematicity of the language since these material relations are themselves only 
possible in virtue of the established meanings of the sentences that stand in these relations. But 
whether such sentences can be shown to have any meaning at all is what is in question in the 
first place. Here is an alternative way to put the demand behind the Minimal Structuralist 
Conception of sentential meaning. The set of inferences that have to be available for showing 
that some string of symbols can be a meaning-bearer at all or that it meets the general 
conditions of the possibility of having any meaning at all cannot be the same set of inferences 
that presuppose that this string of symbols has a particular, already established meaning. What 
precedes the possibility of any material entailment relations between atomic sentences, in the 
logical or conceptual order, is the possibility that these sentences can stand in inferential 
relations, i.e. in a system, and that requires formal relations, which requires sufficient logical 
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structure that the simple feature-placing sentences do not seem to have. In effect, the idea of a 
feature-placing language is the idea of a language which contains only material rules of 
inference and no formal ones, an idea which is actually incoherent.  
2.4.2 Response to Second Objection 
In line with the second counter-argument given above, one may resist the claim that 
feature-placing sentences cannot be shown to exhibit formal entailment relations. There are 
two distinct ways in which one could argue for the availability of formal relations between the 
feature-placing sentences of the nihilist’s language depending on which version of a feature-
placing language one focuses on. Accordingly, I will first consider the proposal by Hawthorne 
and Cortens to introduce devices of adverbial modification of feature-expressions in order to 
paraphrase sentences of our ordinary language into feature-placing sentences. I will call this 
version of a feature-placing language, the Adverbial Feature-placing Language. Second, I will 
consider the Predicate-Functorese language that Turner develops.  
2.4.3 Formal Inferences in Adverbial Feature-placing Languages 
Hawthorn and Cortens introduce devices of adverbial modification of feature-
expressions in order to paraphrase first-order sentences such as “The pebble is white” into a 
feature-placing language. The corresponding feature-placing sentence might be “It is pebbling 
whitely.” Now, it could be that one can move from 
(1) It is pebbling whitely 
to 
(2) Therefore, it is pebbling somehow 
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where the inference seems to be formally valid. If this is the case, then we seem to have an 
example of formal entailment relations between the relevant sentences. Next, consider 
quantificational inferences from sentences that have spatial and temporal adverbial modifiers.38 
Consider the inference one can make from (3) to (4) below: 
(3) It is catting here. 
Therefore,  
(4) It is catting somewhere 
And from 
(5) It is catting angrily 
Therefore, 
(6) It is catting somehow 
It might seem that inferences such as those from (1) to (2) and (3) to (4) above exhibit 
a purely formal character. If these inferences are formally valid, then it seems that these 
feature-placing sentences can, after all, stand in formal entailment relations necessary for the 
requisite kind of inferential systematicity of the language. In other words, it seems that these 
feature-placing sentences do have enough logical structure as a condition of the possibility of 
having any meaning at all. At least, this is the case once one has introduced the device of 
adverbial modification of predicates, as Hawthorne and Cortens do.  
                                                          
38 I should note that I am setting aside the worry that such modifiers introduce existential commitment to 
times and places as entities and so compromise the ontological nihilist construal of the feature-placing 
languages. Strawson discusses such worries in his “Individuals” (ps. 215-25). Hawthorne and Cortens also 
address this difficulty for their position and ultimately dismiss it (see ps. 149-51).  
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Suppose, for the sake argument, that there is a class of formally valid inferences that 
the feature-placing language can allow, namely those inferences of the basic form:  
(1) It’s x-ing y-ly.  
Therefore,  
(2) It’s x-ing somehow.39 
We can also grant that there is a class of formally valid inference patterns, namely those of the 
following form: 
(1) It is x-ing y-ly. 
(2) Therefore, it is x-ing somewhere.  
We can grant that these are genuine examples of formally valid inferences. We can thus 
grant that the sentences which form the premises of such argument patterns have sufficient 
logical structure to sustain formally valid inferences and thus count as genuine meaning-
bearers in the language. But if these are all the formal inferences that the feature-placing 
language can allow, while all the rest are purely material ones, then it is not clear at all that the 
demands of the Minimal Structuralist Conception of language can be met. For only those 
sentences of the language which have the modifiers will admit of this analysis. However, one 
has to establish that the atomic sentences of the language which do not have this added 
complexity, namely the adverbial modifiers, can exhibit enough logical structure to allow 
formally valid inferences and hence count as meaningful units of the language. So, we need it 
to be the case that sentences such as “It’s catting” or “It’s protoning” can admit of the same 
                                                          
39 There will naturally be similar inference patterns involving sentences with multiple adverbial modifiers in 
the premises but I will just focus on this basic case in the body of the paper for the sake of simplicity.  
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treatment. We need to establish that they also have sufficient logical structure to sustain some 
formal inferences in order to get the conditions of the possibility of their being meaning-bearers 
in the first place. After all, in order for us to grant that more complex, adverbially modified 
feature-expressions can form genuine sentences, i.e. genuine meaning-bearers of the language, 
we first need to ensure that the atomic, non-modified feature-placing sentences are such 
genuine meaning-bearers. But here the adverbial version of the feature-placing language does 
not seem to help. There seems to be no purely formal inference that one can make from a 
simple, atomic sentence like “It’s dogging” to a different sentence of the language.  
One cannot resort to “somehow inferences” here, even though we have granted that 
these can be shown to be formally valid. In other words, one cannot infer that “It’s catting 
somehow” from “It’s catting” on purely formal grounds. But if these basic sentences are not 
covered, then it is no help to appeal to the availability of formally valid inferences in the 
language that involve feature-placing sentences with adverbial modifiers in order to show the 
language meets the demands of the minimal structuralist conception of language. There is thus 
good reason to think that these demands cannot be met for the relevant feature-placing 
sentences. 
However, it is even not clear that we have a genuine instance of formally valid inference 
in the cases highlighted by the proponent of the adverbial feature-placing languages. To see 
this, consider the following questions we can ask. What guarantees that one can legitimately 
infer “It is catting somewhere” from “It is catting here” but not “It is catting somehow”? 
Alternatively, what guarantees that one can legitimately infer from “It is catting angrily” that 
it is “It is catting somehow” but not “It is catting somewhere”? It seems that the only plausible 
answer here is: the meaning of the adverbs “here” and “angrily.” We cannot discriminate 
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between the above valid and invalid inferences unless we look to the meanings of the adverbial 
phrases.  
But one might argue against these observations as follows. The proponent of the 
adverbial feature-placing languages has a reply to these questions. What explains why one 
cannot legitimately infer “It’s catting somehow” from “It’s catting here” is that quantificational 
inferences involving “somehow” are formally valid only with adverbs but, crucially, “here” is 
not an adverb. What explains the validity of the inference from (1) “It’s catting here” to (2) 
“It’s catting somewhere,” on the other hand, is the logical form of (1) which includes a location 
argument. With the latter in the premise, it is valid to infer (2), i.e. that it is catting somewhere.  
The first thing to note here is that this response involves a departure from the standard 
adverbial account of the nihilist’s feature-placing language that Hawthorne and Cortens favor 
since they treat “here” as a spatial adverb. If “here” is an adverb in the way “angrily” is an 
adverb and one can always make formally valid inferences to sentences with the “somehow” 
quantifier given adverbs in the premise, then it should be the case that “here” also admits of a 
somehow inference but that seems implausible.  
Suppose, however, that we adopt the present proposal and treat “here” separately. 
Suppose that “here” is not actually an adverb but rather a location argument in sentences such 
as “It is catting here.” One can then infer, on purely formal grounds, that it is catting 
somewhere, given that the logical form of this sentence features the location argument. Since 
“here” is not an adverb, this can explain why one cannot make a formally valid inference to 
“It’s catting somehow.” There is a difference in logical form between “It’s catting angrily,” for 
example, and “It’s catting here.” 
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The difficulty with this response is that it is not clear how this account of the logical 
form of sentences featuring “here” can allow the proponent of the feature-placing language to 
avoid introducing objects or entities to serve as the values for the argument places in the 
premises of such arguments. It seems that spaces will have to count as objects in the domain 
of quantification. This will compromise the nihilist’s position as it will compromise the 
ontological innocence of the feature-placing sentences in question. At this point, the best 
course for the objector to take would be to argue for a primitive, irreducible style of 
modification of feature-expressions that does not involve any objects as values for the location 
arguments. This would be the argument-style modification that characterizes sentences 
containing “here” and, perhaps, “now,” i.e. a temporal modifier of feature-expressions.40 
The trouble with this response is that it amounts to nothing more than a bare insistence 
that there is such a thing as argument-style modification of feature-expressions. We might ask 
why we should suppose that this style of modification does not, after all, involve the 
introduction of entities as the values of the location arguments in the logical form of the 
relevant sentences. Do we have an example from ordinary language of such argument-style 
modification? It seems not. But then we do not seem to have a grip on this particular kind of 
modification. The nihilist must then resort to a primitive, unexplicated apparatus to make his 
or her proposal work.  
Perhaps a different strategy for dealing with the above challenge is needed at this point. 
Instead of denying that “here” is an adverb or that the logical form of a sentence like “It’s 
catting here” permits a formally valid inference to “It’s catting somehow,” the opponent can 
                                                          
40 Thanks to Thomas Hofweber for suggesting to me this line of response.  
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insist that such inferences, contrary to my contention above, are formally valid. We may be 
misled by the surface appearance of the adverb “here.” If, for example, we make the relevant 
adverb “herely” so that we have sentences like “It’s catting herely,” then we might not be 
similarly resistant to the claim that one can infer “It’s catting somehow,” on purely formal 
grounds.41 The objector’s alternative response would then run as follows. Sentences like (1) 
“It’s catting angrily” and (2) “It’s catting herely” share a logical form. Since both of them 
feature adverbs, we can infer a quantified sentence of the form “It’s catting somehow” on 
purely formal grounds from both of these sentences. So there is no issue of discriminating, on 
purely formal grounds, between those sentences which feature spatial adverbs and those which 
feature non-spatial adverbs. Both can serve as premises in formally valid arguments with 
quantified sentences of the form “It’s X-ing somehow” as a conclusion. The conclusion follows 
as a matter of form. 
If these sentences share a logical form, then it seems that they must have in common 
all of their formal logical properties. In other words, they must have in common the formally 
valid inferences which are made possible by the logical form they have, though of course these 
sentences can differ with respect to the material inferences that they allow in virtue of the 
meanings of the constituent adverbial expressions. Consider, however, different 
quantificational inferences, namely those that involve the “somewhere” quantifier. Take the 
above two sentences, again. 
(1) It’s catting whitely. 
And 
                                                          
41 I owe this suggestion to Thomas Hofweber.  
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(2) It’s catting here. 
These two sentences should share a logical form, on the present proposal. But there seem to be 
only two options here. Either (i) both (1) and (2) will allow a formally valid inference to (3) 
“It’s catting somewhere” or (ii) neither of them will. Take the first option. Then, (3) “It’s 
catting somewhere” has to follow as a matter of logical form from (1) “It’s catting whitely.” 
But this does not seem to be a formally valid inference at all. It is surely implausible to suppose 
that one can validly infer “It’s catting somewhere” from “It’s catting whitely” on purely formal 
grounds, if any. If there is any doubt that this is the case, just consider a sentence with number 
predicates or feature-expressions, instead. “There is a number two” will have to be paraphrased 
roughly along the following lines: “It is two-ing” or something equally awkward. But of course 
no one will argue that there has to be a place where the number two exists or that one can infer 
as a matter of logical form that there is a number two somewhere. Hence one cannot make the 
corresponding inference from the feature-placing sentence, i.e. one cannot infer “It is two-ing 
somewhere.” But then what explains why the inference is available in the case of “catting” but 
not “two-ing” cannot be mere logical form since the relevant sentences share logical form. 
They differ with respect to the meaning of the constituent feature-expressions. This seems to 
show that the original inference to “It is catting somewhere” is material in nature, i.e. it depends 
on the meaning of the feature-expression “catting,” according to which cats are the sorts of 
things that occupy space and can be located somewhere (while numbers are not).  
Take the second option, then. So neither (1) or (2) will allow an inference to (3). This 
means that one cannot infer on purely formal grounds that it is catting somewhere from the 
assumption that it is catting here. Perhaps the inference to (3) can be admitted as a materially 
valid one. But the consequence of the foregoing line of response is to treat only “somehow 
 76 
 
inferences” as formally valid but not “somewhere” ones.42 This is hardly plausible. It does not 
respect our intuition that such an inference is valid merely in virtue of logical form.  
But perhaps the proponent of the adverbial feature-placing languages can bite the bullet 
here and accept that consequence. The point is that such seemingly ad hoc maneuvers will be 
needed to resolve the foregoing challenge. So whether one adopts a view according to which 
feature-placing sentences with spatial adverbs share logical form with those with ordinary, 
non-spatial adverbs or a view according to which they do not share logical form, there will be 
ad hoc moves that have to be made. This casts doubt on the viability of the present strategy. 
Still, even if we grant that some sentences of the favored feature-placing language can stand 
in formal entailment relations and thus exhibit enough logical structure, the appeal to these 
sentences will not help here. As argued above, what is needed here is an equally successful 
argument that feature-placing sentences without modifiers, the more basic sentences of the 
language, can stand in formal entailment relations. Such an argument, I want to say, does not 
seem to be available to the opponent here.  
However, it may well be the case that a different version of the feature-placing language 
favored by the nihilist can allow him or her to argue that there are indeed formal entailment 
relations between the sentences of the language, contrary to my contention. So let us consider 
the Predicate-Functorese language. The objection to my claim that the feature-placing 
languages do not meet the demands of the Minimal Structuralist Conception of language and 
meaning takes a somewhat different form when it comes to this particular version of feature-
placing languages. The attempt to show that the sentences of the language do indeed stand in 
                                                          
42 A similar point can be made about quantificational inferences involving “sometime.” 
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formal entailment relations is somewhat different than that articulated above in the case of the 
adverbial account. Hence, this attempt merits a separate discussion.  
2.4.4 Formal Inferences in Predicate-Functorese  
I have claimed that since the inferential relations between the relevant feature-placing 
sentences are based on the meanings of the complex predicates or feature-expressions of the 
language, they cannot be purely formal and the feature-placing sentences do not have the 
requisite logical form necessary for having any meaning at all. But suppose one abandons the 
proposal given by Hawthorne and Cortens to build complex predicates by introducing 
adverbial modifiers in the feature-placing language and instead, focuses on the way complex 
predicates are built by predicate-forming functors of the kind featured in the Quanean 
predicate-functorese language.  
The predicate-functor language features truth-functional predicate functors such as “&” 
and “~”. From a stock of simple predicates or feature-expressions such as ˹is A-ing˺ and ˹is B-
ing˺, together with these truth-functional functors one can build complex feature-expressions 
such as ˹is A & B˺-ing. Attaching the sentence-forming functor ∆, one can then place the 
complex feature and make an assertion about its instantiation “It is (A & B)-ing” thus becomes 
˹∆ (A&B)-ing˺. So one can infer the corresponding sentence ˹∆ (A)˺, i.e. “It is A-ing.” Even 
though Turner, for example, would consider the inference a reflection of the interrelations 
between the meanings of the feature expressions “(A & B)-ing” and “A-ing”, this need not 
exclude treating the semantic structure encoded in the complex predicate, which supports the 
inference in question, as also logical in some important sense. After all, the complex predicate 
is built from the application of a truth-functional predicate functor and one need not know the 
meaning of “A” and “B” in order to infer “It is (A)-ing” from “It is (A & B)-ing.” Why not 
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assume that “logical form” can apply to the kind of mereological structure that complex 
feature-expressions seem to exhibit and treat the corresponding inferences underwritten by 
such semantic, mereological structure as formal in nature?43 
In effect, this proposal to extend the notions of logical form and purely formal inference 
in this way amounts to the rejection of a basic distinction between those inferences that depend 
essentially on the meanings of subsentential expressions, i.e. material inferences, and those 
inferences that depend merely on the logical form of sentences, i.e. formal inferences. After 
all, feature-placing expressions, simple or complex, are subsentential expressions or they have 
to be treated in that way to preserve a basic distinction between sentences and other elements 
of a language, which, presumably, any language should have. These expressions need to have 
a sentence-forming functor attached to them to form sentences of the language. So if the 
feature-expressions of the language are the bearers of “logical form” and their content also 
serves to underwrite purely formal inferences, then there is no distinction to be made between 
formal and material inferences. In this case, for an inference to be valid essentially in virtue of 
the meanings of the subsentential expressions contained in the sentences that stand in the 
relation of premises to consequences is for it to be valid essentially in virtue of logical form. 
This is because here “logical form” really stands for the semantic structure of the values of 
feature-expressions and has nothing to do with the sentence-forming functor of the language, 
∆, and its contribution to the structure of the sentence. “Logical form” will here apply to 
subsentential expressions and not sentential ones. 
                                                          
43 I owe this objection to Alan Nelson.  
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But such a mix of positions is unstable and ultimately incoherent. We want to say that 
when inferences are formally valid in virtue of logical form, we are presupposing that logical 
form applies to sentential symbols for it is sentences that stand in inferential relations of the 
requisite kind, not their subsentential expressions. Put in a different way, it seems like it is a 
basic conceptual point about “formal inference” to say that the bearers of formal inferential 
relations are the same kinds of things whose logical form is what makes these inferences 
possible, namely sentences. Certainly, one might insist that the words of a language can also 
stand in inferential relations or, rather, that the concepts that they express can do so, just as 
some inferentialist views of the meaning of subsentential expressions would have it. But the 
sense in which words or the concepts they express can stand in such relations can only be 
derivative. Only in virtue of our prior understanding of what it is for sentences to stand in 
inferential relations can we can we say that, for example, a word of the language stands in 
inferential relations to another one in virtue of featuring within sentences that are 
systematically inferentially related. So, we are committed to saying that the primary bearers of 
inferential relations, formal or material, are also the bearers of logical form, which is what 
makes such relations possible. The proponent of feature-placing languages, in effect, rejects 
this point. 
As long as one grants the basic distinction between sentences and subsentential 
expressions, as one must, there seems to be room for the traditional distinction between validity 
in virtue of the meaning of subsentential expressions and validity in virtue of logical form. The 
objector’s de facto rejection of the latter distinction comes at the price of rejecting certain basic 
conceptual points about what we understand by “inference” and “formal inference” as 
attaching primarily to sentences. It is a rejection that brings the proponent of feature-placing 
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languages to the point where he or she removes the common notions we can use to 
meaningfully evaluate the proposal that we are dealing with a genuine language. For, after all, 
these conceptual points are all we have to go on in the evaluation of this proposal. If we remove 
them, all we have is just a proposal to mean something different by “inference” and “logical 
form” which is really to mean something different by “language.” I doubt that this is what the 
ontological nihilist is up to.  
If the conclusion of the last few paragraph stands, then we have no good reason to think 
that the atomic sentences of the feature-placing language can stand in systematic formal 
entailment relations. They do not exhibit sufficient logical structure and hence fail to “hang 
together” in the right way for us to preserve the initial assumption that we are dealing with 
genuine meaning-bearers. I do not think this should be surprising. By eliminating the basic 
distinction between subject and predicate, the proponents of feature-placing languages have 
actually eliminated the logical structure that makes possible purely formal relations at the level 
of atomic sentences. They are thus naturally forced to resort to the meanings of feature-
expressions to show how the sentences of these languages can be inferentially related at all. 
But there is no way we can make sense of the idea of a language whose sentences are 
inferentially related only in virtue of the meanings of their subsentential expressions. It will 
not help the nihilist to show that his or her preferred language houses purely formal rules of 
inference, those articulated by the propositional calculus, for example. For even if there are 
truth-functionally complex sentences that are related in a purely formal way, this achievement 
comes only later, i.e. only under the condition that there are syntactic strings the propositional 
calculus can treat as sentences, i.e. as meaning-bearers. But that condition cannot be met, as I 
have argued above.
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3.  Kant on Alien Logical Forms 
 
3.1. Introduction 
It is common knowledge that Kant’s transcendental idealism implies a radical 
limitation on our ability to represent truths about reality as it is in itself. The noumena or things 
in themselves, which somehow ground the phenomenal world, are not only in principle 
unknowable by us human beings but they are beyond our powers of objective representation. 
This is because, according to Kant’s transcendental philosophy, the formal conditions of 
possible human experience set necessary limitations on our representational capacities. If this 
is indeed the case, transcendental idealism seems to imply that there is a large class of ineffable 
for us truths about noumenal reality.  
My goal in this paper is to revisit this common knowledge and consider in detail to 
what extent the transcendental philosophy can allow for a particular class of ineffable truths 
about noumenal reality, thereby complicating the Kantian picture of our relationship to the 
allegedly ineffable realm of things in themselves. In the following introductory remarks, I 
sharpen the central question I deal with in this paper and delineate the key Kantian concepts at 
play in the discussion on ineffable truths.  
The operative notion of representation here is “objective.” The kind of conceptual 
representation that a discursive understanding like the human understanding employs can attain 
the status of “objective” representation, according to Kant, only insofar as it can be given an 
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object or only insofar as it can have determinate enough content to have a possible relation to 
objects. Things in themselves and so reality as it is in itself, given the implications of Kant’s 
critical philosophy, cannot be objectively represented in this sense. No empirical concepts can 
be legitimately applied to things in themselves for they are formed solely on the basis of 
experience, reflecting, as Kant maintains (A77/B102), the forms of intuition, within which all 
phenomenal objects must be intuited. Since things in themselves or, more neutrally, things as 
they are in themselves, are, by definition, not objects of our experience and stand outside of 
space and time, such concepts cannot be legitimately applied to them. But neither can the pure 
categories, when abstracted from any sensible conditions of their applications, be used to 
represent things in themselves for the merely “logical” content of the categories is insufficient 
to determine any possible relation to real objects. The pure concepts are, effectively, “empty” 
as Kant sometimes says, exhibiting merely “the form of a concept” insofar as they are general 
representations, but their content or matter is not determinate enough to allow for “objective 
representation”  (A 239-260/B 298-315). 
It is still debatable whether Kant works with an additional, thinner notion of 
representation, in accordance with which even things in themselves might be represented by 
means of our most general categories of thought, the unschematized categories of substance, 
ground and consequence, etc. But even in the context of ongoing debate over the applicability 
or inapplicability of the categories to things in themselves, I take it to be clear that the relevant 
notion of representation that we should be concerned with in the context of discussion on 
ineffable truths is the stronger notion.44 Only this stronger notion is at play when the possibility 
                                                          
44 The dominant view in the literature is that things in themselves can be characterized by the unschematized 
categories and hence in some sense “represented” by the categories, even if not cognized through them: Adams 
(1998); Ameriks (2000); Jauernig (2008), Hogan (2009), Guyer (2010), Langton (1998), Watkins (2002), Watkins 
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of representing “truths” about noumenal reality is under consideration because, according to 
Kant, the very notion of “truth” requires the use of concepts that can be related to objects. But 
this relationship to objects requires, in turn, that there is determinate enough content in these 
concepts for any such relation to particular objects to be possible. “Truth,” is, according to 
Kant, “agreement of cognition with its object” (A 58/B83). But such an object must be 
distinguishable from other objects when we make any truth-apt judgments about it, for only in 
this way can we get the truth-conditions of that judgment right, i.e. only in this way will the 
truth of this judgment depend on facts about the relevant object. Kant says as much: 
“If truth consists in the agreement of a cognition with its object, then this 
object must thereby be distinguished from others; for a cognition is false if it 
does not agree with the object to which it is related even if it contains 
something that could well be valid of other objects” (A58/B83).  
 
It is not an accident then that Kant’s discussion on the applicability of the categories to 
things in themselves is so often couched in terms of their inability to determine a possible 
object of thought, given their merely “logical content.”45 What his discussion thus amounts to 
is a denial that the categories can be used to represent any truths about things as they are in 
themselves independently of human experience. This possible “relation to an object” is then a 
condition of the possibility of “material truth” as opposed to formal truth, whose condition, 
according to Kant, is merely “logical consistency” or lack of contradiction (A58-60/B82-4).   
Given the above articulated sense of “objective representation” then, we can say the 
following. Objective representation gives the conditions of the possibility of material truth 
                                                          
(2004), Pereboom (1991). For a dissenting view, according to which the categories are not strictly applicable to 
things in themselves, see Kohl (2015).  
45 This line of thought is most extensively developed in the chapter “On the ground of the distinction of all 
objects in general into phenomena and noumena” in the Critique of Pure Reason (A 235-60/B 294-315). 
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insofar as to say that a judgment X is truth-apt in the sense of “material truth” is to say that X’s 
constituent concepts have determinate enough content to bear a possible relation to the object 
of the judgment. So, to say that some aspects of reality are ineffable for us human beings is to 
say that we cannot in principle form materially true or false judgments about these aspects of 
reality.  
Kant maintains that we can at least know that noumena exist and affect the human mind 
thereby providing the matter for its faculty of sensibility.46 So it seems that we can represent 
at least some truths about reality as it is in itself. But if the foregoing, admittedly quick, 
argument is correct, we should not expect there to be any other truths about the noumena that 
we can in principle represent, given the transcendental idealist framework. Hence, the question 
of whether there can be ineffable for us truths about reality, according to Kant, at least when 
noumenal reality is the focus, seems to admit of an easy answer. Empirical concepts, applicable 
only to the phenomenal world, and the pure concepts of the understanding are the only 
categories of concepts that we can use to represent reality. Since no concepts that we are in 
principle capable of employing can be used to represent reality as it is in itself, the latter is in 
principle ineffable for us.47 Moreover, it seems to be almost completely ineffable for us. 
                                                          
46 The claim about noumenal affection is controversial but I take there to be good evidence to suggest that Kant 
is committed to the reality of noumenal affection as a core element of his theory of sensibility. There are places 
in the Critique where Kant defines sensibility as “the capacity to acquire representations through the way in 
which we are affected by objects” (A 19/B 34). The crucial point is that the affecting objects seem to be super-
sensible things or things in themselves (A 42/B 59; A 494/ B 522; A 537/B 565; A 566/ B 594). 
47 Caveat: one might think that there is another concept that is neither an empirical one nor one of the 
categories, the concept of “I” which represents the transcendental consciousness, and it could be used to 
represent noumenal reality in the thin sense, i.e. to refer to some noumenal entity. But this presupposes a 
controversial view of the referential nature of the “I” in Kant’s “I think.” For a recent overview of the debate 
over the referential status of “I” in Kant’s treatment of transcendental consciousness and a defense of the 
aforementioned referential view, see Marshall (2010).  
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Besides its mere existence and some tenuous relationship to sensibility in general, we cannot 
think anything else about it.  
However, these observations should not obscure the possibility of raising a related, though 
distinct question whose answer could prove revealing of central and underexplored facets of 
Kant’s transcendental system. The level of generality at which I conducted the foregoing 
discussion concealed important distinctions between the different sources of ineffable truths 
that there might be, distinctions which may well be essential to a more detailed and deeper 
understanding of the sense in which Kant maintains the ineffability of noumenal reality. In 
order to formulate my target question in this paper, I have to introduce precisely such 
distinctions.  
 We often draw a content vs. form distinction in thought and language. The content of 
thought is often taken to be concepts or, at least loosely, the corresponding objects of thought 
in reality, i.e. properties, relations, events, objects, etc. So, one might think that we cannot 
represent any truths about noumenal reality, according to Kant, because we cannot form the 
necessary concepts to grasp the nature of the relevant objects, their properties, relations, etc. 
This would imply content limitations on what truths about noumenal reality we can represent. 
In light of the foregoing discussion, it should be obvious that that Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy implies precisely such limitations on our ability to represent the noumena. In fact, 
it is not strictly correct to formulate the relevant possibilities in terms of ineffable properties 
or objects as the corresponding categorial concepts, according to Kant, cannot have anything 
like the familiar content that they have in their application to the sensible or phenomenal realm. 
All that we could mean when we try to describe what is it that we are limited from representing 
is “something in general” for this is what the categories signify, at most, once they are divorced 
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from any sensible conditions for their application. If the content of “object” and “property” 
goes beyond the thin, merely logical content of the related categories, then we cannot even 
speak of objects having properties. This brings back the problem of the merely logical content 
of the categories.  
However, there may be another source of representational limitations that Kant could 
endorse. The form or structure of propositional thought could constitute a distinctive source of 
ineffable truth. One might think that there are facts or truths about things in themselves that 
have structural features radically different from the familiar predicative structures in our 
thought and language or any other kinds we employ. We represent the world, paradigmatically, 
with representations in subject-predicate form. We use the categorical form of judgment. In 
other words, we represent objects having properties. But there may well be truths with other 
propositional structures that are radically different from these ones. Such radically different 
structures could be in principle inaccessible to us. In this case, the source of the ineffability 
will be structural. Since Kant would hardly reify propositions as abstract objects and, by 
extension, their propositional structure, subscribing to an ontology of propositions or facts over 
and above the basic ontology of things in themselves, what such a hypothesis would amount 
to is the possibility of forms of judgment which another alien understanding could employ to 
represent truths about noumenal reality, forms of judgment that would be utterly alien to us.  
I am now in a position to articulate the main question that I would like to pursue in this 
paper. Does Kant’s transcendental system, in particular his theory of cognition, allow the 
possibility of structurally ineffable truths or, what comes to the same thing, alien forms of 
judgment? Could it be that one distinctive explanation of why noumenal reality is ineffable for 
us is not just that we cannot form the necessary concepts to represent the intrinsic nature of 
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things in themselves but that the human understanding is limited with respect to the forms of 
judgment it can use to represent the truths about noumenal reality? Call the thesis that it is 
possible for there to be alien logical forms of judgment underlying the possibility of 
structurally ineffable truths the ALF thesis. In effect, the thesis concerns the possibility of 
another kind of discursive understanding, characterized by the use of alien logical forms that 
we cannot conceive. The question then becomes: Would Kant endorse or reject the ALF thesis?  
It may seem like this question also admits of a fairly quick and easy answer as most of 
us are well aware of Kant’s adamant position on the so called completeness of the table of 
judgments. If Kant’s table of judgments is indeed complete, then it might seem as if we cannot 
intelligibly speak of representational limitations of a structural origin. The matter is a lot more 
complicated, however, not just because of Kant’s ambiguous remarks on the possibility of 
proving the table’s completeness but also because there are several distinct Kantian modal 
notions whose implications for the assessment of the ALF thesis are quite distinct. Moreover, 
appeal to the alleged completeness of the table of judgments by itself could not resolve the 
problem independently of a prior understanding of the nature of Kant’s analysis of the faculty 
of discursive understanding in the chapter on the Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories, 
i.e. independently of a correct view of whether Kant’s analysis is meant to apply only to the 
human discursive understanding, leaving it unsettled whether it is possible for there to be a 
different kind of discursive understanding than ours.  
The thesis I want to defend in this paper is that Kant would deny the possibility of alien 
forms of judgment. I offer a justification for this thesis that does not rely on considerations 
about the completeness of Kant’s table of forms of judgment, which may seem to be most 
relevant to the assessment of the question. I argue that a more promising line of argument is 
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centered on Kant’s discussion in the Paralogisms about the conditions of the possibility of 
representing finite minds or discursive thinkers. Moreover, I want to suggest that there are two 
main pay-offs to answering the main question this paper is concerned with. First, developing 
and defending an answer to the question is bound to illuminate substantive core issues in Kant’s 
theory of cognition such as the often unappreciated asymmetry in Kant’s assessment of the 
possibility of alternative forms of sensibility, on the one hand, and alternative forms of 
discursive representation, on the other, as well as the critical limits on any insight into the 
necessary features of our cognition that we can hope to achieve. Second, the grounds for 
dismissing SI truths or alien logical forms of judgment we could isolate from the critical system 
suggest that Kant anticipated a much discussed and prominent argumentative strategy against 
ineffable truths we find in Davidson’s treatment of radically alien conceptual schemes in “On 
the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1973). 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I define the key notions that will 
be essential to our analysis of Kant’s position on the ALF thesis. There are several 
complications attending the very formulation of the problem of ineffable truths that I will also 
need to address before I proceed to defend my main contention in this paper. In section three, 
I turn to my main discussion of Kant’s position on alien logical forms. Finally, in the fourth 
section, I consider possible objections to my analysis.  
3.2. Clarifying the Question 
What does it mean to say that there may be alien logical forms of judgment which could 
underlie the possibility of structurally ineffable truths? What is “logical form,” according to 
Kant? First, it is important to note that the notion of logical form which figures in Kant’s 
analysis of human cognition and his account of what he calls “general logic” is different from 
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our contemporary notion of logical form in certain crucial respects. Kant’s notion of form is 
tied to another key notion in his analysis of cognition, namely to “functions of the 
understanding” both of which play a prominent role in Kant’s so called Metaphysical 
Deduction of the Categories, i.e. the derivation of the categories from the corresponding forms 
of judgment. A “function,” according to Kant, is the “unity of the act of the understanding” as 
it brings unity among its representations, whether intuitive or conceptual, by subsuming them 
under a common, general representation. This is what judgment essentially is, according to 
Kant (A 69/B94). The role of the predicate concept in categorical judgments, for example, is 
to unify, by subsuming, the intuitive representations standing under the subject concept and 
the other concepts which form part of the subject concept (A69/B94).  
Logical form seems to be best thought of as an expression of these functions of the 
understanding, the particular ways in which the understanding unifies its representations in 
judgment. The logical forms reflect different modes of unification of representations. There 
are as many logical forms of judgment as there are functions of judgment. As such, this notion 
of logical form carries essential reference to acts of the understanding and so concerns the 
general, necessary features of such acts. Logical form characterizes acts of the understanding 
first and foremost or, more neutrally, reflects certain necessary features of them. It is hard to 
be more precise here since Kant does not go into further detail but a more thorough analysis of 
logical form is not necessary for our purposes here. Suffice it to say that this Kantian notion of 
“logical form,” intimately related as it is to psychological acts, is importantly different from 
our notion of logical form as that which underlies the logical-inferential properties of sentences 
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or propositions, codifiable in a formal language which is supposed to exhibit such properties 
perspicuously.48 
Given Kant’s understanding of “logical form,” all that the ineffability of propositional 
forms alien to us could amount to is the idea that some alien, discursive understanding has 
other modes of unifying its representations in judgments, modes of combination that do not 
govern our understanding. Since Kant derives the categories from the corresponding forms of 
judgment, such an understanding would presumably also possess alien, ineffable for us 
categorial concepts.  
The question under consideration here then becomes whether Kant would admit the 
possibility of an alien discursive understanding which can represent truths about noumenal 
reality, which will count as structurally ineffable for us. However, one problem that 
immediately arises, given this formulation of the relevant possibility, is that, according to Kant, 
any other merely discursive understanding like our own will also be limited in representing 
noumenal reality. All of the relevant considerations brought forth in the introduction to the 
paper in support of the claim that our human understanding cannot represent any truths about 
the noumena, with the exception of the truth of their existence and possibly their relation to 
phenomena, will also apply to the alien understanding. There will be no other truths about 
things in themselves that such an understanding can represent. This claim should not be 
controversial as long as we are assuming that the relevant understanding will be finite, 
discursive, and, conditioned by the same forms of intuition as the human understanding is.  
                                                          
48 Longuenesse, p.5.  
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The difficulty again is that Kant does not admit any ontology of facts and propositions, 
which could obviate the need to appeal to possible alien thinkers in formulating the hypothesis 
of structurally ineffable truths. Such independent reference to a domain of true propositions or 
facts is unavailable to us. But we could try to state the thesis in a way that does not presuppose 
the other alien thinkers can objectively represent noumenal reality. For instance, it is possible 
that there are other alien logical forms of judgment which are essential for representing truths 
about the noumena. Such alien forms of judgment would be necessary for such representation, 
so that if the alien thinkers had the capacity to form the requisite concepts with which to think 
about the noumena, they would be in a position to represent truths about the noumena reflecting 
the relevant logical forms.  
Still, one may argue that the key difficulty does not really have to do with the 
assumption that the alien discursive understanding will also be limited with respect to which 
truths about the noumena it can represent. Rather, there is a deeper difficulty of which these 
observations are merely symptomatic. One might think that there is an argumentative thread 
in Kant’s thought that could account for why no finite discursive understanding, whether it 
shares our forms of judgment or not, can represent noumenal reality. If, for example, Kant is 
committed to the view that things in themselves are the way that an intuitive intellect would 
represent them as being, then no finite discursive understanding can represent the way things 
in themselves really are. This is precisely the principle that Markus Kohl has attributed to Kant 
in the context of his argument for the claim that Kant does not endorse the applicability of the 
pure categories to things in themselves (Kohl 2015).  
An intuitive intellect, according to Kant, uses only intuitive and so direct or immediate, 
singular representations of individuals or objects, without any need to synthesize or unify 
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through concepts sensory representations that are received through a passive faculty of 
sensibility. Instead, it is characterized by a self-active, non-sensible form of intuition through 
which the objects of its intuition are first given (B 71-2; B 145; A 256/B 312; B 309). Since at 
least one key concept of a noumenon is what Kant calls the positive concept of a noumenon, 
namely the concept of an object with an intelligible constitution that can be the object only of 
a non-sensible kind of cognition, it may seem like noumena are properly represented only by 
such a non-sensible intuition. We have thus arrived at the idea of an intuitive understanding 
which by its nature can use no general representations for its cognition of things in themselves 
(Cf. Kohl 92). 
Moreover, it is quite clear that Kant conceives of a discursive understanding, as merely 
capable of thinking but not intuiting its objects, as a limited understanding in that respect (B 
71-2). Thus, it seems that any discursive representation of things in themselves will imply a 
limitation and this claim is best understood as a claim about limitations on the representation 
of how the noumena really are. Not even the pure categories can give us a proper conception 
of the nature of things in themselves for an intuitive understanding, which can cognize the 
intelligible constitution of things in themselves, has no use of the categories at all (B 145). If 
this is the case, then there is no good sense in which an intuitive intellect would be representing 
“truths” or facts about the noumena, as these notions would be applicable only to a discursive 
understanding for which judgment would be the primary means of representing objects. 
Judgments represent truths and facts, not singular intuitions of the kind that an intuitive 
intellect would employ.  
But if the foregoing line of thought is correct, then it is futile to ask about the possible 
representational limitations of a specifically human discursive understanding by comparing it 
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to some other alien discursive understanding which employs different discursive forms of 
unity, i.e. different forms of judgment. Both kinds of understanding, insofar as they are 
discursive, are necessarily limited in their capacity to represent the noumenal reality by their 
very nature. Moreover, it is mistaken to conceive of this limitation in terms of a limitation with 
respect to which truths the human and alien understanding can represent; it is a limitation that 
has a deeper source and has nothing whatsoever to do with the available forms of judgment. It 
stems from the very form of conceptual representation that finite minds are characterized by. 
But then it is hard to see how the problem of ineffable truths about the noumena could arise in 
the first place since reality as it is in itself is not characterized by a totality of “truths,” at all, if 
we pursue the foregoing line of thought to its natural conclusion.  
There is, however, good grounds to resist attributing this line of thought to Kant. Kant’s 
critical system cannot have at its core a principle about the nature of things in themselves, 
according to which this nature can be conceived only by a different kind of understanding of 
which we have a merely problematic concept. This is because Kant readily makes claims not 
only about the existence of things in themselves but also about noumenal affection as a source 
of the matter of experience and our own self-intuition, hence about both inner and outer 
affection (A 20/B34; A494-5/B522-3; B 153-6). But it cannot be the case that there is at the 
heart of the critical system an appeal to the positive notion of noumena as objects of a non-
sensible intuition or an intuitive intellect because, according to Kant, we have no understanding 
of how such an intuition is possible. It is, he claims, itself a problem and we have no insight 
into the real possibility of such an understanding: 
Nevertheless the concept of a noumenon [the negative concept], 
taken merely problematically, remains not only admissible, but even 
unavoidable, as a concept setting limits to sensibility. But in that case 
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it is not a special intelligible object for our understanding; rather an 
understanding to which it would belong is itself a problem, that, 
namely, of cognizing its object not discursively through categories 
but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition, the possibility of which we 
cannot in the least represent (A 256/B312; emphasis added). 
 
we have an understanding that extends farther than sensibility 
problematically, but no intuition, indeed not even the concept of a 
possible intuition, through which objects outside the field of 
sensibility could be given (A255/B310; emphasis added). 
How can Kant readily make positive claims about noumena, which are, moreover, central to 
his account of the conditions of the possibility of human experience such as the claims about 
noumenal affection, when the sense of “noumena” in question can be fixed only by appeal to 
a concept of a non-sensible, intellectual intuition that we do not possess? Clearly, Kant does 
make claims about the problematic notion of an intuitive intellect, claims which must have 
some content. But what Kant seems to be suggesting in the foregoing passages where he puts 
into question our understanding of what an intuitive intellect would be is that the concept of 
such an intellect is thin and the possibility of its object merely logical so that we are not at all 
justified in working with a positive concept of noumena as objects for such an intellect. But 
then he cannot be making use of this positive concept of noumena when he is articulating key 
principles of the critical system. An implication of this fact is that Kant cannot be committed 
to a view, according to which, the way things in themselves really are is the way an intuitive 
intellect would represent them as being, as Kohl suggests. It would negate the spirit of the 
critical philosophy, which sets strict epistemic limits on our ability to make any claims about 
reality as it is in itself if the very way we characterize this reality, even minimally, resorted to 
a problematic “concept” of an understanding that is not our own.  
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We cannot set as a standard of cognition of things in themselves what we cannot 
properly conceive of. All we can do is limit, negatively, the pretension of the human 
understanding and sensibility to be the standard for such cognition but this in no way allows 
us to locate this standard elsewhere either, and this seems to be a reflection of the critical 
standpoint, if anything is. Kant may indeed have use of a concept of a divine, intuitive intellect 
in other realms of his philosophy such as the practical philosophy and philosophy of religion 
but the theoretical system cannot make central use of this problematic concept. Hence, if we 
speak of limitations in our representations of the truths about noumena, the sense of limitations 
cannot be that of limitations stemming from the merely discursive character of our 
understanding. We cannot but speak of “truths” about reality for we can only conceive of 
reality as the sort of thing that we can think about and hence judge about and assert truths 
about. I conclude that there are no special difficulties for the coherence of my target question 
that arise from considerations about the relationship between the character of noumenal reality 
and the notion of an intuitive intellect.49 
                                                          
49 There is one additional issue that I should address by way of sharpening the content of the hypothesis of alien 
thinkers that we are presently concerned with before I move on to my main discussion. So far, I have focused on 
representational limitations with respect to noumenal reality. It may seem like there is hardly an alternative here. 
After all, the phenomenal world, according to Kant, is mind-dependent. How can there be ineffable for us truths 
about the phenomenal world if its character is entirely determined by facts about human experience? But it should 
not be hard to see that if we consider the possibility of another finite discursive understanding employing other 
forms of judgments and hence other categories, given the role of the categories in the constitution of the 
phenomenal world, there will be features of the phenomenal world that are ineffable for us. This is because the 
alien thinkers will also have to be conceived as transcendental subjects at the origin of the experiential world with 
whom we jointly constitute a world of phenomenal objects.  
First, any alien discursive understanding will also be conditioned by sensible intuitions and hence make judgments 
about sensible objects. There are two exhaustive options about what the character of its sensible intuition could 
be. But on both of these options transcendental idealism will have to be true. Either the alien understanding will 
be conditioned by the same kind of sensibility we have, i.e. a sensibility whose forms of intuition are space and 
time or it will be conditioned by a sensibility with different forms of intuition. In the first case, Kant’s conclusions 
about the ideality of space and time from the Aesthetic and his arguments about the sensible conditions of the 
applicability of categories to any objects will imply that the alien understanding will also be limited to cognizing 
a merely phenomenal world.  
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In the second case, if the alien understanding is conditioned by a different kind of sensibility, it will be especially 
difficult to see how we can share a world with thinkers characterized by such a sensibility, but even here the 
features of objects intuited within the alien sensible forms reflective of these forms will have to be merely ideal 
features. If this is the case, then the intuited objects will be mind-dependent for similar reasons that the 
phenomenal objects we intuit are mind-dependent. This is because Kant’s grounds for concluding the ideality of 
space and time are fully general and can apply to any forms of sensible intuition. Any forms of intuition will 
imply corresponding intuitive a priori representation. But it is the a priority of the representations of space and 
time, rather than their specific character as spatial or temporal intuitions, that ultimately grounds their ideality. 
Only by making the individuation of the corresponding objects of representation possible can a priori intuitive 
representations be applicable to these objects, according to Kant. Hence, the forms of sensible intuition as a priori 
intuitions, whatever they are, can only be applicable to objects if the objects of these a priori intuitions are ideal 
in the way space and time are ideal. But if the alien a priori intuitions represent ideal features of objects, then 
transcendental idealism will also follow in this second case. 
I cannot do full justice to this interpretative claim within the confines of this paper. Naturally, substantive 
interpretative work needs to be done to reconstruct Kant’s notoriously difficult argument for the ideality of space 
and time in the Aesthetic. Since it is not central to our purposes, I will have to reserve further justification of these 
claims for another paper. Suffice it to say, if the foregoing claims are true, then even in the case in which the alien 
thinkers are assumed to have other forms of intuition, they will be no closer to cognizing reality as it is in itself 
instead of their phenomenal world than we are. Transcendental idealism and the epistemic limitations it 
incorporates will be equally true for such thinkers.  
Finally, it is worth setting out explicitly why even in this second case, there will be ineffable for us truths about 
the phenomenal world constituted on the basis of the alien forms of intuition and categories. This is just the 
limiting case of ineffability. All of the truths about this world will be ineffable for us simply because we will have 
no experiential access to a world whose sensible character is different than the spatiotemporal character of our 
world. It is not our world. As such, this possibility can only have limited interest for us given the current concerns 
of this paper.  
Moreover, the more puzzling case is actually the first one. If we assume a joint constitution of the phenomenal 
world, it will be hard to understand how that world is grounded by facts about human categorial thought and 
sensible intuition but also by additional facts about alien categorial thought. Obviously, this possibility will be 
intelligible, perhaps partially, only on the assumption that the alien understanding employs our categories and 
additional ineffable ones and not altogether different categories than we do. Even in the former case, however, it 
is difficult to comprehend how it could be the case that there are additional features of the phenomenal world we 
occupy together with such alien thinkers grounded in facts about alien experience. There is little material in Kant’s 
critical texts that can decide for and against the intelligibility of this hypothesis. But as I will be concerned to 
argue in what follows, once we get clear on Kant’s position on the completeness of the table of judgments, it will 
emerge that we are not forced to confront such a puzzle. This is because, according to Kant, any finite discursive 
understanding, whether conditioned by a sensibility that shares our forms or not, will have to be characterized by 
our forms of judgment. So if alien thinkers can qualify as transcendental subjects at the origin of the phenomenal 
world, then they will be relevantly like us for such puzzles to dissolve.  
The problems that the hypothesis of other forms of sensible intuition gives rise to are not really our problems 
since, as argued above, there will be no good sense in which we would share a world with beings whose forms of 
sensible intuition are not our own. Forms of intuition are, after all, the individuating framework in which different 
objects are located. Differences in that framework amount to differences in the nature of the world represented. 
In what follows, I will thus be concerned only with the hypothesis that there is an alien understanding whose 
forms of judgment are different from our own, whether they overlap or not at all, but whose forms of intuition are 
still our own.  
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3.3. The Main Argument Against the Alien Forms Thesis 
Recall the Alien Forms Thesis. It states that it is possible for there to be logical forms 
necessary for representing truths about noumenal reality that are not accessible to the human 
discursive understanding. This claim, however, immediately runs afoul of Kant’s insistence on 
the completeness of his table of logical forms of judgment (A 67/B92; A69/B94; A81/B107). 
Given that Kant takes himself to have exhibited a complete table of logical forms, what room 
is there for the possibility of other alien forms? As the substantial literature on the problem of 
the table’s completeness testifies, however, there are difficulties with this easy line of response. 
There are two major difficulties. First, Kant does not seem to have offered any proof of the 
table’s completeness through a derivation of all of the forms from the common principle 
underlying the table’s coherence and systematicity that Kant appeals to in several places in the 
Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories (A 67/B92; A81/B107).50 It is thus possible to raise 
the following question. What can give us rational confidence that there are not more logical 
forms after all in the absence of a proof to the contrary? Second, seemingly paradoxically, Kant 
himself seems to preclude the possibility of such a proof. In a passage whose import is not 
often appreciated, Kant states the following: 
But for the peculiarity of our understanding, that it is able to bring 
about the unity of apperception a priori only by means of the 
categories and only through precisely this kind and number of them, 
a further ground may be offered just as little as one can be offered for 
why we have precisely these and no other functions of judgment or 
for why space and time are the sole forms of our possible intuition. 
(B146) 
                                                          
50 Kant is more explicitly referring to the completeness of the list of categories in these passages but evidently the 
claim also concerns the completeness of the list of forms of judgment as they are then used to derive the categories. 
The forms of judgment themselves need to spring from this “common principle” which underlies the systematicity 
and completeness of the respective tables.  
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The paradox, again, is that Kant seems to insist that the completeness of the table of judgments 
can be proven or that a derivation of the table is in principle possible and, at the same time, 
seems to deny that such a proof is possible. So, we might wonder again how we can be 
confident that there is no other kind of understanding capable of employing other logical forms 
of judgment to bring about its unity of apperception if we have no insight into the grounds for 
our forms of judgment. Perhaps if we had such insight, we would dismiss the possibility of 
another kind of understanding because we would be in a position to see that it cannot be 
otherwise in light of the ultimate grounds for these features of the human discursive 
understanding. Alternatively, such insight might put us in a position to see an ultimately 
contingent basis for such necessary features of our understanding, which would then leave 
room for alternative forms of cognition that another understanding might employ. How can we 
legitimately dismiss the possibility under consideration by Kant’s own lights?  
I will not address the important question of how to reconcile Kant’s claims about the 
completeness of the table of judgments and his seemingly paradoxical denial that we could 
have a ground for asserting that completeness at B146 in any detailed way. There are some 
reasonable attempts in the literature to remove the air of paradox. Lorenz Kruger (1968) and 
Reinhard Brandt (1995) have both done important work on the subject. I share their view that 
the paradox is only apparent. My own view is that Kant’s remarks at B146 do not contradict 
his claims about completeness for their import lies solely in the negative contention that we 
cannot have insight into the ultimate metaphysical grounds or source of this completeness for 
any such insight would require cognition of our minds as noumena or things in themselves. 
What we cannot attain is a distinctively metaphysical explanation of what transcendental 
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reflection reveals as necessary features of our cognition. I think this interpretation is confirmed 
by similar remarks Kant makes in a letter to Marcus Herz on May 26, 1789 [citation needed]: 
But we are absolutely unable to explain further how it is that a sensible 
intuition (such as space and time), the form of our sensibility, or those 
functions of the understanding as those out of which logic develops are 
possible; nor can we explain why it is that one form agrees with another in 
forming possible knowledge. For we should have to have yet another 
manner of intuition than the one have and another understanding with 
which to compare our own and with which everyone could perceive things 
in themselves. But we can only judge an understanding by means of our 
understanding, and so it is, too, with all intuition. 
Why would Kant mention that everyone would be able to perceive things in themselves in the 
context of an explanation of what would be the necessary conditions for us to have any insight 
into the functions of the understanding out of which logic develops? It would be implausible 
to think that, according to Kant, the grounds for the functions of our understanding are to be 
sought in outer things in themselves or those external to the mind. They seemingly have 
nothing to do with the nature of the human mind. So, the only relevant thing in itself in this 
context seems to be the noumenal mind or the noumenal self. We are, according to Kant, 
noumena, on the most plausible interpretations of his views, in addition to empirical beings. 
So, this passage is best read as referring to ourselves as things in themselves.  
What Kant seems to be suggesting here, unless his remark about things in themselves 
has no relevance whatsoever to his explanation of the impossibility of having any insight into 
the grounds for our functions of judgment, is that we cannot have an explanation that requires 
cognition of things in themselves. Moreover, it seems that precisely such cognition would be 
required, i.e. another understanding capable of such cognition with which we can compare our 
own. So if giving a justification or an explanation of why we have precisely this kind and 
number of logical functions of the understanding requires cognition of our noumenal minds, 
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then critical strictures on the possibility of such cognition preclude any such justification or 
explanation. I think Kant’s remarks at B146 in the Critique are best read in light of these further 
comments to Herz. But then all that Kant seems to be saying is that we cannot have any insight 
into the ultimate metaphysical grounds for the seemingly necessary features of our cognition.  
Notice, first, that Kant’s remarks at B146 do not have any implications about the 
possibility of other alien logical forms or other, hitherto undiscovered, human forms of 
judgments. It is consistent to argue, on the one hand, that we can have no insight into why there 
is precisely this number and kind of logical forms of judgment, and insist, on the other hand, 
that it is not possible for there to be other forms of judgment. We will have to see, on 
independent grounds, whether Kant would consider alien logical forms to constitute a genuine 
possibility, below. For now, I need to make several other observations. Crucially, the remarks 
at B146 do not contradict Kant’s other claims about the completeness of the table of judgments. 
We can still “readily” exhibit in an exhaustive way all the functions of the understanding as 
Kant contends just before laying out the table of judgments (A69/B94). We can be confident 
in the completeness of the table once we recognize the common principle from which all the 
functions/forms of judgment are supposed to spring, namely the understanding as a faculty for 
judging. Kant gives every impression of thinking that a derivation of all the logical forms, even 
if not explicitly provided by him, should not be hard to construct. But it is a good question why 
Kant does not provide the derivation himself and what the details of a derivation would look 
like.  
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There are some attempts to construct a derivation which take seriously Kant’s claim 
that it is the faculty of judging that provides the principle for any such derivation.51 But the 
details of such a derivation are not important for our purposes. What is essential, however, is 
the nature of the common principle that, according to Kant, secures the completeness of his 
table. If the best construal of this principle, i.e. “the faculty for judging (which is the same as 
the faculty for thinking),” grounds the derivation in analytic reflection on what judgment and 
hence thought is, given Kant’s concern to reduce all functions of the understanding to the 
functions of unity in judgments and given the view of judgment as a way of unifying many 
representations under one, we should be confident that the derivation will result in a complete 
table. We should be confident because the principle, once unpacked, is intimately tied to what 
judgement most fundamentally is, according to Kant. Hence, it is open to us to consider any 
putative claims about additional functions of judgment as incoherent for they would imply that 
we have not grasped something about what judgment is. We cannot coherently entertain the 
idea of other logical forms given that the basis for our derivation of the forms we recognize is 
ultimately an analytic one, i.e. it is analysis of judgment that most plausibly yields the table of 
judgments.  
In my view, the most cogent effort at working through the details of such a derivation 
is due to Reinhard Brandt, whose analysis aligns with the foregoing remarks (Brandt 1995). 
While I cannot discuss the merits of his proposal as opposed to alternative proposals within 
the confines of this paper, I should say that I take it that the proper account of the completeness 
of the table of judgments, developed roughly along the foregoing lines, should imply the 
incoherence, on analytic grounds, of the thesis that there could be alien logical forms of 
                                                          
51 Klaus Reich (1932; 1994) and Reinhardt Brandt (1995).  
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judgment. But my own strategy for showing that Kant would deny the possibility of alien 
logical forms does not rely on such an account. Instead, the purpose of the foregoing remarks 
was primarily to remove the air of paradox surrounding Kant’s claims about our lack of insight 
into the grounds for our functions of judgment. The paradox should disappear once we allow 
that there can be, on the one hand, ultimate metaphysical grounds for the nature of the faculty 
of judging, i.e. the character of the noumenal mind, which we cannot in principle grasp, and, 
on the other hand, analytic grounds for concluding that, given the nature of this faculty, there 
can be no other forms of judgment but the once Kant has exhibited. There is no inconsistency. 
One may still wonder, however, to what extent, if any, it is intelligible to suppose that 
what seems like an analytic truth, i.e. “there are exactly this number and kind of logical forms 
of judgment,” given the foregoing analysis, could also have an ultimate metaphysical ground. 
The first thing to note here is that Kant does not necessarily admit that there is such an ultimate 
metaphysical ground and hence an explanation for the functions of judgment. His remarks are 
consistent with a much weaker contention. All that he could be suggesting is that cognition of 
the noumenal mind would be necessary for any insight into the possible metaphysical grounds 
for the functions of judgment, if it is possible for there to be such metaphysical grounds in the 
first place, but that is not to say that there must be such metaphysical grounds or such an 
explanation.  
Now, it will be out of character for Kant to assume that there are brute facts about 
human cognition evident in the phenomenal realm that have no ultimate grounds in the 
noumenal mind but that is not to say that in any of these passages he exhibits commitment to 
this view. More importantly, however, there should be no difficulty in admitting further 
grounds for analytic truths, at least if we work with Kant’s own understanding of analytic 
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truths. This is because “ground” does not mean “truth-conditions” or “truth-makers” for Kant 
where the truth-makers for analytic truths would be, well, the content of the relevant concepts. 
It could still be the case that one could have a further insight into the nature of judgment by 
means of an insight into its basis in the character of the noumenal mind and hence insight into 
what follows from that nature, i.e. the particular modes of unifying representations in 
judgments.  
There are numerous examples of analytic truths interspersed throughout the Critique 
that admit of further “insight.” Consider, for instance, the statement that “space is one” or that 
“time is one,” which are, arguably, analytic claims for Kant. Even though they count as 
analytic, one could still have further insight into the ultimate grounds for such truths for one 
can investigate the ultimate metaphysical character of the things denoted by one of the key 
concepts, namely space and time. In fact, once we recognize that space and time are, originally, 
pure intuitions, hence singular representations by their very nature, according to Kant, we 
should come to have precisely such insight. Certainly, there is an important disanalogy here 
since we are not dealing with insight into any noumenal grounds but the latter is not essential 
for making the key point here. There are further grounds one can offer, as in explanatory 
grounds, of truths that we would deem to be analytic. This suffices to remove the 
aforementioned difficulty.  
 As noted above, I do not want to appeal to considerations about Kant’s principle for 
deriving the table of judgments. Even though a demonstration of how it can underwrite the 
completeness of the table should undercut the alleged possibility of alien forms of judgment, I 
want to explore a different route to that end. Part of my motivation for taking this route is that 
one can be skeptical of the power of any considerations about completeness to really undercut 
 104 
 
the possibility at hand. It is open to us to interpret Kant’s remarks about the completeness of 
the table of judgments as a relativized claim, namely as applicable only to the human 
understanding, which is the focal point of his investigation in the Metaphysical Deduction, 
anyway. So even if Kant has exhibited all the forms of judgment that a human discursive 
understanding can employ, this would still leave open the possibility that an alien discursive 
understanding will use other forms of judgment. Claims to completeness can and perhaps 
should be relative to a particular kind of understanding, or so one might argue.  
Now, one of the purposes of the foregoing remarks about the analytic grounds for 
Kant’s thesis about completeness was to forestall such attempts at relativization. However, I 
suspect that unless one produces a very detailed derivation of the logical forms of judgment, 
which shows by merely analytic steps how we end up with precisely this number of logical 
forms, skeptics will not be convinced. Since I do not have a detailed account of my own, I need 
to offer alternative, independent grounds for my main contention that Kant would reject the 
possibility of alien logical forms. I want to assess, on Kantian grounds, the modal claim that it 
is possible for there to be alien logical forms of judgment. In what follows, I argue that on the 
proper interpretation of the modal claim in question, Kant will reject this thesis.   
There are several different ways in which we can construe the ALF thesis. First, it could 
be that there is an alien discursive understanding that does not share any of our logical forms 
of judgment but uses entirely different ones. Second, it could be that the alien understanding 
shares with us the twelve forms of judgment but has additional ones, as well. Third, it could 
be that it shares with us only some of the forms of judgment but has additional ones, too. The 
third possibility should be formulated more carefully, however, once we make clear one facet 
of Kant’s views on the logical form of judgment. According to Kant, every possible judgment 
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is characterized by the four titles quantity, quality, relation, and modality. There is no possible 
judgment that can have quantitative form but no relation between the constituent cognitions or 
be neither affirmative, nor negative, nor infinite. Modality, too, characterizes every judgment. 
Hence, the alien forms of judgment must include at least the four different titles. But it might 
seem like there is room for the possibility that the alien thinkers will employ only some of the 
moments under the different titles but not others. For the sake of argument, I will assume for 
now that this third option is also coherent.  
I do not want to make any further specific claims about the different alternatives 
enumerated above. I think they admit of much the same treatment. All of these alternatives 
should prove indefensible in the final analysis. In order to develop my argument against the 
AFL thesis so understood, I need to articulate Kant’s theory of modality.  
There are several different modal notions that Kant is working with. There is, first, 
what we can call, judgmental modality, modality characteristic of the form of any judgment.52 
Judgmental modality thus characterizes any possible judgment, according to Kant, i.e. it is not 
reflected in the content of judgments in virtue of any explicitly modal notions so it is in a sense 
non-alethic. The different modalities here are what Kant calls problematic, assertoric, and 
apodeictic where a judgment is problematic if it represents the relation between constituent 
cognitions (whether concepts or judgments) as possible, assertoric if it represents the relation 
as actual or true, and apodeictic if it represents it as necessary. 
 Second, there is what we can call categorial modality which introduces explicitly 
modal content in judgments by means of the different categories of modality, derived from the 
                                                          
52 I borrow this formulation of the relevant kind of modality from Kannisto (2013).  
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judgmental modalities. These are “possibility,” “actuality,” and “necessity.” These categorial 
modal notions admit of two distinct interpretations or senses. As with any other categories, the 
modal ones can be either schematized or unschematized in Kant’s sense, which just means that 
they can be either given empirical content in virtue of the sensible conditions under which they 
can ever stand in a relation to objects or they can stand as “mere forms of concepts,” holding 
merely logical content. The schematized categories, whose interpretation Kant gives in the 
Postulates of Empirical Thought, represent real modality, according to Kant. This is supposed 
to contrast with merely logical modalities which give us only formal characterizations of the 
“inner validity” of judgments or the internal validity of concepts. As to be expected, logical 
possibility stands for lack of contradiction or consistency, logical actuality for what Kant takes 
to be conformity with the principle of sufficient reason and logical necessity stands for 
necessity based on the laws of the understanding. 
I want to consider both judgmental modality and the categories of real modality in 
relation to the ALF thesis. But before I do so, I need to say a few words about why the logical 
modalities should not be relevant for the assessment of the thesis. First, Kant takes a really 
strong position on the irrelevance of merely logical possibility for any metaphysical questions. 
Even when we can take a concept to be logically possible, according to Kant, i.e. non-
contradictory, all that this demonstrates to us that it is a well-formed concept. Mere logical 
consistency cannot guarantee us that whatever is represented by means of that concept is really 
possible for there may be some metaphysical conditions that render its existence impossible.53 
Similarly, the mere logical consistency of a judgment yields merely “the form of truth” for 
                                                          
53 This is part of Kant’s treatment of the ontological argument for the existence of God where he claims that 
the concept of God might be logically consistent but this does not guarantee us the real metaphysical 
possibility of its object (A 607/B635 – A 610/B637).  
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even though a cognition may be “in complete accord with logical form, i.e. not contradict itself, 
yet it can always contradict the object” (A60/B84). In order for a judgment to be a candidate 
for “material truth” as opposed to merely formal truth, it has to represent a possible relation of 
concepts where “possible,” means really possible. This observation is based on Kant’s 
requirements for genuinely objective representation, which I discussed in the introduction to 
the paper. To be able to stand in a possible relation to an object, a concept must have 
determinate enough content to exhibit the real possibility of its object as distinguished from 
other objects.  
One important consequence of Kant’s view here is that in order for any concept to count 
as a genuine objective representation, it must allow us to see the real possibility of its object. 
Hence, modality is intimately tied to Kant’s conception of objective representation. If this is 
the case, however, it should not be difficult to see why we should not be assessing the mere 
logical consistency of the ALF thesis. We are not interested in the logical possibility of alien 
logical forms and we should not be. For to demonstrate that there is no logical contradiction in 
the concept of alien logical forms, assuming for the sake of argument that there is no such 
hidden contradiction, is not thereby to exhibit the real possibility of a discursive understanding 
with such alien forms of judgment.  
In light of the foregoing remarks, we may be tempted to say, instead, that the notion of 
modality that should be relevant to assessing the possibility of an alien discursive 
understanding is real or empirical modality. Crucially, to attain the status of objective 
representation, the concept of an alien understanding will have to allow us to see the real 
possibility of its object for the corresponding judgment about a possible alien understanding to 
have any claim to material truth. Otherwise, by endorsing the view that it is possible for there 
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to be an alien understanding working with different logical forms, we will not be making any 
judgment about the world for a condition of the possibility of the latter is, according to Kant, 
the use of concepts which can at least have a possible relation to an object and that, as noted 
above, is understood in terms of the requirement that these concepts have determinate enough 
content to exhibit the real possibility of their objects as distinguished from others. Non-
contradictoriness is not sufficient for establishing this possible relation to an object. So, one 
might argue, “it is possible that” must be interpreted, by Kant’s lights, as “it is really possible.”  
However, there is a difficulty attending this tempting line of interpretation. Once we 
get clear on what Kant understands by real modality, we should be in a position to see that this 
line of interpretation would misrepresent the nature of the original issue. It will turn out that 
the defensibility or indefensibility of the ALF thesis should depend on whether the idea of an 
alien discursive understanding conforms to the empirical, sensible conditions for the 
representation of finite minds. This is a troublesome implication because we would have to 
end up denying the possibility of minds with different, alien forms of intuition, as well, under 
this particular interpretation of the relevant modality. But Kant is quite clear that alien forms 
of intuition are at least possible.  
So what does Kant mean by real modality? In short, he means empirical modality, i.e. 
the modal categories are given empirical content. According to his discussion in the Postulates 
of Empirical thought, Kant considers the modal notions as conditioned by sensibility in a way 
that gives us their corresponding empirical definitions: 
1. Whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in accordance 
with intuition and concept) is possible 
2. That which is connected with the material conditions of experience (of 
sensation) is actual. 
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3. That whose connection with the actual is determined in accordance with 
general conditions of experience is (exists) necessarily. (A 265/B266) 
 
If we evaluate the alleged real possibility of a discursive understanding which employs other 
forms of judgment, in accordance with all of the three options articulated above, we should 
thus be concerned with the conformity of this possibility with the formal conditions of 
experience both with respect to intuitions and concepts. What precisely does this mean? I take 
it that, minimally, what Kant means here is that a discursive understanding of the kind under 
consideration must be an object of our spatiotemporal intuition, hence embodied, and 
represented conceptually by means of our categories. It is thus an object of possible experience 
much like other human thinkers are objects of possible experience. But on this construal of 
possibility, it should turn out that it is not possible for us to represent minds with alternative, 
alien forms of intuition for we would not be able to make sense of how such finite minds could 
be occupants of the same spatiotemporal world that we are occupants of. It seems that when, 
in accordance with core tenets of the transcendental Aesthetic, we maintain that other forms of 
intuition should be possible, we are employing the merely logical notion of possibility all the 
while, that is, if we want to make sense of Kant’s commitment to the possibility of alien forms 
of intuition. So, the challenge is, why not take it that in our assessment of the ALF thesis it is 
actually logical modality that is relevant and not real modality?  
If real and logical modality are the only modal notions that Kant’s transcendental 
system allows, then there seems to be no other option. But surely, one might argue, it is at least 
logically possible that there be an alien discursive understanding characterized by different 
forms of judgment, i.e. there is no contradiction involved in the idea.  
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I think that there is a way out of this dilemma that allows us to respect the observation 
that Kant takes logical possibility to be irrelevant to questions of real metaphysical possibility. 
The way out is to notice that Kant must be operating with an additional notion of modality in 
the background, which is essentially tied to merely intellectual, as opposed to sensible 
conditions of representation. These intellectual conditions are only one element of what he 
calls real or empirical modality as the other element is given by intuitive conditions, i.e. for 
given objects to be really possible, they must conform to our spatiotemporal intuition. Call this 
additional modal notion operative in the background transcendental modality to mark its most 
essential aspect, namely that it is concerned with the broadest possible formal conditions for 
any human representation, namely intellectual conditions.  
The possibility of alien forms of intuition is safeguarded under this construal of the 
relevant modality because it is a possibility that conforms to the broadest intellectual conditions 
for any possible representation of objects - the principle of the unity of apperception and the 
categories of the pure understanding. Nothing in the thought about and hence representation of 
alien forms of intuition as a mere possibility violates the condition that finite minds 
characterized by such forms of intuition be representable in accordance with the categories and 
the highest intellectual condition, the synthetic unity of apperception. Finite minds 
characterized by different forms of intuition can still be represented in accordance with the 
categories and the synthetic unity of apperception. So, in short, we should take the relevant 
modal notion to be transcendental modality. This should be relatively unproblematic since 
Kant uncontroversially thinks of the categories as more general formal conditions of the 
representation of any objects of experience than our forms of intuition. Moreover, the logical 
conditions that ‘general logic” imposes do not exhaust the intellectual conditions for the 
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representation of any objects of experience since there are further such conditions which 
“transcendental logic” affords.54 
Hence, our main question becomes: what is it for minds to be objects of possible 
experience for us, according to Kant, if by that we mean objects which conform to the broadest 
intellectual conditions for the representation of any objects? It is, first and foremost, for them 
to be represented as capable of the same unity of apperception that we are capable of. But how 
do we recognize, by representing to ourselves, an intelligence that is, like us, capable of that 
necessary unity of apperception which is the ultimate ground for any discursive cognition? We 
take a being capable of the unity of apperception to be the kind of being that can attach the “I 
think” to all of its possible judgments just as we do. But how do we represent such a being to 
ourselves? Kant gives us a clue in the Paralogisms chapter in the A edition: 
It is obvious that if one wants to represent a thinking being, one must place 
oneself in its place, and thus substitute one’s own subject for the object one 
wants to consider (which is not the case in any other species of 
investigation); and it is also obvious that we demand absolute unity for the 
subject of a thought only because otherwise it could not be said “I think” 
(the manifold in a representation) (A354). 
A similar passage occurs at B 405 in the B-edition. Kant makes it explicit that the case of 
thinking beings is no exception to the critical principle that “we must necessarily ascribe to 
things a priori all the properties that constitute the conditions under which alone we think 
them” (A 347/B405). If these are the conditions for the representation of a thinking being, 
                                                          
54 Noumena, for instance, are not supposed to be merely logically possible as far as the negative concept of a 
noumenon does not contain any contradiction. Rather, they are possible in the stronger sense in which the 
concept of a noumenon accords with our categories as a general representation of a type of object which can 
be thought under the unschematized categories of substance, cause, etc. I think that making the notion of 
transcendental modality, of which empirical, real modality is a particular instance, explicit, can allow us to make 
sense of a lot of theoretical claims that jointly characterize Kant’s critical framework, the claims about noumena 
being one example.  
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according to Kant, then if we are to encounter a possible alien thinker in experience, then this 
experience must allow for this effort at imaginative identification with a mind capable of the 
representation “I think.” But it is important to be clear about the sense in which experience 
“must allow” this imaginative identification. Crucially, it can do so only in a negative way, i.e. 
by exhibiting features that do not render this imaginative representation impossible. This is 
because outer experience can never represent self-conscious thinkers to us: 
Now I cannot have the least representation of a thinking being through an 
external experience, but only through self-consciousness. Thus such objects 
are nothing further than the transference of this consciousness of mine to 
other things, which can be represented as thinking beings only in this way 
(A347/B405; emphasis added).  
To be sure, Kant would allow that we can have “signs” and hence some defeasible evidence 
that we are dealing with self-conscious thinkers in experience, presumably related to the 
possibility of communication. But all that experience can afford us is such signs. It is 
constitutive of the representation of such thinking beings that they are in the final analysis a 
“transference of our consciousness.” This has consequences for how we interpret our 
experience of other minds. This experience, if indeed we can take it to be an experience of 
other minds, must conform to these constitutive conditions for the representation of anything 
that is to count as a thinking being for us. What one represents then is a being that has a concept 
of “I” and, moreover, can make very much the same judgments we make so that they fill in “I 
think__(the manifold in a representation)” in a way that makes such judgments recognizably 
our own. It is judgments, first and foremost, which serve as those representations that we can 
predicate of ourselves as subjects of thought (A 348/B406). If we are to confirm on the basis 
of experience that we have indeed encountered a thinking being, then we must recognize its 
ability to make judgments that we can recognize as such, i.e. our kinds of judgments.  
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It is not hard to see the consequences of Kant’s view for the putative possibility of alien 
thinkers. If we are to encounter such alien thinkers, communication should confirm our guiding 
presupposition that such beings are capable of apperception. But apperception, objective unity 
of apperception of the kind that any discursive understanding must be capable of, according to 
Kant, is achieved and thus expressed through judgment. A significant portion of his so called 
B-Deduction is devoted to an argument for precisely this claim. The logical form of all 
judgments, according to Kant, “consists in the objective unity of apperception of the concepts 
contained therein” or a judgment is “nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to 
the objective unity of apperception” (B 142). But then again if we are to recognize the requisite 
kind of apperception in the alien thinkers we must recognize “the logical form of judgment” 
that is familiar to us in their own representations. Hence, any experience of a thinking being 
we can take ourselves to have must be interpreted in such a way that we can recognize it as an 
experience of beings who judge like us, i.e. with our forms of judgment. 
Consider then the above mentioned possibility that the alien discursive understanding 
might not share any of our logical forms of judgment. It should now be clear why this can 
never be considered as a real possibility, according to Kant. Given the conditions of the 
possibility of representing any thinking being, we can never count anything as experiential 
evidence that we have encountered thinking beings who can employ alien to us logical forms 
of judgment. What about the possibility that while the alien understanding shares all of our 
forms of judgment, it has, nonetheless, other forms of judging that we do not have? It might 
be that we can satisfy the conditions of the possibility of representing a thinking being in this 
case in virtue of representing a being who shares our forms of judgment. We can perform the 
imaginative transference that Kant insists upon. It is just that we can also suppose that there 
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other judgments, other ways in which the alien mind can fill in “I think__” that are ineffable 
for us.  
However, this second possibility is also illusory. For recall that, on Kant’s conception 
of logical form, all judgments are characterized by all of the titles of logical form Kant exhibits 
in his table of judgments. Every judgment has a quantity, quality, relation, and modality. But 
if we adhere to this conception of logical form, then any additional title with its own moments 
that could characterize the logical form of alien judgments must also characterize our own, on 
the assumption that we make very much the same judgments as they do, given the argument 
articulated above. But this possibility is naturally incoherent. Our judgments cannot have 
additional logical forms that we do not know of or cannot come to know of.55 These 
observations should also suffice to undercut the third alleged possibility mentioned above. It 
cannot be the case that the alien understanding shares only some of our logical forms and 
employs some additional ones, too, for identical reasons. For any additional logical forms of 
judgment must first belong under some general category or title and whatever it may be, it 
must characterize our judgments, too.  
Given Kant’s conception of logical form, the only alternative that is seemingly coherent 
on first inspection is the first one, according to which the alien thinkers share none of our 
logical forms of judgment. But we have seen good reasons to think that Kant would find this 
alternative incoherent as well. There is no other sense of “possibility” that Kant allows, which 
could enable us to formulate the ALF thesis in a way that could be admissible for Kant. 
                                                          
55 Notice that Kant is not working with any substantive theoretical distinction between deep vs. surface logical 
structure in order for it to make sense to entertain the possibility that some of our judgments have logical structure 
that is inaccessible to us. This ties back to the fundamental point that logical form, according to Kant, is a 
characteristic of psychological acts, it is very different from contemporary notions of logical form. 
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Whether we have a proof of the completeness of the table of judgments or not, Kant is in a 
good position to reject the ALF thesis by his own lights.  
At this point, the reader will no doubt notice the extensive similarities between this 
Kantian argument against ineffable truths or facts and Davidsonian arguments, although the 
latter are developed at the level of linguistic considerations whereas the former is developed 
on the level of thought and mental representation. According to the Davidsonian line of 
argument, there could be no ineffable for us languages or large portions thereof, and hence no 
ineffable for us truths representable in such languages, for these would have to be 
untranslatable into our own language. But nothing can count as evidence of linguistic behavior 
or speech if it does not also count as evidence that the relevant speech can be translated into 
our own language (Davidson 1978). Similarly, Kant’s argument goes, as reconstructed above, 
nothing can count as evidence that some being has a mind and so a discursive understanding 
capable of apperception if it does not also count as evidence that it has our kind of 
understanding or judges relevantly like us. 
Before I move on to consider possible objections to my reconstruction of Kant’s 
position on the ALF thesis, I think it is worth noting a potentially illuminating disanalogy 
between Kant’s treatment of the sensible conditions of human experience and the intellectual 
ones. Kant is concerned to limit the pretensions of the human faculty of sensibility to represent 
objects as they are in themselves. Such concern explains the importance he places on the so 
called negative concept of noumena, which he also calls a “boundary” or “problematic” 
concept (A255/B310). It is the concept of things which cannot be conceived as objects of 
sensible intuition and hence only as objects in themselves, i.e. independently of sensibility. It 
is a boundary concept because it serves as a “boundary for given concepts” (A254/B310-11). 
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What is the concept that the negative notion of a noumenon provides boundaries for? It is the 
concept of sensible intuition of the kind that characterizes our faculty of sensibility. It is a 
concept that limits the applicability of our sensible form of representation in virtue of 
presenting a possible object that cannot be represented or thought of as an object of that kind 
of representation. It also reflects the fact that we have no proof that our sensible kind of 
intuition is the only kind of intuition that there could be (A255/B310).  
But now, if Kant is prepared to admit alternatives to our kind of intuition, given the 
suspicion that he is not justified in assuming that our discursive understanding is the only kind 
of discursive understanding, it should be surprising that Kant does not appeal to another 
boundary concept, namely the concept of an alien discursive understanding or some such 
concept. In fact, given the epistemic strictures on our assumptions about the extent to which 
our cognitive capacities can provide the standard of representing reality as it is in itself, flowing 
from the critical standpoint, one would expect Kant to take measures here. If we have no proof 
that no other kind of discursive understanding is possible, as the skeptic about Kant’s grounds 
for claiming the completeness of his tables would contend, then this should be reflected in a 
similar boundary concept in the case of our intellectual representations not just sensible ones.  
I think it is significant that we see such a disanalogy between the two cases. It is 
symptomatic of what I take to be a core feature of Kant’s analysis of the conditions of the 
possibility of human experience. In the context of his analysis of human discursive 
representations in the Metaphysical Deduction, Kant is also offering an analysis of discursive 
representation tout court. There is no analogous analysis in the context of his treatment of the 
human faculty of sensibility in the Aesthetic. There may be not only a different kind of intuition 
than our own but there may be different forms of sensible intuition [A 27/B43; citation 
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needed].56 But Kant, tellingly, nowhere indicates the possibility of another kind of discursive 
understanding. In other words, he nowhere indicates the possibility of an understanding 
characterized by different forms of judgement in the way he seems to allow for the possibility 
of different forms of sensibility. Given that we have some reason to think that he would do so 
if he considered this to be a genuine possibility, we should admit his failure to do so as some 
indirect evidence that he took himself to be providing an analysis of the discursive faculty of 
understanding per se.  
3.4. Objections and Replies 
3.4.1 First Objection 
One may question the foregoing contention that there is an important asymmetry in 
Kant’s treatment of the sensible conditions of possible experience, on the one hand, and his 
treatment of the intellectual ones, on the other. There are two distinct ways to see this. If the 
main line of argument against the ALF thesis that I attribute to Kant were correct, it would be 
possible to generalize it and apply it to the case of alien forms of intuition. Couldn’t one argue 
that alien forms of intuition are not a genuine possibility because finite minds characterized by 
such forms of intuition could not be represented as capable of the synthetic unity of 
apperception? If we have to represent any putative discursive thinkers as capable of filling in 
“I think_(the manifold in a representation)” in much the same way we do, so that we can 
recognize them as making very much the same types of judgment we make, then should we 
not expect that the alien thinkers have to employ much the same categories of thought we do? 
But to recognize them as employing the same categories of thought we employ would require 
that they have the corresponding forms of intuition for the relevant categories in question can 
                                                          
56 Text at B43 not explicit about different forms of sensible intuition but context makes the claim plausible.  
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only be the schematized ones, which are essentially given empirical meaning through the a 
priori form of time. Such a line of argument, however, would directly contradict Kant’s 
assertions that other forms of intuition are at least conceivable or possible.  
The foregoing challenge is misconceived, however. Kant’s discussion in the 
Paralogisms does not in any way suggest the aforementioned, stronger condition on attributing 
the unity of apperception to other minds. Our kinds of judgment are just the judgments 
characterized by our logical forms. This is because the ground on which one can first maintain 
the necessity of attributing our forms of judgment to the putative alien thinkers is the 
connection between the logical form of judgment and the objective unity of apperception 
established in the B-deduction. But there is no comparable route from the unity of apperception 
to the necessity of our forms of intuition.  
Moreover, this point can be appreciated by simply keeping in sharp focus the very 
structure of the B-deduction where Kant first argues for the applicability of the pure categories 
to objects of experience by arguing that any manifold of intuition must stand under the 
categories which ground the unity of that manifold. The identification of the objective unity of 
apperception with the logical forms of judgment occurs in the context of this argument 
culminating in section 20 of the B-deduction (B 143). But Kant does not specify at this stage 
of the deduction that the manifold given in intuition must be the sensible, spatiotemporal 
manifold that characterizes our form of experience. It is only in the second stage of the B-
deduction that Kant argues that the unity of our specific empirical intuition must be accounted 
for by way of the application of the categories to experience (B 144-5).  
Still, there is another distinctive way in which the claim of asymmetry may be 
challenged. I argued above that we should pay special attention to the fact that Kant nowhere 
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speaks of a boundary concept for the discursive faculty of understanding whereas he, notably, 
introduces the negative concept of a noumenon as a boundary concept to limit the pretensions 
of the faculty of sensibility. But doesn’t Kant in effect introduce a boundary concept for the 
human discursive understanding in the form of the positive concept of a noumenon? Recall 
that the positive concept of a noumenon is the concept of a purely intelligible object that is the 
target of a non-sensible intuition or, what comes to the same thing, of an intuitive intellect. The 
notion of an intuitive intellect seems uniquely suited to provide the necessary contrast to our 
discursive intellect and, moreover, capture the necessary epistemic humility when considering 
the limits or bounds of the human discursive intellect in cognizing reality as it is in itself. 
Perhaps then there is a corresponding boundary concept for the human discursive 
understanding. Furthermore, one might argue, the symmetry between the sensible and 
intellectual conditions of experience is quite striking since it is the two distinct concepts of a 
noumenon which correspondingly serve as boundary concepts for human sensibility and 
human discursive thought. But if Kant introduces one boundary concept for the human 
discursive understanding in the form of the positive concept of a noumenon, the objection goes, 
why not take him to be prepared to introduce a different one, namely the concept of an alien 
discursive understanding characterized by different forms of judgment than our own? It would 
then be hard to maintain that Kant’s project in the Metaphysical Deduction is the wholly 
general, analytic project of specifying what discursive thought is tout court, as opposed to 
merely what human discursive thought is supposed to be like.  
The trouble with this line of argument, however, is that it runs afoul of the foregoing 
observations that Kant cannot be committed to the view that things in themselves are the way 
an intuitive intellect would represent them as being, contrary to Kohl’s thesis. The major point, 
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recall, is that the positive concept of a noumenon, as opposed to the negative one, is a merely 
problematic concept, according to Kant, insofar as we do not really understand how a purely 
intellectual intuition is to be possible. We have a thin, merely logical grasp of this notion. 
Moreover, it is essential to Kant’s claim that the negative concept of a noumenon is a boundary 
concept that it is grounded in certain key results of the Aesthetic. It is because we have good 
grounds to think that there are objects which can be thought independently of our sensible 
conditions of representation, namely things in themselves, given the arguments for the ideality 
of space and time, that we can be confident in the use of this negative concept of noumena. In 
other words, the results of the Aesthetic about the ideality of space and time are what ultimately 
justify the use of this concept and the pretensions of sensibility are limited in virtue of Kant’s 
demonstrations that things in themselves are not in space and time. The negative concept of a 
noumenon thus merely encapsulates the philosophical insight into the limits of sensibility we 
get from Kant’s prior arguments in the Aesthetic. He says as much: 
Now the doctrine of sensibility is at the same time the doctrine of the noumenon in 
the negative sense, i.e. of things that the understanding must think without this 
relation to our kind of intuition, thus not merely as appearances but as things in 
themselves (B 308).  
But it is important to notice that Kant has no similar grounds on which to defend the use of the 
positive concept of a noumenon and it is not a concept that encapsulates critical results to the 
effect that there are objects which must be thought independently of our pure categories of 
thought. There is no corresponding argument about the transcendental ideality of the pure 
concepts of the understanding, a result which would then be captured in the positive notion of 
a noumenon.  
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Furthermore, in light of my foregoing argument against the view that Kant is committed 
to the principle that things in themselves are the way that an intuitive intellect would represent 
them as being, it should be clear why there cannot be such a boundary concept. For to say that 
there is such a boundary concept is to say something very much along these lines, i.e. there are 
objects whose nature is what an intuitive understanding would represent it as being, objects to 
be represented independently of human categorial thought. This would be parallel to the claim 
that there are objects, things in themselves, which are to be represented independently of 
conditions of sensibility such as our own. But, the crucial point is, we cannot say anything 
along the foregoing lines given the critical strictures of Kant’s transcendental framework. 
Hence, Kant gives us no reason to think that he is prepared to treat the intellectual conditions 
of possible experience in the same way as he is prepared to treat the sensible ones. Sensibility’s 
pretensions should be limited. But the claims of the human discursive understanding to 
represent reality as it is in itself are limited in a very different kind of way. They are limited in 
virtue of the necessity of sensible conditions for the application of the categories to any objects 
that we could experience. But this is just the familiar result of the Analytic of Concepts and 
the Analytic of Principles and does nothing to justify the use of the positive concept of a 
noumenon. I conclude that there are no good grounds to think Kant has introduced a boundary 
concept for the human discursive understanding or could be prepared to introduce one in the 
form of a concept of an alien discursive understanding. 
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3.4.2 Second Objection 
There is one final objection to my main thesis in this paper, which I need to address. It 
is perhaps the most serious and pointed objection of the ones broached here. One might argue 
that the line of thought attributed to Kant here makes his commitment to ineffable aspects of 
reality a complete muddle. If my interpretation were correct, then we would not be able to 
make sense of the claim that there are any truths about noumenal reality that are ineffable for 
us human beings but there being such truths is a commitment of the transcendental philosophy. 
If we are going to maintain that there are content ineffabilities, according to Kant’s 
transcendental system, i.e. ineffable truths about noumenal reality whose particular conceptual 
content is inaccessible to us human beings, then it should be possible to conceive of alien 
discursive thinkers who can represent such truths. But it seems that it is not possible to conceive 
of such thinkers. Moreover, the objection goes, there is a clear-cut diagnosis of why or where 
the main argument of this paper goes wrong. The argument confuses the proper standpoint 
from which the putative possibility of ineffable truths is to be evaluated. Bringing in 
considerations about the formal conditions for the representation of other minds is just as 
misguided in the case of structurally ineffable truths as it would be if we had to evaluate the 
possibility that there are ineffable for us truths of non-structural origin. The mistake stems from 
relying on the notion of transcendental modality isolated above. The ALF thesis should be 
evaluated, instead, only from the standpoint of logical possibility.  
However, this line of thought is mistaken. Our failure to imagine alien thinkers who 
entertain ineffable for us truths that are of non-structural origin depends on the truth of 
transcendental idealism as applied to such thinkers, it does not depend on this alleged 
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possibility violating necessary conditions for the representation of other minds. In other words, 
conceiving the possibility of non-structural ineffable truths depends on having a coherent 
negative concept of noumena. The conception of such ineffable truths follows straight from 
formal conditions on our experience, as a framework proposition of the transcendental system. 
Any finite minds characterized by our forms of intuition and categories, or even alternate a 
priori forms of intuition, which, nonetheless, would still underlie the corresponding ideal 
features of the objects intuited under these forms, must be limited with respect to what concepts 
they can use to represent reality as it is in itself – empirical and pure. But just as in the human 
case, this would leave things in themselves unknowable and beyond the possibility of 
substantive cognition for such finite minds. All this follows from transcendental idealism about 
the formal sensible conditions of experience and the limited application of the pure categories. 
Content ineffabilities are thus grounded in the truth of transcendental idealism.  
The contrast between the conditions for conceiving of content versus structural 
ineffabilities, within the transcendental system, should be clear at this point. The conception 
of SI truths depends on our having a coherent concept of an alien discursive understanding, 
which I have been concerned to argue, we do not seem to have given the most general 
intellectual conditions on possible experience of other minds. The conception of content 
ineffabilities, on the other hand, depends on having a coherent negative concept of a 
noumenon, i.e. an object that is not characterized by spatial and temporal features and could 
only be thought through the unschematized categories and thus not at all cognized. The 
conceivability of ineffable truths in this sense, non-structural ones, thus does not depend on 
conceiving alien thinkers who can represent such ineffable for us truths.  
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But the resolution of the problem is only apparent, the objector might respond. For the 
real difficulty transpires only after we make explicit this difference in the conditions of 
conceivability of structural and non-structural ineffable truths. If, indeed, it is not necessary to 
take a mediate route of conceiving alien thinkers who can represent ineffable for us truths of 
non-structural origin to make sense of the possibility of such truths, then there is a problem 
with my set-up of the problem in the first place. As I noted at the beginning of the paper, Kant 
should hardly be interpreted as endorsing an ontology of facts and propositions over and above 
the ontology of objects he is working with. But, one might argue, wouldn’t one be in effect 
forced to admit such an ontology of facts or true propositions to make sense of the possibility 
of ineffable for us truths? If the route through other alien thinkers capable of thinking such 
truths is not available to us, what other option is left? It seems then that we cannot even 
formulate the problem of ineffable truths of non-structural origin, if the argument I attribute to 
Kant is correct.  
However, the tacit presupposition that Kant must either admit an ontology of facts or 
propositions or take the mediate route mentioned above in order to make sense of the 
possibility of ineffable truths is mistaken. First, it is important to note that Kant starts out with 
a conception of reality as first and foremost a totality of objects or things and then recovers the 
notions of truth and fact as the correlate of the only kind of intellectual representation that we 
are capable of, i.e. discursive representation, or as the correlate to our judgments. Second, we 
can speak of ineffable truths or facts when we speak of ineffable aspects of reality, even with 
no background ontology of facts or propositions, within the transcendental system, because we 
are bound to think of the world in terms of the possibility of conceptual, discursive 
representation, i.e. the possibility of making judgments about it. In other words, what justifies 
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the move from ineffable aspects of reality to ineffable truths about these aspects of reality is 
the absolute necessity of thinking about reality in terms of the only kind of representation that 
is available to us humans. Kant can thus respect the analytic observation that if there are 
ineffable aspects of reality or some ineffable way that reality is, then there has to be a truth 
about how reality is or about these ineffable aspects of it.  
If, nonetheless, one insists that in the absence of a background commitment to fully 
mind-independent facts and propositions, one cannot make sense of the idea that there are 
truths and facts ineffable for us, then it is open to us to interpret Kant as committed only to 
ineffable aspects of reality and abandon talks of truths or facts altogether. He can then 
accommodate the observation that it is natural to move from ineffable aspects of reality to 
ineffable truths about it along the same lines as above. Given the very form of our intellectual 
representation of reality, i.e. the use of judgment or discursive thought with its logical forms, 
we are bound to think in terms of truths, i.e. represent the world as a totality of truths or facts. 
The appearance of a deep difficulty here is, I want to suggest, due to an insufficient 
appreciation of the distinctive way in which Kant understands the concept of reality, an 
understanding which he inherits from the early moderns. Before the Tractarian framework 
where we become comfortable talking about reality as a totality of facts or truths, it used to be 
natural to adopt a different concept of reality as a totality of objects or, in the philosophical 
idiom of early modern philosophy, a totality of substances. The idea of reality as a totality of 
truths is only derivative in Kant’s system and this should be kept in mind in assessing Kant’s 
views on ineffable truth.  
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I have argued that Kant would reject the possibility of alien logical forms of judgment.57 
If the foregoing reconstruction of a central line of thought from the Paralogisms is correct, then 
                                                          
57 There is one additional way in which one might object to the foregoing argument against alien logical forms. 
Granted that all titles of logical form of judgment must characterize each judgment, as the Kantian conception 
demands. Still, it may be the case that there is some additional form of judgment that is relevantly like the modality 
of judgments, adding nothing to the “content” of a judgment but, instead, representing the “value of the copula in 
relation to thinking in general,” as Kant maintains (A 75/B 100). If such an alien logical form of judgment is 
conceived in analogous terms, then there may not be any special difficulty in admitting it while simultaneously 
maintaining the Kantian view of logical form. It could be that this fifth title of judgment, alien to us, also 
characterizes human judgments but with no awareness on our part that it does so. After all, on the Kantian view, 
the modality of judgments is not discerned by reflection on their content but their relationship to thinking in 
general. Why couldn’t there be a title of judgment that shares this feature of modality and thus intelligibly remains 
hidden from our human understanding? If there could be such a title of forms of judgment, only the alien 
understanding will be capable of recognizing the relevant logical forms. But this hypothesis seems to harbor no 
incoherence.  
The problem with this line of argument is that it attempts to gloss over the real difficulty with the hypothesis at 
hand. The real difficulty is not to conceive of a form of judgment that is in no way reflected in the content of 
judgments but to conceive of a form of judgment that is in principle unrecognizable as such, even though it 
characterizes, by assumption, all of our judgments. Even modality, which is not reflected in the content of a 
judgment, showing the relation to thinking in general, can be recognized by us once Kant elaborates on the said 
“relation to thinking in general.” What this relation is supposed to be is controversial. Blecher (2013) argues that 
Kant’s conception of formal modality concerns the attitudes or understanding that a subject of thought has to his 
or her own acts of judgment. A similar line of interpretation is advanced by Mattey (1986). For an alternative 
interpretation, according to which the modality of judgment reflects the location of a judgment in an inference or 
a course of reasoning, see Jessica Leech’s (2010). I think Leech’s analysis is the more plausible one. On the 
analysis I prefer, it is the inferential, syllogistic role of judgments that underlies their modality. Kant identifies 
the forms of modality in terms of the place of the relevant types of judgment in possible or potential syllogisms: 
“The assertoric proposition deals with logical reality or truth. Thus, for instance, in 
a hypothetical syllogism the antecedent is in the major premise problematic, in the 
minor assertoric, and what the syllogism shows is that the consequence follows in 
accordance with the laws of the understanding. The apodeictic proposition thinks the 
assertoric as determined by these laws of the understanding” (A75-6/B101) 
 
Certainly, we can recognize the modality of judgments when so construed. The possibility of alien logical forms 
we are presently entertaining, on the other hand, can be upheld only if these forms, analogous to modality, in 
principle escape our recognition despite characterizing our judgments. I submit that no “relation to thinking in 
general” construed in some other terms, can be reflected in the putative alien forms of judgment. For this would 
require that we cannot in principle recognize what the relation to thinking in general underlying the alien forms 
of judgment is supposed to be. This scenario is unintelligible. To judge and think is to know implicitly what the 
relationship of one’s judgments to thought in general is supposed to be, if thought in general means a system of 
judgments standing in logical relations.  
We are not entertaining the possibility of different, alien forms of inference or syllogistic reasoning 
within which judgments with the alien to us logical forms would be situated. In order for there to be such alien 
inferential forms, there must be corresponding logical forms of judgment, as Kant takes the table of judgments 
minus modality to be mirrored in the table of syllogistic forms – categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. Not 
only is the latter table reflective of the former but it is also grounded in it since Kant’s core thesis in the 
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it shows that Kant has the resources to reject the AFL thesis without providing a proof of the 
completeness of his table of judgments, a proof that has remained so elusive for commentators 
and scholars. Hence, if the foregoing analysis is correct, it will also have the virtue of steering 
clear of long-standing controversy surrounding Kant’s justification for the claim to 
completeness of his general logic.  
                                                          
Metaphysical Deduction is that all functions of thought are ultimately reducible to functions of judgment. Forms 
of judgment are prior in the order of analysis to forms of syllogistic reasoning. 
We have dismissed the possibility of additional titles of judgment above, at least titles that can contribute 
to the “content” of a judgment in a way quality, quantity and relation do, according to Kant. Hence, there can be 
no alien syllogistic forms either. But then, under the present hypothesis, all alien thought is relevantly like ours 
with the sole exception of the presence of a form of judgment reflective of the relationship between each judgment 
and “thought in general.” However, it is not even clear what it could mean for such a relationship to be ineffable 
for us and this suggestion runs contrary to a very natural view of what it takes to be able to judge or think, namely 
an implicit understanding of how one’s judgment is related to other judgments.  
It will not help to construe Kant’s analysis of modality in alternative terms either. According to an alternative 
view of Kantian modality, the formal modality of judgments concerns the attitude that the subject takes to the 
content of a judgment, i.e. taking its assertion to be admissible or optional in the case of problematic judgments, 
taking it to be true or real in the case of assertoric judgments or taking it to follow from the laws of the 
understanding in the case of apodeictic judgments. If modality concerns some cognitive attitude that the subject 
of thought takes to either affirmations or negations, it would be even more absurd to think of some other alien 
form of judgment relevantly like modality where the relationship to thought in general is thought along the above 
articulated lines. For what could it mean to say that the cognitive attitudes we take to our judgments are in principle 
unrecognizable by us? Trying to conceive of an alien form of judgment on the analogy with formal modality is, I 
conclude, a futile effort. One may elect to stay silent on the nature of the relevant relationship to thought in general 
reflected in the putative alien forms of judgment but this will hardly help. There is only a limited range of options 
about what such a relationship can be. It can either concern the relationship of judgment to the subject of judgment 
or its relationship to other judgments and we have seen that neither of these options is workable 
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4. Realism and the Ineffable 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Most of us like to think that the external world is independent from our minds. What 
exists in reality, what it is like, or what is the case is, in some sense, to be further specified, 
independent from our minds. Whether we represent it as being a certain way or not, whether 
we perceive or think of it, reality is there anyway, to use a familiar phrase of Bernard Williams’ 
(Williams, 1986). Let us agree with Nagel, in his discussion on the topic of realism in the The 
View from Nowhere (Nagel, 1989) that this is “the natural picture” of the relationship between 
mind and reality. Let us further call this natural picture “realism,” also in line with Nagel.  
Here is a line of argument that might seem forced on us given our natural commitment 
to realism. If reality is independent from our representations of it, then it seems like, unless we 
are (implausibly) prepared to attribute to ourselves divine powers to represent all there is to 
represent about reality, we should admit the possibility that reality far outstrips our powers of 
conceptual representation. It may be thought that in order to safeguard the mind-independence 
of reality, we should recognize the possibility that there are features or aspects of it that are 
unconceivable or ineffable by creatures like us, i.e. we cannot represent them in either thought 
or language. But, naturally, talk of “features of the world” is to yield to the more precise 
language of facts about reality or truths, locutions that allow us to speak of how things are in 
the world, so we might further say that we should recognize the possibility that there are facts 
or truths about reality which are ineffable by us human beings. Moreover, it may well be that 
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such facts or truths are not just presently ineffable by us, given certain contingent limitations 
in our conceptual resources and particular historical point of cognitive development. Rather, 
such facts or truths might be in principle ineffable by us. They would be entirely beyond our 
powers of representation. They could be ineffable because they can only be represented by 
means of concepts that we human beings are constitutionally incapable of developing and 
employing. Such concepts would be inaccessible for us.58 
If reality is indeed independent from our representing it in any given way, then it should 
seem close to obvious that nothing would guarantee us that our particular powers of 
conceptualization are sufficient to capture all the facts that there are. This seemingly natural 
line of argument underlies Nagel’s insistence, in the same work quoted above, that realism 
requires the possibility of inconceivable aspects of reality or what I have been calling ineffable 
truths or facts (Nagel, 90-2). After all, the idea that what there is or what is the case must be in 
principle representable by us, a possible object of thought, seems to amount to a form of 
idealism (ibid.). At least, the strong thesis that it is not even possible for there to be ineffable 
for us truths or facts or that it does not make sense to suppose so, seems to underlie an 
objectionable form of idealism. Call this strong thesis the Effability Thesis. An implication of 
this thesis would be the view that all the truths about reality are in principle effable by us.  
So, in light of the foregoing line of argument, one might suspect that the Effability 
Thesis implies idealism. Only some kind of dependence on our thought could account for the 
fact that reality cannot outstrip our possible representations of it. This kind of idealism may 
not fall under the more familiar kinds of idealism that tie the existence of physical reality to 
                                                          
58 This is Nagel’s preferred formulation of the ineffability hypothesis.  
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our perceptual representations of it, for example, Berkeleyan and Kantian versions of idealism, 
but it is a version of idealism, nonetheless. This is precisely the form of idealism that Nagel 
takes to be opposed to the natural, realist, picture of the relationship between mind and reality. 
If rejecting the possibility of ineffable for us truths implies an idealism of some sort, then, 
naturally, realism would require that it is possible for there to be such ineffable truths. 
Accordingly, in his defense of realism, Nagel undertakes the task of refuting the idealist 
position he has identified through an extended argument against the Effability Thesis.  
The issue of the connection between idealism so construed, realism, and something like 
the Effability Thesis has received some attention beyond Nagel’s discussion. Recently, Thomas 
Hofweber has argued for a view which, in its core, would amount to a version of idealism of 
the kind identified by Nagel (Hofweber, 2015). According to this view, what is the case, i.e. 
what truths or facts there are, in some sense, depends on what we can in principle represent in 
thought or language. Hofweber sees conceptual idealism so understood as directly tied to 
considerations about ineffability. In the same work quoted above, he argues for a version of 
the Effability Thesis, according to which all truths or facts are in principle effable by us human 
beings, at least on a specific understanding of the key notion of “effability” implicated here. If 
indeed what facts there are in some sense depends on our powers of representation, it should 
be no surprise that the facts cannot in principle outstrip our conceptual capacities. Nagel’s 
suspicions that realism is threatened by the Effability Thesis thus seem to find a confirmation.   
My goal in this paper is to argue against the view that realism, understood as “the 
natural picture” of the relationship between our minds and reality, requires the possibility that 
there are ineffable facts. The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, I consider 
several reasons to doubt the claim that realism requires there to be ineffable facts. My 
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discussion here will be directly responsive to Nagel’s arguments and thus my objective will be 
mostly negative in nature, i.e. I will be primarily concerned to argue that no good positive basis 
has been given for the claim that realism requires ineffable facts, although I also offer some 
preliminary positive considerations in support of my main contention that no such requirement 
can be extracted from the realist position. In the second section, I present my main argument 
in support of the thesis of this paper. I argue that not only does realism not require the 
possibility of ineffable facts but it cannot require them on pain of rendering our concept of 
reality incoherent or inconsistent. This is because careful consideration of another key feature 
of our concept of reality, namely its embodiment of the view of reality as “one” or the principle 
of the unity of reality, would show that there cannot be such ineffable facts. So if the mind-
independence of reality, which, we may suppose along with Nagel, is part of our concept of 
reality, required the possibility of ineffable facts, as Nagel insists, our concept of reality would 
seem to support incompatible implications. It would be ultimately incoherent. Since this is 
hardly a result that we should endorse, I argue that we have good reason to re-examine the 
assumption that the mind-independence of reality should be interpreted in terms of the 
possibility of ineffable facts. Coupled with the independent doubts against this Nagelian 
interpretation raised in the first section of the paper, the argument should be sufficient to 
establish the main conclusion of this paper.  
However, the suspicion that the Effability Thesis is bound to lead to some form of 
idealism, if reality is indeed “limited” by what we can represent, may still be hard to dislodge 
despite any arguments that realism does not require ineffable facts. Such a suspicion could 
outweigh any evidence we might have that the mind-independence of reality should not be 
taken to require the possibility of ineffable facts. An imposing idealism could, after all, be the 
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best evidence we can have that safeguarding the natural picture requires rejection of the 
Effability Thesis or so one might argue. Hence, in the third and final section of the paper, I 
undertake an examination of the alleged relationship between the Effability Thesis and 
idealism. I argue that the Effability Thesis does not imply any form of idealism. Endorsement 
of the thesis, by itself, does not lead to idealism.  
I should note a caveat at this point. I will not be endorsing the Effability Thesis in this 
paper. I intend to remain non-committal with respect to its truth or falsity. My concern 
throughout the paper will be solely with its possible connections with realism and idealism.  
 
At this point, some further remarks about the sense of ineffability operative in the 
following discussion are in order. I will take a class of facts to be completely ineffable by us 
human beings, as it is standard in the literature on the topic, just in case if there were any 
differently organized intelligent beings, say, some aliens or gods, who were able to represent 
these facts, they would not be able to communicate them to us.59 This understanding of 
“ineffability” will be crucial to the discussion of my main argument in section two.  
The limitations on our expressive resources, either in thought or language, the 
possibility of such facts would imply presumably derive from limitations inherent in the nature 
of the human mind (Cf. Nagel, 108). In other words, we would not be able to form any 
conception of such facts, even if we were in possession of unlimited time and technical abilities 
(Nagel, 108). In this way, reality emerges as independent from us. It is not exhausted by what 
is thinkable or conceivable by us given our cognitive nature.  
                                                          
59 This is how Hofweber (2017) and Kukla (2010) formulate the ineffability hypothesis, for example.  
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I can now turn to my main discussion. Recall the Effability Thesis articulated in the 
introduction to this paper. According to this thesis, it not possible for there to be ineffable for 
us facts or, alternatively, it does not make sense to suppose that there are such facts. Notice 
that this formulation is rather strong. The Effability Thesis does not just state that there are as 
a matter of fact no ineffable facts or that all facts happen to be effable by us. Instead, it 
precludes the very possibility of such facts. How should we understand the modality in 
question here? It is clear that it is conceptual possibility that is operative in Nagel’s discussion 
and this will be the interpretation I will adopt, too. The notion of “conceptual possibility” can 
be construed in a broad sense where to consider ineffable facts to be conceptually possible is 
to find it conceivable on a priori conceptual reflection that there are such facts.  Given this 
interpretation of the Effability Thesis it may seem very hard to deny that the truth of realism 
and the Effability Thesis are incompatible and so, following Nagel, that realism would require 
the rejection of this thesis. In what follows, I want to consider the reasons we might have for 
this view.  
4.2. Reasons in Favor of Nagelian Realism  
However, Nagel’s discussion features a more prominent and seemingly more 
promising line of argument for the view that realism requires ineffable facts. It is also a more 
explicit line of argument as opposed to the foregoing one. I now turn to this is to this alternative 
line of reasoning. Consider the following remarks: 
Whether such things [inconceivable things or features of reality] are possible is 
absolutely central for if they are, they set a standard of reality independent of the 
mind, which more familiar things must also meet. We may then say that the reality 
of the features of the things in themselves that we have discovered is just as 
independent of our capacity to discover them as is the reality of whatever may lie 
outside our conceptual reach, actual or possible (Nagel, 105).  
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Human objectivity may be able to grasp only part of the world, but when it is 
successful it should provide us with an understanding of aspects of reality whose 
existence is completely independent of our capacity to think about them – as 
independent as the existence of things we can’t conceive of (Nagel, 91-2).  
If realism involves the commitment to the mind-independence of reality and the possibility of 
ineffable by us aspects of reality or the possibility of ineffable facts demonstrates a particularly 
strong sense in which reality is independent of us, even the reality of those aspects of it that 
are representable by us, then it should be clear how and why realism requires ineffable facts. 
After all, what could be a starker example of the independence of reality from our thought and 
representation than the fact there could be some parts of reality that cannot in principle be 
thought or represented by us?  
Natural as this idea might seem, it should not be difficult to see that it runs immediately 
into an obvious problem. Crucially, admitting the possibility of ineffable facts, thereby 
rejecting the Effability Thesis, in no way guarantees us that the effable facts are mind-
independent at all. The existence of other ineffable and so mind-independent features of the 
world does not guarantee us that those features of the world which we can represent are mind-
independent. There could be a class of mind-independent, ineffable for us facts and, 
consistently with that, there could be another class of facts that are effable by us but whose 
effability is due precisely to their mind-dependence.  
In fact, we have a historical example of a metaphysical position which implies precisely 
this combination of views. This is Kant’s transcendental idealism. According to this position, 
the facts that constitute the phenomenal world or the world of physical objects as it appears to 
us in experience are mind-dependent. The relevant facts are mind-dependent because the 
phenomenal objects and their properties, along with the entire spatiotemporal and causal 
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structure of the physical world, are constituted by the human forms of intuition and categorial 
thought. Facts about things as they are experienced by us are thus mind-dependent. There is 
nonetheless another part of reality, namely the noumenal world, the part of reality which 
consists of things as they are in themselves independently of human experience, which is not 
a possible object of representation for us human beings except in the thin sense of being 
thinkable in purely logical categories. The details of the view are not important for our 
purposes. Suffice it to say that there is on this view a class of ineffable facts, which would 
qualify as mind-independent, but that does not guarantee that the class of facts that are 
representable by us is mind-independent in the relevant sense, whatever that may be, according 
to Nagel. So if realism requires ineffable facts in order for us to secure a strong sense of mind-
independence for the effable by us facts, then we have seen a good reason to reject the view 
that realism carries such a requirement.  
At this point, one might argue that the foregoing remarks are quite beside the point. 
Nagel has not advanced the claim that the possibility of ineffable facts somehow guarantees us 
the mind-independence of the effable facts. All that he has done is just use that possibility to 
fix a particular sense of mind-independence that the effable facts should measure up to, if 
realism about the facts is to hold any substance. This may well be the case. Certainly, Nagel’s 
discussion leaves it open to us to adopt this weaker interpretation of his claims. But then it is 
not clear whether we have extracted a genuine rationale for requiring the rejection of the 
Effability Thesis. If the possibility of ineffable facts, evident in the transcendental idealist 
picture of reality, for example, does not guarantee us or does not imply the mind-independence 
of the effable facts, why should realism require the possibility of ineffable facts? All we seem 
to have achieved by introducing the idea of ineffable for us facts is a sense of mind-
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independence that could be applied to only part of reality but not to other parts for which we 
want to maintain the realist interpretation.  
I take it that there is no good route to the conclusion that realism requires ineffable facts 
on the basis of the foregoing considerations. It could be, however, that even though there is no 
positive reason to believe that realism requires the possibility of ineffable facts, still, rejecting 
the possibility of such facts is tantamount to accepting idealism. For what could explain why 
it makes no sense to suppose there could be such facts except some view about the nature of 
the facts as mind-dependent? There seems to be one quick way to demonstrate the connection 
between the Effability Thesis and idealism of some kind. To say that there could not be 
ineffable facts or that it does not make sense to suppose so requires an explanation. Why should 
we think that? After all, the thesis hardly seems intuitive or self-evident. Moreover, given that 
what exists or what is the case does not in any way depend on our representing it in thought or 
language, as our realist commitment dictates, it is puzzling why there should not be any 
possibility that what is the case simply outstrips what we can come to conceive. Just as reality 
is independent of our actual representations, it should be independent of our possible 
representations of it. But if it is, then of course, one might think, there could be aspects of 
reality beyond the reach of such possible representations. Correspondingly, to deny that there 
could be ineffable aspects of reality should immediately invite the suspicion that some kind of 
tacit dependence on the mind must ultimately account for why reality cannot hold any ineffable 
for us aspects. What is the case must then depend on us. This would be idealism, if anything 
is.  
This is the key point I want to make in this final section. Only if one defends the 
Effability Thesis on the basis of substantive philosophical grounds, whether metaphysical or 
 137 
 
related to the philosophy of language as in Hofweber’s case, arguing for a particular view of 
the nature of the propositional, will it be justified to ascribe such idealist implications to the 
Effability THesis. It is the particular way in which one reaches it that should decide whether it 
implies or perhaps just defines an idealist position. If, on the other hand, one reaches the 
Effability Thesis by way of reflection on the limits of what we can conceive, i.e. by trying to 
imagine what it would mean for it to be possible for there to be ineffable for us facts, and 
concludes that the original assumption that there are such facts does not really make sense, 
then no idealism is remotely in view. For to say that it does not make sense to suppose that 
there are such ineffable facts and not because of substantive philosophical views about the 
nature of facts but because of breakdown in the very attempt to make sense of the hypothesis 
does not imply anything about the dependence on the facts on us. In an earlier work, I have 
pursued precisely this alternative strategy for showing that the Effability Thesis, at least with 
respect to a certain class of facts, namely structurally ineffable facts, is true. To suppose that 
there could be such facts leads to incoherence or a contradiction somewhere in our imaginative 
exercise, so we cannot make sense of such a possibility. Moreover, if one reaches the Effability 
Thesis in some such way, it is not only the case that it cannot be suspected of idealist 
implications but it will not make sense to ask for an explanation of how it is that we can 
represent all the facts or all of the truths about reality. To ask for an explanation would be 
justified if one had reason to suspect that there is a puzzling coincidence, in our case between 
what we can in principle represent and what is the case.60 But there is no coincidence here once 
we have exposed the right background for the thesis, namely a breakdown in our effort to make 
sense of facts we cannot represent. 
                                                          
60 Hofweber formulates the point in this helpful way.  
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Analogously, if we reach the conclusion that it makes no sense to suppose that there 
are true contradictions in reality because of a breakdown in our effort to think through what a 
hypothesis that there are true contradictions could mean or imply, then it will be entirely out 
of place to ask for a more substantive explanation of why it is impossible for there to be true 
contradictions.61 It will be entirely out of place to suspect that since the principle of non-
contradiction is a supreme principle of reasoning that we humans have to use in representing 
reality, perhaps it is the mind-dependence of reality that accounts for its contradiction-free 
nature. Certainly, there is a sense in which one could ask for an explanation in both cases but 
the explanation can just take the form of taking one through the imaginative effort that exhibits 
the underlying incoherence in the hypothesis. Importantly, this effort need not involve any 
philosophical claims about the conditions of the possibility of human thought, the nature of the 
propositional or factual, the domain of entities that are propositions or anything of suspect 
philosophical origin. These observations have important implications for how we should think 
about the Nagelian charge that if we deny that it is possible for there to be ineffable facts we 
make reality dependent on what we can in principle represent. This charge should now seem 
quite unjustified. For nothing about dependence on the human mind can follow from a perfectly 
ordinary claim that a hypothesis is incoherent, if the incoherence is not at all grounded in 
questionable, philosophically motivated views about the conditions of the possibility of 
thought or the metaphysics of facts and so on. 
                                                          
61 If the reader is a committed dialetheist or at least considers the idea of true contradictions as at least 
coherent, a position I do not understand, he or she can just bracket reservations for now and consider the 
example in an illustrative light only. Other examples can be substituted for this one. The structure of the 
reasoning would be very much the same.  
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All in all, then, what is important for assessing the threat that the Effability Thesis poses 
to idealism is how one arrives at it. By itself, the thesis is quite innocent. Given the arguments 
of the first two sections and my effort in this section to remove the residual sense that the 
ineffable must be necessary for a robust realism, I think we should be in a good position now 
to appreciate how independent realism and considerations about ineffability can be. Realism, 
understood as our natural picture of the relationship between our minds and reality, does not 
require the possibility of ineffable facts. Moreover, if the main argument of the paper is sound, 
then it better not require it on pain of rendering our concept of reality incoherent.  
One good reason to be suspicious of the view that the mind-independence of reality, 
implicit in the natural picture, should be understood along the lines of the strong realist position 
advanced by Nagel is that if carried to its logical conclusion, Nagelian-style realism has 
obviously controversial, implausible implications for it to be a mere exposition of “the natural 
picture.” Notice first that it is not clear why if realism requires the possibility of ineffable for 
us facts, it should not also require the possibility of facts that are ineffable for all possible 
minds not just our human minds. What is it in the concept of reality that demands the mind-
independence of facts relative to us but not the mind-independence of facts relative to other 
possible minds? It won’t do to answer simply: “Well, it is our concept of reality, after all. Of 
course we would be concerned with the relationship between our minds and reality.” For 
consider our epistemic situation, which seems to be, on the face of it, hard to overcome. We 
have no idea on the nature and extent of other possible minds, how much or whether they can 
differ in fundamental respects from our minds. Nagel himself admits as much: 
Perhaps, given any type of world, there could be a mind capable of conceiving it 
adequately. I have no idea on the limits of possible minds” (Nagel, 91).   
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Moreover, some philosophers have gone so far as to suggest that we cannot conceive of minds 
so radically different from our own that if they were to employ a language of their own to 
communicate with us, this language would not be translatable into ours and the communication 
would in fact be impossible. Anything that we can recognize as linguistic, intentional behavior, 
we must be able to translate into our own.62 This is the line of argument advanced by Davidson, 
for example, who is, unsurprisingly, a target of Nagel’s. But what goes for languages goes for 
conceptual schemes and minds are just this, users of conceptual representations. It is not 
accidental that Davidson’s views are frequently taken to undermine any hypothesis about the 
possibility of genuinely ineffable propositions and thus facts by way of undermining the 
hypothesis of ineffable languages in which such propositions or facts are to be represented.63  
The most efficient way to get around the Davidsonian considerations about language 
would seem to be to grant them and insist that they do not suffice to establish the strong 
conclusion that there can be no ineffable for us facts because they do not suffice to establish 
the conclusion that there can be no ineffable facts, simpliciter, i.e. no facts that are ineffable 
for any possible mind. It might well be that any mind we can recognize as such, any linguistic 
speakers we can recognize as such, must be sufficiently like us in a way that undermines the 
possibility that they can have access to ineffable for us facts. But this still leaves open the 
possibility that there are facts ineffable for all possible minds and so ineffable for us, too.64 I 
do not mean to endorse the Davidsonian views on the inter-translatability of languages. All I 
mean to be doing here is strengthening the point that considerations about what other possible 
                                                          
62 Davidson “On the Very Idea of Conceptual Schemes” (1973-4). 
63 See Kukla’s discussion, for example, and give references to Hofweber who agrees with the view that 
Davidson’s views on language undermine ineffability hypotheses.  
64 This is a point that Kukla also makes. See his (2010). 
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minds are capable of representing are indeed intimately tied to what sense of “ineffability” 
should be at play when we want to insist, along with Nagel, that ineffable for us facts must be 
a genuine possibility if realism is to hold any substance.  
Here is the essence of the foregoing considerations. Given our epistemic position with 
respect to the nature of other possible minds, it should appear as a genuine possibility, which 
we do not seem able to exclude a priori, that our finite minds are the only possible minds. If 
this possibility is too slim, then we can say that it is possible that all other possible minds are 
relevantly like ours, even if different in some respects, so as to undermine the hypothesis that 
they can represent facts we cannot in principle represent. But then it is not clear how we can, 
on the one hand, insist that there could be ineffable for us facts, without, on the other hand, 
insisting that there could be facts ineffable for all possible minds, given the importance of this 
possibility in securing the relevant sense of the mind-independence of reality. If we are to 
guarantee the mind-independence of reality by securing the possibility that there are ineffable 
for us facts, we will need to secure the possibility that there are facts ineffable for all possible 
minds since, for all we know, our kinds of minds could be the only possible finite minds. If 
there could be no facts that are ineffable for any possible minds, and our kinds of minds are 
the only possible minds, then there could be no facts that are ineffable for our minds and this, 
according to Nagelian-style realism, would undermine the realist “natural picture.” Given the 
commitments of Nagelian-style realism to ineffable facts, along with the admission of our 
ignorance about possible minds, it would be a very curious modesty indeed if we insisted 
merely on the possibility of ineffable for us facts. It seems then that if we carry the realist 
demand to its natural conclusion, there should be no reason to limit the notion of “ineffability” 
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relevant to the realist demands to “ineffable by us.” It should rather be expanded to include 
“ineffable by any possible mind.” 
The real difficulty appears once we recognize that this is indeed the natural conclusion 
of Nagelian-style realism. This is because the idea that there could be facts that are completely 
ineffable to any possible mind whatsoever is extremely problematic. To see this, let us examine 
more closely what it would mean to say that there could be some facts about reality in principle 
unrepresentable by any mind. Here, the sense of “possibility” when we speak of any possible 
mind should be conceptual possibility, i.e. what we can recognize as a mind given our concept 
of a mind.  
Let us set aside any issues concerning the powers of an infinite mind such as the mind 
of God, according to the traditional conception of God we see in theism. By definition, such a 
mind can conceive everything there is to conceive about reality. It is clear that the relevant 
notion of “mind” that is important for our discussion is that of a finite mind such as ours. So, 
the question becomes what it could mean to say that there could be facts that are ineffable for 
any possible finite mind.  
 I think it is fair to say that whatever the range of possible minds, it seems that there are 
two possibilities. First, it could be that all possible finite minds are capable of the same kinds 
of conceptual representation that is paradigmatically our kind of representation, i.e. the kind of 
representation which is relevant for our current discussion on the possible limits of human 
representations. On this option, what unites all possible minds, the common feature they all 
share, is their use of conceptual representations in grasping the features of reality. Second, it 
could be that not all possible minds are like ours in this respect. Some possible minds might 
employ very different kinds of representation to capture the features of reality that are not at 
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all like our conceptual representations. Take the first option. To say that there could be facts 
that are completely ineffable for any possible minds would amount to saying that there could 
be facts about reality that cannot in principle be represented conceptually since no possible 
mind capable of conceptual representation can grasp such facts. But now it should be obvious 
that this possibility is close to incoherent. For, according to our concept of a “fact,” and I do 
not mean to be saying anything controversial here, facts are propositional entities, i.e. we can 
only express what facts are by appeal to some such locutions as “the way things are” or what 
is the case.65  
Facts, philosophers like to say, are either true propositions or make propositions true. 
On both options, it is propositional representation that the representation of facts is supposed 
to implicate. But conceptual representation is just propositional representation. We cannot 
divorce our concept of a propositional type of representation of reality from our concept of, 
well, conceptual representation of reality. Some philosophers even like to make the 
relationship between concepts and propositions as intimate as one can want it to be. They take 
concepts to be constituents of propositions. But then we cannot make sense of the idea that 
facts, which are propositional in nature, may be in principle unrepresentable by means of 
conceptual representations. Notice that I am not referring to human conceptual representations 
so this point should not raise any suspicions of an idealism that ties “facthood” to being 
“essentially representable by our conceptual means” or “in principle representable by our 
conceptual means.” Rather, the point is just that we have no good grasp of the notion of a “fact” 
                                                          
65 I do not mean to be reifying facts or making any particularly substantive claims here by talking of “entities.”  
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which does not make it essentially tied to “possibly conceptually represented” since facts are 
the sorts of things that must be conceptually representable, at least in principle. 
It should be obvious now that considering the second option articulated above, 
according to which some other minds might be capable of non-conceptual representation, will 
not be of any help in this context. For if we cannot understand the idea that facts might be in 
principle unrepresentable by means of concepts, we will not be able to understand the idea that 
facts might be in principle representable by means of other non-conceptual means for the 
corresponding denial that facts can be in principle representable by non-conceptual means to 
make sense in the first place.  
Now, at this point, one might argue that it is open to Nagel to reject the formulation of 
the realist requirement for ineffable features of reality in terms of facts or truths or anything 
that implicates a propositional, conceptual type of representation. All he needs to secure is the 
ineffability of some features of reality. There need be no mention of facts here. But what could 
this amount to? There could be some features of reality that no possible propositional 
representations can in principle capture? If there are no facts about such features or no true 
propositions about them, what does it mean to say that reality has them anyway? At this point, 
it might seem like we have reduced the possibility of ineffable features of reality to the 
possibility of a radically different sort of cognitive relation to reality, which most of us will be 
somewhat familiar with. We have come to the idea of a mystical insight into reality whose very 
form is supposed to distinguish it from any propositional thought. In having a mystical insight 
into reality, one would have an insight into real features of the world. It is just that nothing of 
what one grasps can in principle be given any propositional form. So, it seems we have arrived 
at the idea of mystical features of reality. 
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But recall how it is that we ended up here in the first place. We were supposed to be 
following our “natural picture,” the realist attitude towards the world, which, according to 
Nagel, requires the possibility of ineffable facts. But we saw that the only way to maintain that 
requirement is really to insist on a form of mysticism that is hard to square with the original 
motivations behind the view that ineffable facts must be possible. It is hardly plausible to 
believe that something in our natural picture of the relationship between our minds and the 
world commits us to view that reality should hold some mystical aspects. Moreover, it appears 
independently strange to believe that for realism about the world to get off the ground, we need 
to admit the possibility of mystical aspects of reality. Nagel himself could hardly have intended 
this sense of realism. I take it that at this point we have a good case against the initial 
assumption that realism requires ineffable facts. If we really think through the implausible 
implications of this demand, we should become convinced that something in the initial demand 
must have been wrong.  
4.3. The Argument from Unity 
The goal of this section is to argue for the claim that realism cannot require the 
possibility of ineffable facts. Not only does it not require it, as I have given reason to believe 
in the last section of this chapter, but it cannot do so. At least, it cannot do so short of rendering 
our concept of reality inconsistent or incoherent because it can be shown to carry incompatible 
implications, if our concept of reality does indeed ground the requirement of ineffable facts, as 
Nagel seems to suggest.66 I intend to show this by appeal to a particular feature of our concept 
                                                          
66 There is at least one place at which Nagel writes, instead, that the notion of “mind-independence” he wants 
to isolate “should be built into our conception of reality,” which is an entirely different kind of claim (Nagel, 
108). The question then would become why we should built this notion of mind-independence in our concept 
of reality.  
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of reality. I take it that most of us, including Nagel, would agree that the relevant feature does 
characterize our concept of reality. I have in mind the “oneness” of reality or its necessary 
unity. Call this the Principle of the Unity of Reality.  
To make principle somewhat more precise and to draw out certain intuitive 
implications of this principle, I will be referring to a helpful discussion from Adrian Moore’s 
work Points of View (2000). Though his discussion of the principle of the unity of reality occurs 
in a somewhat different context, namely in the course of his argument for the possibility of 
absolute representations of reality, there is significant overlap between the crucial premises 
that he uses in support of his so called Basic Argument for absolute representations and the 
argument against ineffable facts that I intend to construct.  
It seems plausible to say the following. Reality as it is in itself, reality that is there 
anyway, whether we represent it or not, is what makes our representations true. For any two 
true conceptual or propositional representations of the world as it is in itself, if indeed it is only 
one reality that makes both of them true, it must be possible to unify these representations. But 
there can be no other relevant sense of unifying such representations than producing a third 
one which somehow or in some sense entails both of them or, at least, shows how both of them 
can be true of reality. This may not always be possible in a direct way, i.e. by simple 
conjunction of the relevant representations. But it should then be possible indirectly. The 
details of how this is done and what are some of the difficulties inherent in the project of 
unification, such as the perspectival features of many true representations we produce, should 
not be relevant to our purposes here.67 The crucial step in this reasoning is from the assumption 
                                                          
67 Moore goes into a lot of detail both to motivate some of the seemingly uncontroversial and intuitive steps 
of this reasoning and to explicate the sense of “unification” in question. See Chs. 4-7.  
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of the unity of reality to the claim that such unity requires unity in our representations of it. If 
we are to preserve the sense that it is indeed one and the same world which makes any given 
true representations of ours true, we need to see how they “hang together,” so to speak.  
Now, I have not made it clear how we should understand the reference to “we” here. 
Presumably, it is “we, human beings.”68 But, in fact, given certain plausible assumptions, “we” 
should include any thinking beings with whom we can take ourselves to share a single reality 
and a relevantly similar way of representing that reality. To see this, consider the following 
case. Suppose that we had reason to believe that there are other alien minds that can represent 
all of the facts about reality. Thus, they must be capable of propositional or conceptual 
representation since we are dealing with facts here. Suppose further that while such alien minds 
can represent all of the facts that there are, some of these facts are ineffable for us human 
beings. If the aliens were to attempt to communicate them to us, they would fail. Now, unless 
we suppose that we are completely misrepresenting reality by employing the concepts that we 
use or could come to use in principle, given sufficient scientific developments, a hypothesis 
that is hardly intelligible, we should also take these alien thinkers to be in possession of the 
equivalents of some of our concepts or, let us just say, some of our own concepts. I say that 
the hypothesis that there could be alien thinkers who correctly represent reality but share none 
of our concepts is unintelligible, as we could never be in a position to recognize anything as 
thought if it did not at least employ some of our basic categories of thought such as “object,” 
                                                          
68 Moore himself expends a lot of effort in clarifying who “we” should stand for in his own discussion of the 
key thesis that we should be capable of attaining absolute representation of reality in his sense of absolute, 
i.e. representations presented from nothing identifiable as a point of view. The issue of who “we” are also 
surfaces in his discussion of various versions of transcendental idealism he sees at play in Wittgenstein, 
versions of idealism that could pose a threat to his own argument for absolute representations.  
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property,” “truth,” “process,” “event,” etc. For this reason at least in rough outline, any alien 
thinkers must use some of our concepts or equivalents thereof.  
While I take the foregoing point to be obvious, it is not strictly necessary for me to 
argue for it. This is because I am working within a framework of discussion that is largely 
informed by Nagel’s exposition of the Effability Thesis. We are not here presupposing the 
possibility of radical skepticism about the ability of some of our basic categories of thought or 
even many of our reliable scientific concepts to capture the facts about reality. Hence, if we 
are imagining that there could be some alien minds capable of representing more facts than we 
are, this need not require that we cover the case where their representations will bear absolutely 
no relation to ours because our conceptual representations are in principle or, at least in fact, 
entirely off the mark and cannot capture reality as it is in itself. I am thus assuming that the 
alien thinkers will have to share some of our conceptual resources and will, moreover, 
represent some facts that we are also capable of representing using our kinds of conceptual 
resources.  
So let us examine the imagined scenario of alien thinkers capable of representing 
ineffable for us facts in light of the above articulated consequences of the principle of the unity 
of reality. We are assuming that the alien thinkers occupy and represent the same reality that 
we attempt to truthfully represent. But if this is so, then it seems like it should be possible for 
any given true alien representations to be unified with the true human representations. The 
assumption of the unity of reality, again, requires the unity of representations. If we are to 
maintain the sense that it is one and the same, single reality that makes all of these 
representations true, then they should be unified. This unification, as noted above, should 
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include producing some third true representation which shows how all of the original ones 
could be simultaneously true.  
Let us examine what could be some of the conditions for the possibility of such 
unification. I want to propose the following, to my mind almost obvious, condition. Unity of 
propositional representations requires unity of concepts, to use a slightly Kantian turn of 
phrase. What this means is that the concepts used in the relevant representations that are to be 
unified must bear intelligible relations to each other. Whether we think of such relations in 
Kantian terms, for example, as relations of subordination in a systematic hierarchy where 
“lower” concepts are subordinated to “higher” more general and more inclusive ones and 
“lower” ones emerge as specifications of the “higher” ones, or not, some such intelligible 
relations seem necessary.  
To unify the two true representations “I am speaking now” as it is uttered by Beth on 
Monday, July 2nd at 3:00 pm and “I am speaking now” as it is uttered by John on Tuesday, July 
3rd at 4:00 pm, I produce a third representation that removes the perspectival features of the 
original representations and refers non-perspectivally to the speakers in the original contexts 
of utterance and the exact times of speech. But then there must be intelligible connections 
between the concept of “I” and the concept of a speaker at a time as well as between the concept 
“now” and the concepts of specific times. This same reasoning should apply to any given true 
representations since the requirement of the unity of representations is fully general. But if that 
is to be possible, then there should indeed be a unity of concepts in precisely this sense. Directly 
or indirectly, any given concepts used in the relevant true representations should bear 
intelligible relations that allow to see the logical, inferential relations between the propositional 
representations in question.  
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At this point, we have all of the resources necessary to derive a contradiction from our 
initial assumption that the alien thinkers we have imagined represent ineffable for us facts. The 
aliens will have to employ ineffable for us concepts in addition to our familiar effable ones. 
The unification of our true representations and the alien true representations, which are 
ineffable by us, will thereby require the unification of effable and ineffable for us 
representations. This in turn would require the unity of effable and ineffable for us concepts 
which the aliens employ. We have already noted that the unity of concepts requires there to be 
intelligible relations between the concepts. The crucial question here would be: “intelligible 
for whom”? It is clear that they should be intelligible for the aliens who are in possession both 
of the effable and ineffable for us concepts. But how about us?  
There are two options here. Either such relations are effable by us of they are ineffable. 
Now, the first option is entirely untenable given the guiding assumption that some of the 
concepts to be unified are supposed to be ineffable by us. It does not really make sense to 
suppose that the relation between an effable concept X and an ineffable-for-us concept Y is 
intelligible by us and hence effable, if Y itself is ineffable. We cannot grasp how X is related 
to Y, if we cannot at all grasp Y. This is obvious. So, of course, the relevant relations must be 
ineffable or unintelligible for us. There are two independent ways in which we can show that 
adopting this option is untenable. First, we can appeal to the principle of the unity of reality 
and thus the unity of representations again. Second, we can appeal to considerations that are 
distinct from considerations about unity and have to do with general observations on what 
kinds of relations our familiar, effable concepts can sustain. Let me first develop the first 
response based on the unity of reality. Then, I will turn to the second response.  
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In adopting the second option on which the relationship between the alien ineffable 
concepts and our concepts is unintelligible and so ineffable for us, we have thereby 
contradicted the initial assumption that the relevant concepts must be unifiable by us, if the 
corresponding true representations are to stand unified. The requirement that we should, too, 
be capable of unifying the relevant representations stems from the generality of the principle 
that the unity of reality demands unity of representations. Since both our representations and 
the alien ones are taken to be answerable to a single reality, it must be possible for these 
representations to be unified. There was no relativization to different thinkers in the principle 
since the principle, as initially stated, requires simply that any true propositional 
representations must be capable of unification and hence any concepts necessary for such 
representations must be capable of unification. If we and the alien thinkers are to recognize 
each other as representing one and the same reality, a single world, then it should be possible 
for us to produce such unity of representations and hence unity of concepts. To admit that there 
can be no such unity is thereby to put ourselves in a position from which the alien thinkers 
cannot be thought of as representing our reality. The ineffable concepts they employ must be 
necessary for the representation of facts constitutive of a different reality, but it is not our 
reality. What emerges then is that the hypothesis of ineffable facts conflicts with the 
assumption of the unity of reality. 
Now, at this point, one might argue that the proper conclusion to draw from this 
discussion is that the principle of the unity of representations needs modification. What we 
need to say is that it should be possible for us human beings to unify any given true 
representations of reality that we can in principle produce. Similarly, it should be possible for 
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the alien minds to unify any given true representations of reality that they can in principle 
produce.  
It is certainly open to us to modify the principle. But then, all we can say is that we 
have secured the sense that the reality we represent is one and we might have evidence to 
suppose that the alien thinkers have secured the sense of reality as one for themselves. We can 
grant them that they are capable of representing a single reality given the possibility of such 
unification. But what we cannot secure is the result that the reality that is one for them is also 
the reality that is one for us. So in a certain important sense, we cannot share a world with 
them. This is a problem for we have assumed that there are true representations of reality that 
we and the aliens share. They will be presumably unifiable. Which reality are these 
representations answerable to? What we seemed forced to say is that part of the totality of true 
alien representations is answerable to reality as we know it. The aliens represent our reality. 
But the other ineffable for us representations, which cannot be unified by us with our own 
representations, are answerable to another reality. But then, for the aliens themselves, the 
totality of their representations should not be unified either. From this reflective standpoint, 
we have already given up on the unity of reality. We have admitted that part of the alien 
representational system answers to one reality and a different part to another reality.  
One might object to the foregoing argument on the following grounds. We can respect 
the principle of the unity of reality because we can have evidence that the aliens have unified 
the representations answering to the effable for us facts and those representations answering to 
the ineffable for us facts and hence that the reality they represent is the same reality as our 
own. Perhaps the aliens can tell us that they have performed the unificationist task. It is not 
necessary that we should be in the position to unify the relevant representations ourselves. 
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Moreover, this response does not run afoul of the fully general principle of the unity of 
representations. All that this principle requires is that it be possible for any true representations 
of a single reality to be unified. There is no mention here of who does the unification. In fact, 
this is as it should be. It is implausible to require that “we” always be in a position, in principle, 
to do the necessary unification. Moreover, as it stands, all this principle requires is that it be 
true that the aliens can do the unification in question. It is not clear that we should have 
evidence that this is the case. This seems like an unmotivated requirement or so one might 
argue.  
However, the foregoing response does not take into account the exact formulation of 
the initial argument from unity presented above. It was crucial to that argument that we have 
to be able to recognize the aliens as representing the same reality as ours. Let me make the 
motivation for this formulation explicit here and further underscore its implications, which will 
undermine the foregoing critical response. Here is a trivial claim, which, however, can lead us 
to an important line of thought. If we are to recognize the possibility that the aliens represent 
ineffable for us facts about reality, then surely we must recognize them as representing the 
same reality as we do. After all, it will not be at all relevant to our purposes if they represent 
some alternate reality. Here is another trivial claim: 
(*) It is possible for alien minds to represent ineffable for us facts only if the alien minds 
represent the same reality as we do. 
Now suppose that we cannot in principle recognize the fact that the alien minds 
represent the same reality as we do. The relevant truth is, in other words, recognition-
transcendent for us.  
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But now, by (*), the truth, if it is a truth, that it is possible for alien minds to represent ineffable 
for us facts must also be recognition-transcendent in the relevant sense. But it is surely 
implausible to grant this conclusion. I do not suppose that the proponents of ineffable facts 
would want the weak thesis that it is possible for alien minds to represent ineffable facts and 
thus that there could be such ineffable facts to be in principle beyond our recognition. I will 
thus assume that it cannot be the case that the truth that the aliens represent the same reality as 
we do is recognition-transcendent. Consider the implications of this. (1) The aliens represent 
the same reality as we do.  
(2) The alien true representations and our own can be unified.  
The truth of (2) is a precondition for assuming the truth of (1), as already noted above. 
But if the truth of (1) must be in principle recognizable by us, then the truth of (2) must also 
be in principle recognizable by us. However, it hardly makes sense to suppose that we can in 
principle recognize when our and the alien representations are unified without our being in a 
position to unify these representations ourselves. Hence, we should be able to unify these 
representations ourselves. Notice, that the issue at hand is not whether we can be in a position 
to have evidence for either (1) or (2). We can grant that the aliens can utter sentences to the 
effect that “We have unified the relevant representations,” though it will then be a good 
question how we should translate the relevant utterance, as stating a truth or not. This will 
quickly bring in Davidsonian considerations. But we can escape such complications. It is 
essential to the foregoing argument that it was formulated in terms of recognition of the 
relevant truths rather than evidential considerations in favor of them. If we admit the foregoing 
line of reasoning, the argument from unity should hold. It is not sufficient to assume that it be 
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true that the aliens represent the same reality as we do, we should be in a position to recognize 
this in principle.  
The main purpose of the foregoing discussion was to bring forth the tension in the 
requirements that our concept of reality is supposed to ground, if indeed one could extract from 
it the commitment to the possibility of ineffable for us facts, as Nagel seems to implicitly 
assume by presenting his realism as “the natural picture.” But even if one does not insist that 
this commitment is reflected in our concept of reality but, instead, merely, prescriptively 
contends that it “should be,” as Nagel does at one point (Nagel, 108), the result is relevantly 
similar. One would be requiring that we built into our concept of reality a feature that seems 
to conflict with its character because it conflicts with features that already characterize it. 
Whatever sense of “mind-independence” is at play, when we give expression to the thought 
that reality should be independent of our representations of it, it is not the sense of “mind-
independence” that is tied to the possibility of ineffable facts. When we insist that there is one 
reality that makes our representations true, we implicitly assume that there are no ineffable 
facts.  
The foregoing conclusion may appear too quick, however. After all, the inconsistency 
generated above followed only in a carefully chosen case. We were supposing that there were 
other alien minds who can capture some ineffable for us facts in addition to being able to 
represent the facts accessible to us. This observation immediately suggests a possible way 
around the present difficulty for Nagel’s position. We could just maintain the possibility of 
facts that are ineffable for any possible minds or, alternatively, the possibility of alien minds 
which can represent only facts ineffable for us. It is obvious how the previous difficulty is 
sidestepped in the former case since there will be no question about the unity of effable and 
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ineffable for us representations. No mind can represent the ineffable facts and so there will be 
no candidate representations for unification.  
But this response relies on a problematic idea, against which we have raised serious 
doubts in the previous section of the paper. The idea that there could be facts which no possible 
mind can represent was shown to carry untenable implications. It certainly appeared 
indefensible on the basis of Nagel’s original motivations for introducing the idea of ineffable 
facts. I will not here repeat the case against taking seriously this idea. I think there are good 
reasons to dismiss this option. In the latter case, however, we have to suppose that it is possible 
for us to recognize other minds as such which cannot communicate with us at all, since they 
represent, by stipulation, only ineffable for us facts. But even if we could make sense of this 
possibility and, again, Davidsonian considerations militate against it, what we have to say is 
that there are true representations of reality, by assumption, which we cannot at all unify with 
any of our own. But then the same reasoning as given above applies in this case, too. We cannot 
then take the reality that the alien minds are representing to be the same as our own. We were 
supposed to imagine a case in which there are facts ineffable for us, facts about the one reality 
we take there to be. So here, too, we have the strange result that we meet alien minds here, in 
our world (where else can we meet them?), which we cannot interpret as representing the world 
they are occupying. Though they will be in this world, they will not be having a single true 
thought about it. These are implausible results. It should be obvious that we have not made 
much progress and our assumption of reality as one is not respected.  
Finally, one could argue that it is open to us to reject the claim that the unity of reality 
is indeed a part of our concept of reality. But I take it that this will be a rather forced measure. 
For if anything seems like a basic conceptual point about “reality” it is that there is just one. 
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On some really avant-garde metaphysical views about the nature of reality that significantly 
depart from commonsense such as Kit Fine’s fragmentalist view, reality is merely 
“fragmented” in that it is said to consist of incompatible facts, namely the tensed facts that 
obtain at different moments of time. But even Fine himself does not seem prepared to formulate 
his view in terms of a denial that reality is one. It is still one. It is just that it is in a sense 
fragmented.69 So I think this route of response is implausible. There seems to be no good 
response to the main argument presented here.  
Still, the suspicion that the Effability Thesis implies an objectionable idealism may be 
strong enough to outweigh the considerations advanced in the last two sections. No argument 
for the claim that realism does not and cannot require the possibility of ineffable facts can be 
quite sufficient to remove that suspicion. There is just something very “shady” about the 
Effability Thesis. Thus, in order to dislodge the sense that realism must be intimately tied to 
the possibility of ineffable aspects of reality, doubts to the contrary notwithstanding, I will 
need to consider the issue of from the other direction. I need to consider what reasons we might 
have to think that the Effability Thesis carries idealist implications. This is the purpose of the 
next and final section of the paper.  
4.4 Idealism and the Effability Thesis 
There seems to be one quick way to demonstrate the connection between the Effability 
Thesis and idealism of some kind. To say that there could not be ineffable facts or that it does 
not make sense to suppose so requires an explanation. Why should we think that? After all, the 
thesis hardly seems intuitive or self-evident. Moreover, given that what exists or what is the 
                                                          
69 See his “The Reality of Tense” in Modality and Tense. Oxford: OUP, 2005. 
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case does not in any way depend on our representing it in thought or language, as our realist 
commitment dictates, it is puzzling why there should not be any possibility that what is the 
case simply outstrips what we can come to conceive. Just as reality is independent of our actual 
representations, it should be independent of our possible representations of it. But if it is, then 
of course, one might think, there could be aspects of reality beyond the reach of such possible 
representations. Correspondingly, to deny that there could be ineffable aspects of reality should 
immediately invite the suspicion that some kind of tacit dependence on the mind must 
ultimately account for why reality cannot hold any ineffable for us aspects. What is the case 
must then depend on us. This would be idealism, if anything is.  
In a recent discussion on the topic of ineffability, Thomas Hofweber has argued that 
one version of the Effability Thesis, namely that all facts are effable by us, and what he calls 
conceptual idealism are, indeed, intimately connected. But he would presumably agree that the 
stronger Effability Thesis identified in this paper, according to which it is not possible for there 
to be ineffable for us facts, is also intimately connected with idealism. Here is how. Conceptual 
idealism is the view that what is the case, i.e. what truths or facts there are, in some sense, 
depends on what we can in principle represent in thought or language. Hofweber thus sees 
conceptual idealism so understood as directly tied to considerations about ineffability. The 
sense of dependence in question is what he calls “range-dependence.”70 This notion of 
                                                          
70 This sense is opposed to another sense of dependence, namely “truth-dependence.” If what facts there are or 
what truths obtain depended on us, then this kind of idealism would easily collapse into traditional forms of 
ontological idealism, according to which what objects there are and what they are like, depends on our 
representations. Hence, the truths would depend on us. Whether “there are planets” is true would depend on 
whether we represent there being planets.  
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dependence makes clear the connection between idealism and the Effability Thesis we have 
been discussing. 
Conceptual idealism is based on a notion of mind-dependence that Hofweber explicates 
as follows. What it is for the facts to depend on us is for it to be in principle impossible for 
there to be any facts that are ineffable for us human beings where, crucially, the sense of 
ineffability at play here is what Hofweber calls “object-permitting” and “property-permitting,” 
which just means that we are assuming we can in principle represent all of the objects and 
properties that there are.71 Thus, Hofweber in effect fixes the sense of mind-dependence at the 
core of the idealist position as “it is in principle impossible for the facts to outstrip our powers 
of representation” or “it is in principle impossible for there to be ineffable for us facts” This is 
what it means to say that the facts are “range-dependent” on us human beings. This, as the 
reader may recall, constitutes a kind of reversal of the Nagelian criterion of the mind-
independence of reality, which was tied to the possibility of ineffable facts. In a way, then, 
Hofweber’s conceptual idealism may seem to confirm the Nagelian and perhaps the reader’s 
own suspicions that denying the possibility of ineffable facts is tantamount to endorsing 
idealism.  
However, even though one may be quite impressed by the observation that there is a 
version of idealism which is so intimately tied to the Effability Thesis, such a reaction would 
be premature. For what ultimately justifies both the conceptual idealist position Hofweber 
advances and the Effability Thesis is a view that is prior to both of them in the order of 
                                                          
71 The question he addresses is thus: “Given that we are assuming that we can in principle represent all the objects 
and properties that there are, even if help from more advanced alien minds is needed, can there still be some facts 
about these objects and properties that are ineffable for us human beings?” His answer is no.  
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justification. In other words, it is not the Effability Thesis that is used to support conceptual 
idealism. Instead, Hofweber appeals to internalism about the propositional, a view in the 
philosophy of language, according to which the nature of our talk of propositions, and, by 
extension, facts and anything else that is proposition-like in character, is non-referential. It is 
non-referential and should not be analyzed in terms of an ontology of entities such as 
propositions or facts. Rather, according to internalism, when we make general or existential 
claims about propositions and facts like the claim “Every proposition is effable” what we are 
doing is quantifying over the instances of propositions expressible with sentences in our 
language. We are not referring to a domain of entities. A key implication of such an internalist 
picture of the nature of facts and propositions is the truth of the Effability Thesis that is 
Hofweber’s target of discussion: “Every fact is effable” is true because the truth conditions for 
this thesis, according to internalism, are given by a conjunction of instances of true sentences 
of the language, reflecting the facts. Hence, the truth-conditions of it would be “That p is 
effable ^ That q is effable...”, etc. This of course is true. If it is not a domain of entities that 
makes claims about facts and the propositions true, then there will not be any possibility that 
such a domain could be larger than the domain we can come to represent. This means that the 
stronger thesis, i.e. that it is not possible for there to be ineffable for us truths or facts would 
also follow from internalism as a view about the nature of our talk of the propositional and, by 
extension, the nature of the propositional. There cannot be any ineffable facts. But the 
impossibility of ineffable for us facts demonstrates the “range-dependence” of the factual or 
propositional on us. Hence, internalism simultaneously grounds both Hofweber’s conceptual 
idealism and The Effability Thesis with which I am concerned. 
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We need not get into the details of the internalist picture to see how it justifies the 
Effability Thesis. What I wanted to show here is that the ultimate justification for this thesis is 
a particular view about the nature of the propositional and the ultimate justification for 
conceptual idealism is this same view. But the Effability Thesis by itself is not what underlies 
Hofweber’s idealism. In other words, he does not argue from its truth to the conceptual idealist 
conclusion. This is as it should be. I think Hofweber’s argumentative strategy here 
demonstrates clearly that the Effability Thesis can be shown to be related to idealism or even 
imply an idealist conclusion, only if it is itself grounded in views that imply an idealist 
conclusion. It is the particular way in which one argues for the Effability Thesis that might 
show there to be an idealist underpinning to the thesis but we have been given no reason to 
think that the thesis holds any idealist implications by itself.  
Naturally, the observation that it is really internalism that is doing all the work in 
Hofweber’s defense of conceptual idealism does not thereby show that the Effability Thesis, 
even if not supported on the basis of internalism, cannot by itself be charged with idealist 
implications. Moreover, one might argue, it is not accidental that Hofweber fixes the sense of 
“mind-dependence” characteristic of conceptual idealism in terms of the Effability Thesis. He 
is exploiting idealist potential that is already there.  
Of course, I did not mean to suggest that the foregoing observations should convince 
us that the Effability Thesis by itself carries no idealist implications. Rather, I meant to give 
partial support for a point that I want to elaborate on at present. This is the key point I want to 
make in this final section. Only if one defends the Effability Thesis on the basis of substantive 
philosophical grounds, whether metaphysical or related to the philosophy of language as in 
Hofweber’s case, arguing for a particular view of the nature of the propositional, will it be 
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justified to ascribe such idealist implications to the Effability THesis. It is the particular way in 
which one reaches it that should decide whether it implies or perhaps just defines an idealist 
position. If, on the other hand, one reaches the Effability Thesis by way of reflection on the 
limits of what we can conceive, i.e. by trying to imagine what it would mean for it to be possible 
for there to be ineffable for us facts, and concludes that the original assumption that there are 
such facts does not really make sense, then no idealism is remotely in view. For to say that it 
does not make sense to suppose that there are such ineffable facts and not because of 
substantive philosophical views about the nature of facts but because of breakdown in the very 
attempt to make sense of the hypothesis does not imply anything about the dependence on the 
facts on us. In an earlier work, I have pursued precisely this alternative strategy for showing 
that the Effability Thesis, at least with respect to a certain class of facts, namely structurally 
ineffable facts, is true. To suppose that there could be such facts leads to incoherence or a 
contradiction somewhere in our imaginative exercise, so we cannot make sense of such a 
possibility. Moreover, if one reaches the Effability Thesis in some such way, it is not only the 
case that it cannot be suspected of idealist implications but it will not make sense to ask for an 
explanation of how it is that we can represent all the facts or all of the truths about reality. To 
ask for an explanation would be justified if one had reason to suspect that there is a puzzling 
coincidence, in our case between what we can in principle represent and what is the case.72 But 
there is no coincidence here once we have exposed the right background for the thesis, namely 
a breakdown in our effort to make sense of facts we cannot represent. 
Analogously, if we reach the conclusion that it makes no sense to suppose that there 
are true contradictions in reality because of a breakdown in our effort to think through what a 
                                                          
72 Hofweber formulates the point in this helpful way.  
 163 
 
hypothesis that there are true contradictions could mean or imply, then it will be entirely out 
of place to ask for a more substantive explanation of why it is impossible for there to be true 
contradictions.73 It will be entirely out of place to suspect that since the principle of non-
contradiction is a supreme principle of reasoning that we humans have to use in representing 
reality, perhaps it is the mind-dependence of reality that accounts for its contradiction-free 
nature. Certainly, there is a sense in which one could ask for an explanation in both cases but 
the explanation can just take the form of taking one through the imaginative effort that exhibits 
the underlying incoherence in the hypothesis. Importantly, this effort need not involve any 
philosophical claims about the conditions of the possibility of human thought, the nature of the 
propositional or factual, the domain of entities that are propositions or anything of suspect 
philosophical origin. These observations have important implications for how we should think 
about the Nagelian charge that if we deny that it is possible for there to be ineffable facts we 
make reality dependent on what we can in principle represent. This charge should now seem 
quite unjustified. For nothing about dependence on the human mind can follow from a perfectly 
ordinary claim that a hypothesis is incoherent, if the incoherence is not at all grounded in 
questionable, philosophically motivated views about the conditions of the possibility of 
thought or the metaphysics of facts and so on. 
All in all, then, what is important for assessing the threat that the Effability Thesis poses 
to idealism is how one arrives at it. By itself, the thesis is quite innocent. Given the arguments 
of the first two sections and my effort in this section to remove the residual sense that the 
                                                          
73 If the reader is a committed dialetheist or at least considers the idea of true contradictions as at least 
coherent, a position I do not understand, he or she can just bracket reservations for now and consider the 
example in an illustrative light only. Other examples can be substituted for this one. The structure of the 
reasoning would be very much the same.  
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ineffable must be necessary for a robust realism, I think we should be in a good position now 
to appreciate how independent realism and considerations about ineffability can be. Realism, 
understood as our natural picture of the relationship between our minds and reality, does not 
require the possibility of ineffable facts. Moreover, if the main argument of the paper is sound, 
then it better not require it on pain of rendering our concept of reality incoherent.
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5. Why is There Anything At All? The Ineffable and Reason’s Search for 
the Unconditioned 
5.1. Introduction 
Why is there anything at all? Why is there something rather than nothing? This is 
perhaps, as many would be prepared to say, the ultimate metaphysical question. I want to 
understand this question in the most general sense possible, that is, as distinct from more 
specific questions we may have had in mind with these formulations such as “Why is there a 
universe at all?”, where by “universe” we understand the spatiotemporal world investigated by 
fundamental physics, or “Why are there contingent beings?” or “Why are there any concrete 
beings?” I shall be more precise about how to understand the question in what follows but for 
now we can just take it to be aiming at a far more general inquiry than any of these more 
specific questions. 
 The question represents, among other things, the finest expression of reason’s attempt 
to render reality fully intelligible and attain ultimate explanation. But it is a peculiar sort of 
question. It is peculiar in that, while many have found it natural to take the question as one of 
the hardest ones to grapple with but nonetheless as perfectly coherent and meaningful, there 
seem to be strong reasons to consider the question as somehow misconceived and, more 
strongly, incoherent.  
Some of the grounds for being suspicious of it, for instance, include the difficulty of 
conceiving of such a bare possibility as there being absolutely nothing at all. The question is 
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also frequently thought to arise out of reason’s preoccupation with ultimate explanation, a 
preoccupation that is itself grounded in the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which many have 
considered to be a supreme principle of reasoning. But the Principle of Sufficient Reason is 
itself not immune to a very special kind of doubt. Its own legitimacy may seem to be cast into 
doubt once it is recognized that it is well poised to generate contradictions. The assumption 
that there is an explanation of everything, for instance, an explanation of the totality of all 
truths, seems to lead to contradiction. But then the question which is legitimated on the basis 
of this principle might be rendered suspect by association. Furthermore, this very threat of 
contradiction resurfaces from another direction. It seems that the intelligibility of the question 
presupposes the possibility of absolute generality in thought or absolutely unrestricted 
quantification. When we speak of “anything” or its correlate “nothing,” it seems that we intend 
to quantify over absolutely everything. But, as the debate over the coherence of the notion of 
absolutely general quantification attests, such generality of thought may seem to be inherently 
ridden with contradictions. Finally, it may seem as if the question, especially evident in its 
contrastive formulation in terms of the notion of “nothingness,” undermines the very 
conditions of the possibility of giving any explanation at all. For in giving an explanation of 
any truth or states of affairs we are bound to appeal to some existing thing or other where 
“thing” is taken in a very general sense, according to which even events and forces and laws 
of nature can be taken to be “things.”74 But in appealing to some such thing or other in giving 
a possible explanation we will not have attained ultimate explanation as the original question 
                                                          
74 Naturally, a caveat is needed here. There is one type of explanation one could give which would not require 
any appeal to some existing thing or other. If one could demonstrate the necessity of something existing by way 
of showing that assuming the contrary leads to contradiction, then the problem would be avoided. But it should 
go without saying that this kind of explanation by logical necessity, as it were, is not available to us here. This is 
a crucial point around which much of the following discussion in this paper will be centered.  
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would resurface in the new context and we would have to ask why that thing we’ve appealed 
to exists in turn. The explanatory demand, seemingly, cannot be met by construction. The 
question guarantees its own unanswerability.  
We are thus very close to admitting that the question cannot receive an answer in 
principle. Shouldn’t we expect that a well-formed, meaningful question should, at least in 
principle, admit of a possible answer, even though the latter might be unknowable for some 
reason or another? But if it does not, then aren’t these enough grounds for suspicion that it is 
a misconceived question after all? 
Despite these pressures to reject the question, there is, it seems to me, equally great 
pressure to admit it as legitimate. Not only has the question seemed perfectly coherent and 
meaningful to a lot of sophisticated philosophical thinkers in its long life in the history of 
philosophy, but, importantly, it can also be seen as an expression of the unavoidable and 
definitional tendency of human Reason to seek ultimate explanation, itself an expression of 
Reason’s preoccupation with what Kant calls the Unconditioned. In other words, it is a 
preoccupation of Reason to seek complete and systematic unity in its knowledge of the world-
whole, especially manifested in our pursuit of systematic scientific investigation of the world 
but also, more importantly for our purposes, in our pursuit of general metaphysical knowledge 
of reality as it is in itself.  
The core maxim or injunction of Reason to “find for the conditioned knowledge given 
through the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion” 
stems from the very nature of Reason. It thus represents an inevitable or unavoidable tendency 
to look for an absolutely complete knowledge of reality where every “why” has a 
corresponding “Because” so that there is “no room left over for any further Why?” and Reason 
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can rest “on the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary” (A 584/B 612). In effect, then, 
the guiding principle of sufficient reason, as an expression of this demand to reach the 
Unconditioned, is a principle meant to secure the absolute completion and unity of our thought 
and knowledge about the world by finding some aspect of reality, taken as a totality, or some 
element of reality that we could identify as “absolutely necessary.”  
I will have more to say about how Kant’s theory of Reason can frame the main issue at 
hand in this paper in what follows. Suffice it to say for now, if we take seriously the Kantian 
analysis of Reason’s nature and unavoidable tendencies and interests, which I think we should, 
then we have good reason to take a step back and re-examine the temptation to dismiss the 
question of existence as misconceived. For how can it be the case that, first, we can recognize 
the question as an expression of Reason’s search for the Unconditioned, and, second, recognize 
this search as part of the nature of Reason underlying its most ambitious attempts at systematic 
investigation of reality, but still dismiss the question as incoherent and meaningless? Would 
this not imply that there is at the core of human Reason a kind of unavoidable paradox in the 
sense of “self-undermining” insofar as its prescription to seek the Unconditioned contains a 
hidden incoherence by virtue of the fact that when this prescription is taken to its natural limit, 
it gives rise to an unintelligible or incoherent demand? In other words, if Reason cannot but 
strive for completeness and unity in its thought about the world, on the one hand, but also 
cannot in principle achieve its goal because its attempt to do so generates an incoherent demand 
which it cannot meet in the nature of the case, then it seems as if, in a looser sense than Kant 
meant it, Reason is indeed ridden with a core “antinomy.” I do not mean to suggest that this 
observation settles the matter in the least. My goal is mainly to motivate the claim that there is 
pressure to admit the question as legitimate and coherent in the first place.  
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In light of the foregoing observations, it may seem as if we are at an impasse, which 
confirms yet again the suspicious nature of the so called puzzle of existence. This should be 
troubling. If I am correct in my contention that this peculiar sort of question gives ultimate 
expression of a core tendency of human Reason which stems from its very nature, then to get 
clear on what is the nature and source of the puzzle, its status and possible solutions, if any, 
will be necessary, if we are to come to grips with the nature of Reason. It will be necessary, in 
order words, to examine the alleged threat to Reason’s “wholeness,” or integrity, for lack of a 
better term, or its internal coherence and possible limits. This, in turn, is to engage in a very 
Kantian project of philosophical self-understanding and critique of pure reason.  
My goal in this paper is to take up this challenge. I want to offer a particular 
interpretation of the source and nature of the puzzle which would accommodate, to the fullest 
extent possible that I can discern, the two sets of conflicting views we are tempted to adopt 
with respect to the puzzle articulated above. In other words, my goal is to offer an interpretation 
which incorporates the most important and valuable insights on the nature of the question that 
both those who take it at face value and seek a “straight solution” to it have to offer and those 
who suspect there is some hidden incoherence in the root of the puzzle. I want to argue that to 
“resolve” the impasse, a deep re-orientation of thought is necessary. It may well transpire that, 
in the final analysis, even when admitting the question of existence as legitimate in a certain 
specific sense, we would have to radically change our understanding of what it is for there to 
be an answer to the question. This is what I intend to argue for in this paper. What will 
constitute “an answer” to the question of existence is a certain ineffable insight about reality 
or the world taken “as a whole,” an insight that cannot be put into words or given a 
propositional formulation in principle.  
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The possibility of this solution can emerge once we are in a position to appreciate that 
the “straight solution” to the puzzle which has the best claim to being a satisfactory response, 
i.e. the appeal to the necessity of there being something or other, whether in the form of a 
necessary being or the necessary existence of the world taken as whole, cannot, in principle, 
genuinely satisfy us. In other words, even though a careful examination of the question within 
the context of the Kantian Theory of Reason would show that the question already suggests 
the type of answer that is uniquely appropriate to it, we are not in a position to grasp this 
answer. The latter is ineffable. This is not to say that we cannot describe in propositional terms 
what such insight should be able to accomplish, cognitively speaking, in order for it to 
constitute a proper answer to the question. In fact, part of the function of the detailed work of 
giving an interpretation of the nature and source of the puzzle is to set the frame within which 
we can recognize why and how a certain ineffable insight should be the proper “answer” to the 
question. In a certain sense, then, the question, once properly understood, suggests its own 
answer, but, also, guarantees in a way that this type of answer would be forever elusive to us.  
In light of the requisite re-orientation of thought mentioned above, we would thus be 
in a position to gain a kind of self-conscious understanding of why the question’s answer 
should have proven so elusive to us and how it could be that we can formulate in propositional 
terms a question or puzzle whose solution, if I am correct, cannot but come in the form of a 
non-propositional insight. In a way, we will be gaining an insight into Reason’s limits. It is 
precisely the self-conscious analysis of what we are doing when we ask the question which 
will allow us to make sense of the proposal I will be putting on the table.  
In short, the re-orientation of thought on this question that I want to argue for should 
allow us to accomplish three main things. First, it should allow us to explain why the answer 
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to the question has been and is bound to be elusive or why we cannot in principle provide a 
straight answer in propositional terms. It is, in this sense, a limit question. Second, it should 
allow us to explain how it could be that we can, at the same time, have some sense of what 
type of answer to the question might satisfy us and thus why some straight solutions have been 
almost universally acknowledged as indeed genuine candidates for a solution. Third, it should 
allow us to explain how we can acknowledge a core truth in the skeptical position which 
charges the question with a hidden incoherence, but also, ultimately, how we can preserve the 
legitimacy and meaningfulness of the question despite this observation. Hence, I take the main 
argument for my proposed re-interpretation of the puzzle to consist in what it can do for us. If 
I am correct, then we can impose a certain kind of order and connection among our ideas on 
the nature of Reason and its limits, frequently thought to be related to the ineffable, and our 
long-standing engagement with the elusive puzzle of existence. 
I want to suggest that what allows this re-interpretation of the puzzle of existence is 
Kant’s Theory of Reason. This is the framework I will be presupposing in the rest of the paper. 
I take Kant’s views on Reason, most extensively articulated in the Transcendental Dialectic in 
the Critique of Pure Reason, to be independently plausible. But I also take the theory to receive 
indirect support in virtue of enabling us to make sense of the deep peculiarity of the puzzle of 
existence. The theory has the resources to provide what is to my mind the right interpretation 
of the nature and sources of the puzzle. Given the importance of the problem and the deep 
insight we might be able to gain into its roots on the basis of the Kantian framework, I take 
this to constitute yet further evidence for the power of Kant’s theory and its capacity to 
undergird a deep kind of philosophical self-understanding.  
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However, even though my project here is thoroughly Kantian in both conception and 
motivation, its overall shape is not necessarily such. This is because I will be making a major 
departure from Kant in recommending my particular position on what it is to have an answer 
to the question of existence. This recommendation is much closer in spirit to the project 
definitive of early Wittgenstein’s major work - The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – than it 
is to the project of the Critique. In introducing a role for the ineffable in the debate over the 
puzzle of existence, a role for the ineffable at the limits of thought and language, the delineation 
of which limits is precisely the concern of the Tractatus, I will be staying closer to early 
Wittgenstein. Another key philosophical assumption I will thus be making is that we can make 
good use of what has come to be known as the saying/showing distinction present in the 
Tractatus.  
We cannot in principle say why anything exists at all, but we can be shown why. Only 
this is an ineffable insight that cannot be put into words. Even though I will be making this 
departure from the Kantian framework, what ultimately motivates it is a very Kantian thought. 
My disagreement with Kant emerges in dialogue with him, so that what we should say, in the 
final analysis, is that in order to preserve the integrity of Reason in the light of self-conscious 
understanding of how its commitment to the Unconditioned is threatening to undermine this 
integrity, by generating an incoherent demand, we would have to take seriously the idea that 
Reason is already pointing beyond itself. In other words, we can reflectively come to conclude, 
precisely by taking seriously the demand for the Unconditioned and Reason’s limits revealed 
therein, that we can have only an ineffable insight into the Unconditioned. This would be the 
key to the solution to the puzzle of existence.  
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The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, I clarify the target question, 
setting it apart from certain related but less general questions that one might have in mind, 
instead. I isolate some of the main features of what we can call the traditional approach to the 
resolution of the puzzle of existence, which takes the puzzle at face value and seeks straight 
solutions to it, and some of the main features of what we can call the skeptical approach, 
articulating along the way the major grounds for doubting the coherence of the question. In the 
second section, I introduce in more detail the two main pillars of my interpretation - Kant’s 
Theory of Reason and the Tractarian saying/showing distinction. In the third section, I present 
my interpretation of the nature of the question or what is at the root of the puzzle of existence. 
Here, I develop the interpretation with a view to reconciling core insights from both the 
traditional and skeptical approaches to the puzzle. I defend my proposal to think of the 
resolution of the puzzle with essential reference to the ineffable.  
5.2. The Question of Existence and Possible Responses 
The question “Why does anything exist?” or “Why is there something rather than 
nothing?,” where we take these to be equivalent, admits of various more or less general 
interpretations. It could be that we are asking why the universe exists with “the universe” 
understood as the entire spatiotemporal world with all things in space and time, perhaps along 
with space and time. It could be that such a question can receive a fully scientific answer as 
some current proposals on quantum gravity consider space and time to be emergent, however 
this is to be more precisely understood.75  
                                                          
75 For useful discussion of the fundamental vs. emergent nature of space-time, see Allori, V. “Space, Time (and 
how) they Matter” forthcoming in J. Statchel, G.C. Ghirardi (eds.) Space, Time, and Frontiers of Human 
Understanding. Springer-Verlag (2017) and Kiefer, Claus. “Time in Quantum Gravity” in Callender, Craig (ed). 
Oxford handbook of Philosophy of Time. OUP (2011).  
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It could be that we are asking why any concrete things or beings exist. Depending on 
the various conceptions of what concreteness and its correlate abstractness amount to such as 
the causal or spatiotemporal ones, according to which concrete things are just those things that 
occupy space-time or just those things which have causal powers, respectively, the question 
might receive different answers. We may intend a combination of these criteria, instead, and 
ask why there are any spatiotemporal or causal beings. Alternatively, the question might 
concern contingent versus necessary beings, so that we could be asking why there are any 
contingent beings at all. Depending on how broadly or narrowly we construe “beings,” i.e. to 
cover things of any general category or only some of these (e.g. spatiotemporal objects, sets, 
events, facts, etc.), again, the question would receive different answers. Similarly, we could 
combine these two questions and ask, instead, why there are any beings that are both concrete 
and contingent. It may be that we are asking “Why are there the concrete or contingent beings 
that there actually are rather than other possible ones?”76 
I want to understand the question in the broadest possible sense. In other words, I want 
to consider the interpretation under which it is asking for an explanation of why there are any 
things or, as some prefer to formulate it, any beings at all. This includes not only concrete 
things but any abstract things whatsoever – sets, propositions, facts, numbers, universals, etc. 
A caveat is needed here, however. I have special resistance to including propositional-like 
entities under the broad term “thing” or “being,” as I take it that when we are asking why there 
are any things we are just asking why it is the case that there is something or why it is not the 
case that there is nothing. But I do not want to pre-judge any issues in the debates over the 
                                                          
76 For a useful survey of all of these questions, on which I have modelled the foregoing discussion, see Tyron 
Goldschmidt’s Introduction to The Puzzle of Existence: Why is there Something Rather Than Nothing? (2013). 
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ontology of facts or propositions.77 There are views, according to which even facts and 
propositions can be, in a certain broad enough sense of the term, things, insofar as we can 
quantify over them. They would thus form an independent domain of their own. On these 
views, when we quantify over “things,” we are also quantifying over propositional-like entities 
such as facts or propositions, perhaps understood as abstract beings of some sort and hence 
properly included in the domain of things we are concerned with in the puzzle of existence.  
Perhaps there is a way to dispel any initial sense we might have that the question would 
end up undermining itself if we also include facts and propositions among the things for which 
we seek an explanation by insisting that propositions, at least, are necessary existents. One 
might contend, for instance, that there is a set of all possible propositions that could be thought 
                                                          
77 In other words, I am not sure that I would find it intelligible to ask “Why is anything the case at all” or “Why 
does any fact obtain at all?” or, even more starkly, “Why are there any truths at all?” for even when there is 
absolutely nothing in the sense of “thing” including everything else but facts or propositions, we would still 
describe that as the obtaining of the negative fact that “Nothing exists” or it being true in that case that nothing 
exists. In yet other words, if an absolutely empty world is inconceivable since a world is just a way things are 
and we would have to ask why there is any world at all, instead, we would still be asking why the fact that there 
is a world obtains rather than the fact that there is no world. In effect, we would still describe the alternative, 
there being no world at all, as the obtaining of a negative fact. All of this is symptomatic, in my view, of a 
distinctive difference in kind between everything else that falls under the broad term “thing” or “being,” on the 
one hand, and facts and truths (true propositions), on the other. The latter are just not the sort of thing that we 
should be concerned with when we ask why there is anything at all, even on the broadest possible interpretation 
of the question.  
Notice that this observation does not immediately undercut some types of questions that one could be tempted 
to raise, especially in response to scientific claims that physics can answer the puzzle of existence, such as why 
there are laws of nature at all (should one appeal to laws of nature as necessitating the existence of concrete 
contingent things, at least). The difficulty might be that, according to the foregoing line of thought, it makes no 
sense to ask why there are any laws of nature since laws of nature are not things after all, they are facts, special 
kinds of facts, but the question is not supposed to make sense if we ask why there are any facts at all. However, 
the question of why there are any laws of nature is best understood in very different terms. We are, in effect, 
asking why certain special kinds of fact should obtain, namely those characterized as “laws” or those which have 
whatever special characteristics are definitive of “lawhood” on one’s favorite account of lawhood. None of this 
is threatened by the above mentioned reservations over the inclusion of “facts” or “propositions” in the group 
of things or beings which we are concerned with in the puzzle of existence. For a discussion of related issues 
and the possibility of using laws of nature in an account of why some contingent and concrete things exist, see 
Marc Lange’s “Are Some Things Naturally Necessary” in T. Goldschmidt (ed.) The Puzzle of Existence. NY: 
Routledge, 2013.  
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(but by whom?). This set would exist necessarily.78 There would then be no difficulty in raising 
the original question in its full generality and expecting an answer in the form of some true 
proposition or other, thus a “thing” whose own existence would have to be explained, since 
any proposition would be necessarily existing and necessities are self-explanatory if anything 
is.  
I also do not want to exclude, if anyone should assume that they should be included, 
any merely possible beings in the group of things we are concerned with in the puzzle of 
existence. Even though I do not consider possibilia as the sort of things the question could be 
about, as it seems hard to make sense of the question “Why are there any possibilia at all?” or 
“Why are there the possibilia that there are rather than other ones?,” if one could make sense 
of these questions, then I suppose these should be included.  
The question of existence is thus the question of why there are any things or beings at 
all (henceforth, only “things”), where we quantify over literally anything that should be 
included under “things,” given the foregoing qualifications. It should come as no surprise then, 
in view of the generality of the question, that it should be seen as somehow suspect and 
potentially problematic. In one form or another, it can be thought that even raising the question 
in such generality, should be impossible and, if not downright nonsensical, the question is at 
least incoherent as it rests on assumptions that are contradictory (if one happens to think that 
demonstrating the latter is insufficient for demonstrating the former). But before I articulate 
some of the crucial challenges to the question that resort to such considerations, I want to 
briefly take note of the most prominent “straight” solutions to the puzzle one could give, 
                                                          
78 The difficulty would come from another direction. There is an argument to the effect that there could be no 
set of all truths, according to which the assumption that there is such a set generates a contradiction. This is 
Patrick Grim’s argument (Grim 1984).  
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modelled more or less on the straight solutions to the less general puzzles over the existence 
of concrete and contingent beings one might have intended by the puzzle of existence, instead.  
It could be that it is just a brute fact that something exists. This answer is bound to be 
unsatisfactory, however, and I propose to set it aside. My own view is that it is especially 
unsatisfactory given the nature of this fully general question. If the interpretation of its source 
and nature that I am about to give is correct, i.e. if the question is indeed the ultimate expression 
of Reason’s unavoidable and necessary search for the Unconditioned and hence for ultimate 
explanation, then this answer just constitutes a rejection of a core, definitive task of Reason. 
But the Brute Fact solution is also likely to be unsatisfactory for most participants in the debate 
over the puzzle of existence for a much more basic and obvious reason. One might attempt to 
argue that at least some abstract beings, for instance, sets, universals, or numbers, which are 
counted as some of the “things” over which we quantify, have to exist necessarily. Hence, the 
Brute Fact view would amount to the claim that it is just a brute fact that some abstracta exist, 
a claim not many philosophers would be happy with.79 So this answer can be set aside.  
The other, much more plausible, and, arguably, the only type of answer that is at all 
satisfactory, is the type of answer which appeals to some necessary existents or other. An 
obvious response would be, again, given the generality of the question, that something has to 
exist, because, even if concrete and contingent beings need not exist, abstract things such as 
numbers and perhaps pure sets or, as the aforementioned argument would have it, propositions, 
would have to exist. Alternatively, it could be that one takes God, traditionally conceived as a 
                                                          
79 In fact, there is at least one argument in the literature to the effect that the necessary existence of some 
abstract beings can be used as a basis to show that some concrete beings have to exist as well. This is E.J. Lowe’s 
argument that some concrete beings have to exist for the existence of the only possible abstract beings, i.e. 
universals and sets, depends on there being some concrete beings or other. Since the existence of these 
abstracta is necessary, so is the existence of some concrete beings or other. See (Lowe 1998).  
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necessary being, to provide the necessary explanation. God has to exist and God is something, 
so it is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of God in order to answer the most general 
puzzle of existence. Finally, it could be, on certain Spinozist views about reality as a whole, 
that the latter is itself necessarily existing, as one unbounded, self-contained, infinite whole, 
the ultimate substance. It cannot have failed to exist. But then, at least everything in the world, 
everything that is a mode of the one substance, exists necessarily, whatever we want to say 
about abstracta.  
There is a danger at this point that the question of existence, precisely because it is so 
general, can admit of fairly obvious and easy answers, as the foregoing discussion seems to 
show. But what is the interest in the question then? I think that even quite aside from all the 
important challenges to the coherence of the question that one could raise, which trade 
precisely on this ambitious generality, we should note that it is not so easy to give a satisfactory 
solution to the puzzle by these appeals to necessity. In fact, part of the motivation for offering 
an interpretation of the puzzle of existence squarely within the framework of Kant’s Theory of 
Reason is to show how and why this traditional “straight solution” to the puzzle, even if the 
right kind of solution, in a specific sense to be further elucidated in the next section, cannot be 
satisfactory. It cannot be satisfactory because it does not genuinely meet the explanatory 
demand at hand. The value of exploring how the puzzle of existence should be treated within 
the context of Kant’s Theory of Reason, I want to suggest, lies in the fact that one could 
uncover within it an argument for this view. We cannot in principle attain a solution to this 
fully general puzzle because the only really plausible solution, which adverts to some necessity 
or other, runs afoul of the proper requirements for a notion of “necessity” that can fulfill the 
explanatory demand. According to these requirements, the proper notion of “necessity” that 
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we should be appealing to is what Kant calls “absolute necessity.” This concept, a pure idea of 
Reason, according to Kant, represents a type of necessity which we should comprehend a 
priori, so to speak. The operative notion here is “comprehend.” 
To my mind, the appeal to God as a necessarily existing being or the appeal to 
necessarily existing abstracta following from the necessary truths of mathematics, is extremely 
unsatisfactory. It is so because it is not clear we understand what this necessity consists in. We 
cannot see, for instance, just how and why God should be a necessarily existing being except 
by stipulation so that we can just include the concept of necessary existence in the concept of 
God, understood as the infinite being with all the other traditionally important attributes. We 
cannot see, for instance, just how and why a “set,” say, the empty set, which is used to build 
the entire set-theoretical hierarchy, should be a necessarily existing thing. Does it follow from 
the concept of a set unless the latter already includes the concept of necessary existence? It 
seems not. If, instead, one privileges alethic modalities and moves from necessary 
mathematical truths to necessary existents, then there are various substantive assumptions one 
should be making that could secure this move, assumptions which would invite similar 
challenges. Couldn’t one argue, being very much committed to the priority of reference over 
truth rather than the priority of truth over reference, that, for example, “set” should be 
genuinely referential, i.e. refer to a necessarily existing mathematical entity, in order for the 
corresponding truths in which the term figures to be come out both true and necessarily so? 
But if this is the order of explanatory priority, then it is begging the question to assume already 
that “set” stands for a necessarily existing thing, that is, it is begging the question in light of 
the challenge to the very notion of necessary existence in question. How do we comprehend 
such necessary existence? 
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Kant’s notion of “absolutely necessary existence,” as we will come to see, captures the 
insight that ultimate explanation, if it is going to rely, centrally, on some notion of necessity, 
should rely on a necessity that we genuinely grasp and comprehend a priori. This is the type 
of necessity that can characterize a thing only insofar as one can infer the existence of this 
thing from a distinctive concept under which we represent it. It is, crucially, not a necessity 
that we could just stipulate by including it in the concept of the thing beforehand where it 
stands unconnected to any other features of the thing which could render the idea that this thing 
exists necessarily intelligible.  
I will have more to say in defense of this crucial point in what follows, as part of the 
major argument of the paper is that on a proper understanding of the fully general puzzle of 
existence, it will emerge that “absolute necessity” in the Kantian sense is the notion of 
necessary existence we should be concerned with. But for proponents of at least one of the 
traditional “straight” answers, the appeal to God, this line of thinking should not be entirely 
alien. It concerns the possibility of giving an ontological argument for the existence of God, 
which encapsulates precisely this demand to show how one can grasp the necessary existence 
of God by demonstrating that God’s existence follows merely from the concept of God.  
Before I move on to my main discussion, I need to say a few words about why the 
puzzle of existence should naturally invite skepticism in the form of a charge that it hides some 
incoherence or that it is downright nonsensical. As noted in the introduction to the paper, there 
are three types of challenges. First, if conceivability is the proper guide to possibility, then 
given that we do not seem able to conceive such a bare possibility of there being “nothing” at 
all, in light of the seemingly unrestricted sense of “nothing,” it should not be admitted as a 
genuine possibility. One might argue, then, that the question is nonsensical. This is because for 
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us to count a claim as meaningful, it must be at least possible to conceive what the world would 
be like if its negation were true. So to wonder at the existence of reality or the world taken as 
a whole, perhaps including absolutely everything, would make sense only if we could 
somehow conceive it not to exist. But we cannot do so. This is perhaps what Wittgenstein has 
in mind in his discussion on the question in the “Lecture on Ethics” (1965), even though it is 
not entirely clear how general he takes the term “the world” to be. Either way, the lesson we 
could draw from his discussion is that it should not be immediately assumed that “absolute 
nothingness” is something we could conceive and thus render intelligible the alternative to 
something existing.  
The other type of challenge concerns various threats of paradox that the puzzle of 
existence implicates, which are all intimately inter-related. It seems that the intelligibility of 
the question presupposes the possibility of absolute generality in thought or absolutely 
unrestricted quantification. When we speak of “anything” existing and try to conceive the 
alternative “nothing,” it seems that we intend to quantify over absolutely everything. But, as it 
becomes evident in the debate over the coherence of the notion of absolutely general 
quantification, such absolutely unrestricted quantification may be inherently ridden with 
contradictions. There is no set of all things and, thus, perhaps, no domain of all things to 
quantify over, and if under “things” we include “sets,” and “numbers,” it should be 
immediately clear why one might think this to be the case. The assumptions that there is a set 
of all sets or a set of all ordinals, or, indeed, a set of all true propositions, if the latter should be 
included under “things,” generate a contradiction. If we have to be able to think an absolute 
totality of all things in order to coherently entertain the question, then it is obvious why the 
question should be thought to be incoherent.  
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Relatedly, the question is frequently thought to be motivated by the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason, which itself falls prey to the same challenge, insofar as it is premised on the 
assumption that there are explanations for every true proposition or, at least, every true 
contingent proposition. But the latter assumption might itself depend on quantifying over 
propositions which form a set. The problem is that such a set would be inconsistent and hence, 
there would have been only the appearance that we are dealing with a genuine set of 
propositions, after all. But if the PSR generates contradictions, why assume, contrary to the 
Brute Fact View presented above, that there should be an answer to the puzzle of existence? If 
the ground for this assumption is the truth of PSR, which is what the point about Reason’s 
concern with the Unconditioned amounts to, one might say, why not reject the assumption 
along with the PSR?  
Finally, recall that the question of existence, taken in full generality, seems somehow 
to undermine the possibility of giving it any answer almost by construction. It seems to be, in 
effect, a self-undermining question. It may appear as if the question, especially evident in its 
contrastive formulation, undermines the very conditions of the possibility of giving any 
explanation at all. For in giving an explanation of any truth or states of affairs we are bound to 
appeal to some existing thing or other, but in appealing to some such thing or other we will not 
have attained ultimate explanation because we would have to ask why that thing we’ve 
appealed to exists in turn and so on, ad infinitum.  
Naturally, there are ways one could try to meet these challenges head-on, by defending 
the PSR against the charge, defending the possibility of absolutely general quantification, and 
so on. I will not be concerned to argue in this way. I take it that there is some truth in what I 
will call the “skeptical position,” i.e. there is some underlying paradox in the question, as 
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traditionally understood, in this very ambitious sense where we are concerned to quantify over 
“everything.” But there is also some truth in what I will call the “traditional position” which 
adheres to the possibility of giving a straight solution to the puzzle in terms of a necessity of 
some kind. How these can be reconciled or in what way will emerge after I have provided what 
I take to be the right interpretation of the nature and source of the puzzle in the first place. I 
want to turn to this in what follows.  
5.3. Reason’s Search for the Unconditioned and the Source of the Puzzle of Existence 
There are three components of the interpretation of the puzzle of existence that I want 
to advance, which can be given in the form of answers to the following three questions: 
1. How is the puzzle of existence generated in the first place? 
2. In what particular ways does the puzzle express Reason’s search for the Unconditioned? 
3. How does the puzzle suggest its own answer once its basis in Reason’s search for the 
Unconditioned becomes clear? How does the traditional appeal to a “necessity” of some kind 
to answer the puzzle emerge on this particular basis? The following sections address each of 
these questions in turn. 
5.3.1. The basis of the puzzle of existence 
The interpretative proposal that I want to advance runs as follows. The puzzle of 
existence arises when we take the world or reality, as the totality of things understood in the 
broadest sense possible, to be contingent. Alternatively, it arises when we take the world or 
reality, understood as an absolute totality of truths, to be contingent in its existence. Notice 
what this would have to mean. It would mean that what is contingent in this case is there being 
any set of truths at all. I will set aside for now any difficulty there might be with the idea of an 
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absolute totality of things or truths, as this will be addressed below. At this point, I am 
concerned to argue for a particular interpretation of the traditional puzzle of existence, which, 
as we will subsequently see, will need to be revised to take into account this difficulty. It would 
be part of the re-interpretation of what is involved in the question to reject the assumption that 
we are thinking of reality as an absolute totality of any kind. 
We do not positively conceive of some state of absolute nothing to be contrasted with 
another state characterized by the existence of some thing or other. The contrastive formulation 
of the question, i.e. “Why is there something rather than nothing?,” could be misleading insofar 
as it suggests that the puzzle we give expression to is not unlike the puzzle we might have over 
why there are only three buckets of water in the kitchen instead of four buckets of water where 
we had good reason to expect the latter. In this case, naturally, we can conceive what it is for 
there to be four buckets of water in the kitchen instead of three and there is no question about 
the intelligibility of the puzzle. If we hold the contrastive formulation of our main question as 
paradigmatic and insist on the requirement that we be able to conceive of the alternative to 
anything existing, then we can certainly raise a challenge to the intelligibility of the puzzle of 
existence. It is no surprise that challenges to the puzzle take the form that they take. This is the 
point that Wittgenstein makes, i.e. that it makes sense to wonder at something being the case, 
only if we could conceive it not being the case. But we cannot conceive of the world’s not 
existing if by this we mean conceiving absolutely nothing existing. This is, in effect, 
Wittgenstein’s challenge (1929; 1965).  
But the contrastive formulation is inessential to the puzzle. If the charge that it is hard 
to make sense of the question depends on this particular formulation of it, then it is a misplaced 
charge. What does generate the question is not the conception of some state of absolute 
 185 
 
nothingness. It is a particular aspect under which we think the totality of things or totality of 
truths we call reality. We hold reality taken as a whole to be contingent in its existence. But it 
is important to construe what is involved in taking this cognitive stance to the totality of things 
or truths correctly. To hold its existence to be contingent involves a kind of imaginative 
negation, itself undergirded by a failure to discern any necessity holding this totality firmly 
fixed and unwavering. It is not necessary for us to interpret the content of the thought that the 
world as a whole seems contingent in its existence in terms of the possibility of conceiving a 
state of absolute nothingness as a mark of this contingency. On a proper understanding of what 
it is to conceive the contingency of the world-whole, the Wittgensteinian challenge articulated 
above could be defused. It is only because we hold one particular model of a coherent demand 
for explanation in mind and try to align the puzzle of existence with this model that we find 
ourselves in the present difficulty. To wonder at the existence of the world-whole could be 
perfectly intelligible since the puzzle stems first and foremost from a failure to see any 
necessity in the existence of this world-whole. There is not only one thing that we can call 
“conceiving that something is not the case.” I suggest that the contrastive formulation of the 
puzzle of existence misdirects our thought and obscures the proper understanding of the origins 
and sources of the puzzle of existence.  
I want to suggest that the foregoing interpretation of the source of the puzzle of 
existence is already substantially present in Heidegger’s discussion on the “nothing” in his 
1929 lecture “What is Metaphysics?” 
The nothing is the complete negation of the totality of beings. Doesn’t this characterization of 
the nothing ultimately provide an indication of the direction from which alone the nothing can 
come to meet us? The totality of beings must be given in advance so as to be able to fall prey 
straightaway to negation — in which the nothing itself would then be manifest. 
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Now, the similarities are no doubt only partial and the rest of Heidegger’s discussion 
on the origins of the “basic question of metaphysics,” namely “Why are there beings at all, and 
why not rather nothing?” is obscure to my eye. It is clear, however, that he had something like 
the foregoing idea in mind, even though somewhat cryptically formulated in terms of “the 
revelation of the nothing.” One good way of understanding the core insight in this dense article, 
I would like to suggest, is through this thesis of priority. It is ‘the whole of beings” that we first 
fix in our mind and imaginatively “negate,” thereby first coming across “the nothing” in 
Heidegger’s words, so as to raise the basic question: 
Philosophy gets under way only by a peculiar insertion of our own existence into the 
fundamental possibilities of Dasein as a whole. For this insertion it is of decisive importance, 
first, that we allow space for beings as a whole; second, that we release ourselves into the 
nothing, which is to say, that we liberate ourselves from those idols everyone has and to 
which he is wont to go cringing; and finally, that we let the sweep of our suspense take its full 
course, so that it swings back into the basic question of metaphysics which the nothing itself 
compels: ‘Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing? 
Setting aside the cryptic reference to “the nothing,” the illuminating point to take away 
from this is that the conception of the totality of beings and the conception of “nothing,” if 
there could be such a thing, do not stand on a par. These expressions should not be understood 
in an analogous way, so that to conceive of absolute nothingness is just like to conceive of 
something existing, only in the former case we conceive “nothing.” There is a categorial 
difference or difference in kind in what these expressions are meant to stand for. If we want to 
insist that we can conceive of absolutely nothing, then this should be understood in the way 
suggested above. This is to hold the world-whole as contingent; this is to fail to see any 
necessity in its existence. There is nothing more to the imaginative “negation’ referred to above 
than this recognition of the apparent contingency of the world-whole. 
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But if this is indeed the correct interpretation of the source of the puzzle of existence, 
then we have already taken the first step to a proper understanding both of why it should appear 
that there is some hidden incoherence in the question “Why does anything exist?’ and of why 
one particular straight solution to the puzzle has seemed overwhelmingly natural and tempting. 
I submit that once we locate the source of the puzzle in the attempt to think of a world-whole 
or a totality of beings or things, we can recognize that there is indeed a hidden incoherence in 
the puzzle. The observation that we are bound to come across some contradiction or other when 
thinking through the question, whether by way of defending the PSR, thinking about the 
conditions of the possibility of giving any explanations or about the requirements of absolute 
generality of thought and unrestricted quantification, is telling in this respect. For the root cause 
of all of these challenges is precisely the misconceived attempt to think of reality under the 
aspect of an absolute totality of things or an absolute totality of truths. It is the very same effort 
of thought involved in the attempt to think of a Set of all Sets in making sense of the subject 
matter of contemporary set theory, what we would like to refer to as “the full set-theoretical 
hierarchy” underpinned by the iterative conception of a set. It is also the same effort of thought 
involved in thinking a totality of all truths, though there is good reason to think that such a 
totality cannot exist (Grim 1984). Finally, it is the very same effort of thought involved in the 
attempt to think, in Cantor’s terms, of “an inconsistent totality,” i.e. a totality that is too big to 
be counted as “one” or a unity, such as, to take Cantor’s example, the set of all ordinals. In this 
sense, it is the attempt to think of what Cantor called “the true infinite.” But the notion of an 
absolute totality, a Cantorian infinite totality, is, we have come to appreciate, deeply 
problematic and ultimately incoherent. It is thus no accident that arguments to the effect that 
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the unrestricted PSR ultimately entails contradictions rely on the assumption that there is a set 
of all beings or set of all truths (Ross 2013).  
But if this is the correct diagnosis of why we should continually embroil ourselves in 
contradictions when we reason through the question of existence, then what room could there 
be for the main thesis of this paper that we can, nonetheless, admit the question as legitimate 
and coherent? If the very formulation of the puzzle depends on the presupposition that there is 
such a thing as a “totality of all things” or a “totality of all truths,” understood in the broadest, 
unrestricted sense, then the question should not even make sense, as the idea of such totalities 
makes no sense.  
There is one way that we could go here, which will not be the way I prefer to go. We 
can take a cue from the debate over the possibility of absolutely general quantification and 
seek a re-interpretation of the key problematic notions. First, take the totality of beings or 
things to form a set or set-like object. Second, construe the key concept of a “set” as an 
indefinitely extensible one so that there would be no definite extension of the concept where 
“set” is only subject to principles of extendibility such that for any putative domain of objects 
that forms the extension of the concept, one could always produce an object that is not included 
in the extension specified but must be included in a yet more inclusive one.80 Alternatively, 
take the concept of a “thing” or “being” to be indefinitely extensible and subject to the same 
extendibility principles as “set” (or, for that matter, “ordinal”) could be. So, we might interpret 
the question of existence in light of this altered conception of what it is to be quantifying over 
any “thing.” We could be asking why, for any domain of beings or things in the ascending 
                                                          
80 This is, in effect, the strategy used by Stewart Shapiro and Crispin Wright in their argument against the notion 
of absolutely unrestricted quantification in “All Things Indefinitely Extensible” in Rayo, Agustin & Uzquiano, G 
(eds). Absolute Generality. OUP, 2006.  
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hierarchy of ever more-inclusive domains we could fix in mind, the things or beings referred 
to in that domain should exist rather than not.  
But this is a poor attempt at re-interpretation. It is first not clear whether the above does 
capture the intended generality we want when we ask why “anything” should exist. But even 
setting this aside, notice that in the very attempt at re-interpretation I had to refer to “any 
domain” in the ascending hierarchy of ever more inclusive domains. But what could be 
intended here but “absolutely any” so that there is an attempt at absolute quantification over 
the entire hierarchy of domains? Absolute generality seems to re-enter whenever we try to 
expel it from our formulations. I do not see how to give a proper re-interpretation of the 
question of existence through this revisionary move that would satisfy us. Moreover, the 
success of the effort might crucially depend on a successful resolution of the more general, 
deep and difficult problem over absolute generality where a lot of other considerations could 
be in play. I cannot take up this challenge and I suggest that a different approach is needed, 
instead. This approach is articulated in the next section where I address the second question 
that informs my interpretation of the puzzle of existence, i.e. in what particular ways the puzzle 
expresses Reason’s search for and preoccupation with the Unconditioned. 
 
 
5.3.2. Why Anything Exists and Reason’s Attempt to Think the Unconditioned  
I suggest that we take the appearance of incoherence in the puzzle of existence at face 
value. We should admit that the demand for explanation of why anything should exist does 
involve the self-defeating attempt to think of reality under the aspect of an absolute totality, 
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whether a totality of things or a totality of truths. The motivation for saying this is serious. I 
think we should be in a position to recognize this attempt to think of reality or the world-whole 
as an absolute totality as an expression of Reason’s attempt to think the Unconditioned, in this 
respect to think of the whole of reality as the Unconditioned. I say “attempt,” because this 
particular manifestation of Reason’s concern with the Unconditioned misfires insofar as there 
is no coherent way to think of an absolute totality.  
To see why the attempt to think of an absolute totality is just the attempt to think the 
Unconditioned, notice first that the latter notion just is the notion of the Infinite in its 
metaphysical guise, an idea going back to Parmenides and core to Spinoza’s philosophical 
system, i.e. the idea of something that is “One,” an absolute unity that is “whole,” “unlimited” 
by anything outside of it since being conditioned just is being limited, and “self-subsistent.”81 
Kant says as much in the context of developing the idea of a transcendental ideal of Reason, 
the idea of “All of reality,” representing the Unconditioned, which Reason ultimately 
objectifies to yield the notion of an Infinite being, i.e. God: 
Thus if the thoroughgoing determination in our reason is grounded on a transcendental 
substratum…then this substratum is nothing other than the idea of an All of reality (omnitudo 
realitatis). All true negations are then nothing but limits, which they could not be called unless 
they were grounded in the unlimited (the All) (A 576/ B 604) 
Now this is the natural course taken by every human reason…It begins not with concepts, but 
with common experience, and thus grounds itself on something existing. But this footing 
gives way unless it rests on the immoveable rock of the absolutely necessary. But this itself 
floats without a support if there is still only empty space outside it and under it, unless it itself 
fills everything, so that no room is left over for any further Why? – i.e. unless it is infinite in 
its reality (A 584/ B 612). 
                                                          
81 I take the idea of a division between a metaphysical and mathematical infinite from Adrian Moore’s 
illuminating work on the history of the idea of Infinity in his The Infinite. NY: Routledge, 1991.  
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Reason’s search for the Unconditioned then just is the search for something that would 
satisfy the predicates that have traditionally been associated with the One, the metaphysical 
Infinite, whether the latter is understood as an individual being of the highest reality, i.e. God, 
a further product of “hypostatizing” the ideal of Reason, according to Kant, or as the world-
whole itself, an idea present in Spinoza and Parmenides.82 
It is important to notice, next, that even when we conceive of reality not as one 
underlying substance but as a multiplicity of things, insofar as we attempt to think of reality as 
“one,” and want to fix on the “All of reality” in Kant’s terms, we are thereby attempting to 
think of it as Unconditioned. There is nothing “outside” of it, so to speak; as an absolute totality 
it would be “self-contained,” a multiplicity that is, nonetheless, a “unity” and Unlimited in the 
sense that there is nothing outside it to condition it. Furthermore, if we take reality to be not 
the world of appearances but things as they are in themselves, then, Kant maintains the idea of 
“absolute totality” should be “valid” for it: 
Accordingly, the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas is removed by showing 
that it is merely dialectical and a conflict due to an illusion arising from the fact that one has 
applied the idea of absolute totality, which is valid only as a condition of things in themselves, 
to appearances that exist only in representation, and that, if they constitute a series, exist in the 
successive regress but otherwise do not exist at all. (A 507/ B 535) 
Kant is famous for arguing against the cosmological idea of a world-whole on the basis 
of the antinomies of reason. If there were such a thing as the world taken as a whole, then it 
would be legitimate to presuppose either that it is finite or infinite in both spatial and temporal 
extent, for instance. But this presupposition generates two opposing but seemingly equally 
valid conclusions in both cases. There are reasons to take the world to have a first beginning 
in time but also reasons to take it to be infinitely old, for example. Kant’s solution to the 
                                                          
82 For extensive treatment of this recurring idea of a metaphysical infinite, see again Moore (1991).  
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antinomies, as is well-known, is, in effect, to deny the presupposition generating the antinomy, 
which is, in turn, to endorse his transcendental idealism. The phenomenal world does not 
constitute a world-whole and cannot be considered an absolute totality (A491-502/B519-30). 
But, crucially, this move applies only to the world of appearances. If we take reality to mean 
“reality as it is in itself,” then, as Kant notes in the above quotation the idea of ‘absolute 
totality” is valid for it as “a condition of things in themselves.” This is to say that a condition 
of the possibility of thinking of reality as indeed independent of us is that we recognize it as 
“one,” which is what recognizing it as an absolute totality would be. Kant is thus very close to 
asserting that it should be possible for us to think of reality as an absolute totality of things just 
in virtue of its independence of our thought.  
At this juncture, we should be in a position to see that Kant may not have appreciated 
the paradox lurking in the background. True, Kant was thinking of reality in the restricted sense 
of an absolute totality of noumenal substances rather than a totality of things in the broadest, 
unrestricted sense of “thing.” For his purposes, thinking an absolute totality of “things” could 
well be coherent, at least if there is a finite number of noumenal substances. But this 
observation does little to help us given our concern with the puzzle of existence where the 
attempt to think an absolute totality of things is ridden with the threat of contradiction. Yet, as 
the foregoing remarks are intended to underscore, it seems plausible to suppose that Reason is 
bound to conceive of reality as such an unconditioned totality precisely because it takes reality 
to be one and independent of our thought from it (if it were not, then we shouldn’t be bothered 
if the attempt to collect together all things in one consistent totality were to fail). This 
“totalizing” tendency of Reason presumably has deep roots in the nature of human thought, as 
the application of the category of “unity,” one of the pure categories of the understanding, is a 
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necessary condition for any recognizably discursive thought we are capable of. Moreover, 
Reason’s ultimate concern with the absolute completeness and unity of its knowledge of 
reality, which is what Reason’s concern with the Unconditioned is tantamount to, can be 
readily discerned in this effort to grasp reality as one self-contained “whole,” a multiplicity 
that is also a unity. 
There is thus pressure to recognize that we are indeed attempting to think the 
Unconditioned in the effort to view reality as an absolute totality of things or truths. But then 
our present difficulty is even more perplexing. If I am indeed correct in my foregoing 
assumption that the question of existence depends on this view of reality as an absolute totality 
and, thus, as having a mark of the Unconditioned, then doesn’t this demonstrate that we are 
inevitably involved in a kind of cognitive illusion insofar as we take ourselves to have fixed 
upon the “whole” of reality and the Unconditioned? Is there not some ultimate incoherence 
both in the puzzle of existence and Reason’s general attempt to think the Unconditioned? 
Finally, if it is in the nature of Reason to seek the Unconditioned, then it seems like there is at 
the core of Reason a kind of deep antinomy that should be especially unsettling.  
Is there a way to deal with this problem and recover both the coherence of the puzzle 
of existence and the integrity of Reason’s attempt to think the Unconditioned? I think that there 
is. The key to the solution to this problem is to notice that we first and foremost operate with 
a less definite concept of reality which is further specified in terms of a totality of things or 
totality of truths or, for that matter, in terms of the One, a single all-encompassing substance, 
as in Spinoza’s system. I suggest that we take it as a serious consideration in its own right that 
we are, seemingly, able to reflect on and explain what it is that we are failing to do when 
subject to the aforementioned cognitive illusion, what it is that we are trying to bring into focus 
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but are bound to fail as the notion of an absolute totality falls apart in our hands under the 
pressure of its own incoherence. It is reality or what I have been calling the world-whole that 
we try to think under the aspect of an absolute totality or, alternatively, as the Parmenidean or 
Spinozist “One.” This is why I have been careful above to formulate what I take to be source 
of the puzzle of existence as the effort to think of reality under a certain aspect or under a 
certain concept. If the connections that I draw between the Kantian Unconditioned and the 
notion of an absolute totality of things hold, then the source of the puzzle is the effort to think 
of reality under one of the aspects of the Unconditioned insofar as the idea of an absolute 
totality is just one particular mark of the Unconditioned. It is just that, as we have seen, it is a 
misguided manifestation of Reason’s concern with the Unconditioned insofar as this particular 
conceptual mark does not withstand critical scrutiny and must be abandoned in virtue of its 
incoherence. 
With these observations in mind, we can say the following. There is a coherent content 
in thought that we have in mind or there is a fully intelligible effort of thought generating the 
question of existence. We first bring into focus reality or the world, which we need not already 
construe or understand in terms of any totality at all, and then attempt to conceive of it as the 
Unconditioned in terms of the absolute totality of things in order to raise the question “why” it 
should be rather than not. But even if the idea of such a totality is incoherent, this does not 
undermine the intelligibility of the puzzle. We are, in effect, puzzled as to why there should be 
a world at all or why there should be a reality in the broader, less determinate sense of the 
concept. This perplexity, as I argued in preceding passages, itself arises out of a failure to see 
any necessity in the world’s existence. The world reveals itself as contingent.  
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I take it that we have good reason to regard the general concept of reality or “the world,” 
which I here use interchangeably, as prior to the more specific concepts we use in order to 
think of reality under a certain aspect. After all, not only are we seemingly able to self-
consciously and reflectively grasp the explanation of the cognitive illusion implicated in the 
traditional puzzle of existence, but, as I noted above, we have been able, historically, to engage 
in reflection on how to conceive of reality in the first place, whether as a totality of things or 
truths or as one underlying substance. This reflection would be unintelligible if we did not first 
have an independent grip on the notion of reality or “the world,” which we seek to further 
specify in various ways. 
It might be helpful here to adopt a distinction Rawls draws between a concept of a 
thing, on the one hand, and a conception of that thing, on the other, where two or more 
determinate conceptions can equally correspond to a relatively indeterminate concept of that 
thing (Rawls 1971). So my suggestion is that we think of all these more specific ways to 
understand reality as different, more or less determinate conceptions corresponding to the 
relatively indeterminate concept of reality. The effort of thought behind the puzzle of existence 
involves the misconceived application of a particular conception of reality. This explains why 
the question “why is there anything at all” or “why does anything exist” is so often exposed as 
a pseudo-question, whose very formulation is somehow said to be incoherent, a product of 
Reason’s inevitable “totalizing” tendencies. 
Now, if we take the foregoing suggestion seriously, we can absolve the question of 
existence of ultimate incoherence because we have an understanding of what is the more basic 
thought behind it. In other words, once we recognize the cognitive illusion implicated in the 
puzzle as the assumption that reality can be thought of as an absolute totality, then we should 
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be in a position, precisely by way of this recognition, to recover the underlying thought behind 
it, which is fully coherent. We should be able to come to a better self-understanding of what it 
is that we are doing when we take ourselves to puzzle over existence in general. We, so to 
speak, see reality waver before our eyes as no absolute necessity holds it in existence. There is 
no need to think of reality as an absolute totality of things to coherently raise the question of 
its existence in this way. 
There is, however, one problematic facet to the interpretation advanced above. I have 
argued that the source of the puzzle of existence, as typically formulated, involves an effort to 
think reality under an aspect of an absolute totality or, what comes to the same thing, given the 
Kantian line of thought broached above, the Unconditioned. But is there not a much more 
serious and bewildering illusion at the core of the puzzle, readily seen in view of this Kantian 
line of thought, namely the paradoxical failure to recognize that in raising the puzzle of 
existence we have abrogated the effort to think of reality as Unconditioned or the assumption 
that it could be so? For is it not part of the idea of the Unconditioned that it cannot have a 
contingent or, in a sense, limited existence? How could we be attempting to think of reality as 
the Unconditioned if indeed our question betrays that we view its existence as contingent and 
far from “absolutely necessary”? But Kant is quite explicit that “absolutely necessary 
existence” is a mark of the Unconditioned, a pure idea of reason needed to point to a “certain 
unattainable completeness” (A 592/ B620); 
For the contingent exists only under the condition of something else as its cause, and from this 
the same inference holds further all the way to a cause not existing contingently and therefore 
necessarily without condition (A 584/ B 612) 
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In the context of linking the concept of “All of reality,” one manifestation of the pure 
idea of the Unconditioned, further hypostatized into a being with the highest reality, to the 
concept of unconditionally necessary existence Kant says the following: 
Now reason looks around for the concept of a being suited for such a privileged existence, as 
the absolute necessity, yet not in order to infer its existence a priori from its concept…in order 
to find among all the concepts of possible things that one that has nothing within itself 
conflicting with absolute necessity. For in accordance with the first inference [cosmological 
argument], reason takes it as already settled that something or other has to exist with absolute 
necessity. If it can now do away with everything that is not compatible with this necessity, 
except for one, then this is the absolutely necessary being, whether one can comprehend its 
necessity, i.e. derive it from its concept alone, or not (A 585/ B 613).  
This, therefore, is how the natural course of human reason is constituted. First it convinces 
itself of the existence of some necessary being. In this it recognizes an unconditioned 
existence. Now it seeks for the concept of something independent of all conditions, and finds 
it in that which is the sufficient condition for everything else, i.e. in that which contains all 
reality. The All without limits, however, is absolute unity, and carries with it the concept of 
one single being, namely the highest being; and thus reason infers that the highest being, as 
the original ground of all things, exists in an absolutely necessary way (A 587/ B 615).  
In other words, in order to satisfy the idea of an absolutely necessary existence, which 
reason inevitably employs to bring its effort to comprehend the world to completion, Reason 
searches for a concept of a possible being which can be used as a basis to infer the necessary 
existence of that being. The attempt to link the two conceptual marks of The Unconditioned, 
i.e. absolutely necessary existence, and “the All of reality,” thus yields the ontological 
argument. Reason attempts to infer the necessary existence of the being with highest reality, 
the ens realissimum, the idea of which is a product of hypostatizing the concept of an “All of 
reality.”  
I will return to certain crucial aspects of this part of Kant’s discussion below, and I will 
have more to say about how to understand the key concept of “absolute necessity.” As we will 
see, properly internalizing the more general lesson behind Kant’s critique of the ontological 
argument should already point the way to an important insight into the puzzle of existence. For 
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now it is important to note that there is indeed supposed to be an intimate connection between 
the concept of the Unconditioned and the concept of necessary existence.  
So, to return to our main problem, by taking reality or the world-whole to be contingent 
in its existence, while, nonetheless, attempting to think of it under the aspect of the 
Unconditioned, are we not involved in a self-defeating and paradoxical effort? In other words, 
even if we cannot think of the Unconditioned as an absolute totality of things or truths, for this 
implies an illusion of Reason, given that in the puzzle of existence there is still an attempt to 
think of reality or the world-whole, as the “All of Reality,” and hence the Unconditioned, how 
could the puzzle make sense? If “absolutely necessary existence” is a mark of the 
Unconditioned, then how can we think of the whole of reality as contingent when raising the 
puzzle? 
This important question actually already points the way to the resolution of the puzzle 
of existence and to the final important element in my interpretation of the nature and source of 
the puzzle. It points the way to a proper explanation of why it should have seemed 
overwhelmingly natural to many thinkers tempted to give a “straight solution” to the puzzle 
that we should either say that somehow the world could not have failed to exist, after all, or its 
existence is accounted for by positing an absolutely necessary being, God, independent of the 
world. I address these issues in the final section, which is concerned with the third question I 
articulated above, i.e. “How does the puzzle suggest its own answer once its basis in Reason’s 
search for the Unconditioned becomes clear? How does the traditional appeal to a “necessity” 
of some kind to answer the puzzle emerge on this particular basis?” 
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5.3.3. “Absolutely Necessary Existence” and the Answer to the Puzzle 
Crucially, one of the first attempts to think through an answer to the question of 
existence is, not coincidentally, I urge, to locate some absolute necessity to end the search for 
ultimate explanation either in the existence of the world itself or in the existence of God. It is 
not coincidental, in view of the interpretative framework I have provided, because if we are 
indeed attempting to think of the world or reality as Unconditioned in the puzzle of existence, 
then it should be expected that in the failure to discern any necessity of its existence or in the 
contingency that is revealed to us in thought, we are primed to need a certain type of answer 
to the puzzle. It is an answer that takes the form of recovering the sense of the world as indeed 
Unconditioned, but now bearing the other conceptual mark of the Unconditioned, not that of 
an absolute totality of things or truths but that of “absolutely necessary existence.” We can thus 
see what kind of answer to the question of existence should naturally satisfy us.  
If, indeed, getting clear on what kind of answer would satisfy us is thereby getting clear 
on the nature of the question, we have gained a lot from reflection on the foregoing 
interpretative framework. We should expect that successful appeal to the notion of absolute 
necessity would prove to be the proper response to the puzzle, given the source of the puzzle 
in the attempt to think of reality as Unconditioned and the failure to see any necessity in its 
existence generating the puzzle, manifested in the thought of its contingency and the 
imaginative negation grounding it I adverted to above. We should expect, furthermore, that 
one proper explanation of the puzzle of existence, if only we could attain it, would be to show 
how the assumption that absolutely nothing exists generates a contradiction and so a quasi-
logical necessity would characterize the existence of the world or reality. It is not surprising 
that this should be a model of explanation that we are naturally driven to seek, even when 
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immediately forced reject, in the course of thinking through what kind of answer could possibly 
satisfy us or what could count as an answer to the question of existence. 
The paradox is that, if we were successful in coherently thinking of reality as 
Unconditioned under the aspect of an absolute totality when raising the puzzle of existence, 
we would be denying the other key mark of the Unconditioned – its absolutely necessary 
existence. But, as things stand, I’d like to suggest, no such paradox is involved in the puzzle 
of existence because we are equally incapable of thinking reality under both of these aspects 
of the Unconditioned. We addressed the problem of thinking an absolute totality of things or 
truths above. The only sense in which we think of reality as Unconditioned is if we take it to 
be the world-whole, one and self-contained, but without prior thought of it as a multiplicity 
that is also a unity. This is the only way to render the question coherent.  
Now, Reason is also in principle incapable of regarding anything that is put forward as 
the Unconditioned as absolutely necessary or, in other words, the conceptual mark of 
“absolutely unconditioned existence” is in principle unsatisfiable. The problem is not that 
Reason just cannot conceive of reality or the world-whole specifically as bearing the mark of 
absolutely necessary existence. Even the concept of God or the highest being, traditionally 
understood to be a necessary being, cannot satisfy the mark of absolute necessity of existence. 
This is because, according to Kant, this notion of absolute necessity is very much connected to 
the possibility of comprehending purely a priori, through mere concepts, how the referent of 
that concept should exist necessarily. In other words, existence should be inferred merely from 
the concept of the thing for this is what it would be to comprehend this idea of absolutely 
necessary existence and assure ourselves that it is a determinate, coherent idea. So if it were 
possible for the concept of a given thing to satisfy this condition of absolutely necessary 
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existence, then we should be in a position to demonstrate a kind of logical necessity of 
existence; we would generate a contradiction if we denied the existence of the putatively 
necessary being.  In yet other words, to think of something as existing absolutely necessarily 
is to have available an ontological proof for the existence of that thing. But now, in effect, if 
we assumed that reality enjoyed absolutely necessary existence, which should satisfy our 
explanatory quest, we would have to be in a position to produce an ontological proof of its 
existence very much on the model of the traditional ontological proof of God’s existence. 
However, and this is the punchline, if Kant is correct in his criticism of the ontological 
argument, as I think he is, and if we have good reason to suspect in principle that we cannot 
infer the existence of anything from its mere concept, then we can readily see why we cannot 
be satisfied in principle when it comes to the puzzle of existence either. Although, according 
to Kant, Reason is unavoidably led to the idea of necessary existence, it is not in a position to 
identify any candidate answering to this idea: 
But here we find something strange and paradoxical, that the inference from a given 
existence, in general, to some absolutely necessary being seems to be both urgent and correct, 
and yet nevertheless in framing a concept of such a necessity, we have all the conditions of 
the understanding entirely against us. (A 592/ B 620). 
In all ages one has talked about the absolutely necessary being, but has taken trouble not so 
much to understand whether and how one could so much as think of a thing of this kind as 
rather to prove its existence. Now a nominal definition of this concept is quite easy, namely 
that it is something whose non-being is impossible; but through this one becomes no wiser in 
regard to the conditions that make it necessary to regard the non-being of a thing as 
absolutely unthinkable, and that is really what one wants to know, namely whether or not 
through this concept we are thinking anything at all. For by means of the word unconditional 
to reject all the conditions that the understanding always needs in order to regard something as 
necessary, is far from enough to make intelligible to myself whether through a concept of an 
unconditionally necessary being I am still thinking something or perhaps nothing at all (A 
593/ B 621; emphasis added) 
For in accordance with the first inference [cosmological argument], reason takes it as already 
settled that something or other has to exist with absolute necessity. If it can now do away with 
everything that is not compatible with this necessity, except for one, then this is the absolutely 
necessary being, whether one can comprehend its necessity, i.e. derive it from its concept 
alone, or not (A 585/ B 613).  
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In effect, then, Kant has given us reason to think that what seems like the only answer 
to the puzzle of existence which could satisfy us, whether we appeal to God or to the necessary 
existence of the world, is not in principle available to us. This is because his critique of the 
ontological argument for the existence of God, i.e. that one cannot infer the existence of a 
highest being merely from its concept, is fully general. There is a much broader difficulty in 
inferring the existence of anything as necessary from its mere concept. But the possibility of 
this inference is precisely what is required in order to comprehend the necessity in question. 
The very idea of an absolutely necessary existence is problematic, even if unavoidable for 
reason, because we cannot count as “thinking” the necessity in the existence of some thing 
merely by stipulation. We should be in a position to derive it from “conditions” that show us 
how and why the concept should apply. The ontological argument is an attempt to do precisely 
this with respect to the concept of God but it is bound to fail for fully general reasons that apply 
to any thing that could be said to exist with absolute necessity, thus including reality taken as 
a whole. We cannot derive a contradiction from the assumption that the world does not exist.  
There are very few “straight solutions” to the fully general puzzle of existence, as 
opposed to the puzzle over the existence of the spatiotemporal world and its governing laws of 
nature, which could satisfy us. In fact, aside from appeal to brute facts, and hence a rejection 
of the demands of the PSR, it is not clear what kind of answer one could give but the answer 
from necessity. I want to suggest that we take seriously the idea that what we are indeed looking 
for when we raise the puzzle of existence is some kind of necessity and, moreover, this is 
nothing but absolute necessity in the sense articulated by Kant. This should not be surprising 
given the interpretative framework for the puzzle I have delineated above. As the ultimate 
expression of Reason’s preoccupation with the Unconditioned and thus with ultimate 
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explanation, the puzzle of existence should receive the answer that reflects precisely this 
preoccupation. It should be addressed with the pure idea of Reason of an absolutely necessary 
existence, but now divorced from the more specific commitment to a necessary being such as 
God. This is the idea of Reason expressive of its attempt to bring its thought about the world 
and explanatory quest to completion. It is the idea that can stop the series of “why” and give 
Reason a resting place.  
Now if Kant is correct to argue that we cannot find a proper concept of a thing, in the 
broadest sense possible, to satisfy the conditions of absolute necessity, i.e. admit an ontological 
derivation from it and thereby allow us to put content to the idea of a necessary existence, then 
we are in principle limited from ever formulating an answer to the question of existence. We 
are in principle limited from doing so because for that we would need to think reality or any 
constituents of it through or under the aspect of a special kind of concept – the concept that 
can answer to the idea of absolutely necessary existence. But we have reason to think that such 
a concept is in principle unavailable to us. We cannot just apply the problematic idea of 
necessary existence and assume that our job is done. For what we are asking for, and this is 
one way to see the difficulty that Kant is articulating in the above quotations, is an 
understanding of how something could satisfy this concept, i.e. what it could mean for it do 
so. This is a demand to give content to the idea. The sign that we have given the idea content 
would be the success of an ontological argument premised on this further content. If Kant is 
correct, this demand cannot be met. 
It is at this juncture that we can appreciate what I take to be the real challenge that the 
puzzle of existence presents. The puzzle is fully coherent. We know, after all, what kind of 
answer would satisfy us. But we also know that that kind of answer is principle unavailable to 
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us. Moreover, it seems that if the absolute necessity of the world or reality proves to be the 
proper answer, then we cannot grasp this answer in conceptual terms at all, which is something 
that we can persuade ourselves on the basis of argument. In fact, if the extended argument of 
this paper is correct, then Kant has already given the resources to recover this argument. We 
seem unable to uncover or discover a concept that can answer to the idea of absolute necessity. 
But if we cannot attain such a concept, then to say that we cannot formulate an answer to the 
question of existence in conceptual terms just is to say that we cannot formulate an answer in 
propositional terms, so that we can see how to fill in “The world exists because…” We can 
reflectively come to appreciate the exact point at which Reason reaches a limit in its effort to 
attain the Unconditioned. The limit is the absolutely necessary. The answer is in this particular 
sense, I want to suggest, ineffable.  
Now, I should immediately forestall objections based on a misunderstanding of this 
claim. When we recognize that there is a type of answer to the question which would satisfy 
us, a grasp of some type of necessity, we do not take back what we have just asserted by further 
recognizing that an answer of this type is unavailable to us in principle. The way to see this is 
first to make a few stipulations. Suppose that there is a kind of non-conceptual insight we could 
have in response to the question of existence so that by means of it, we would like to say, the 
“answer” to the question is revealed to us. We can suppose it is a type of immediate, intuitive 
insight into what we would like to call the necessity of the world-whole or some element of it 
which accounts for its existence. Now, I want to suggest that all we have done by identifying 
what I’ve called the kind of answer that would satisfy us is describe in conceptual terms, what 
others are there after all, what the insight in question should be able to accomplish, cognitively 
speaking, so that, if we had attained such insight, we would be inclined to say something like 
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“It [reality] has to be,” or “It must be.” In other words, the intuitive, non-conceptual insight 
should have very much the same function in our relation to the world in general that insight 
into other necessities, for instance the necessity of logical truths, should have. The insight 
obviates the appropriateness of any further demand for an explanation either of what was the 
original explanandum or of what it is an insight into, i.e. a necessity. By the nature of the case, 
there can be no further explanation.  
We do not of course have any remote idea of how this should be possible, i.e. how a 
non-conceptual insight into what we would like to identify as a necessity is possible. But this 
would be no different from our puzzlement as to how some non-conceptual insight into the 
“One” of reality, according to the mystical traditions, should be appropriately expressed by 
certain kinds of denials but not others. What is it about the mystical insight into the “One” that 
makes it uniquely appropriate to say things like “It neither is nor isn’t”? We have no idea. But 
it seems somehow uniquely appropriate to those who claim to have such an insight. This is, 
for instance, how the Vedas describe Brahman’s existence and this is how the neo-Platonists 
think about “the One.”  
Moreover, there are certain lines of analytical thought that can support and shed light 
on the temptation to describe the “One” in such terms. For instance, if the highest being or ens 
realissimum is indeed the ground of the possibility of any existing thing not just its existence, 
as a Kantian line of thought would have it, then there is a certain temptation to say that the 
predicates “is possible” and “exists” do not apply to it. The ens realissimum provides the 
metaphysical conditions for possibilia but it makes no sense to say of it that it is either possible 
or not or that it either exists or not. It provides the most fundamental conditions of the 
possibility of any existents, so it makes no sense to say that of it that it exists. This thought is 
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no different than saying, along with Wittgenstein, that the standard meter is neither a meter 
long nor it is not (PI 50).   
Another example comes from the Tractatus, where Wittgenstein takes statements such 
as “There are objects” or its equivalent “Objects exist” to be nonsensical (TLP 4.1272). This 
is because of the distinctive role that Tractarian objects have in the theoretical framework of 
the work. They are supposed to form “the substance of the world” so that anything being the 
case and the existence of ordinary objects, i.e. tables, chairs, etc. with their own properties 
depends on the particular configurations that the simple objects take. So, statements about 
existence and statements of facts obtaining in the first place are to be analyzed in terms of 
relations among simples. The latter form the necessary background for the possibility of any 
representation of facts or states of affairs and hence the possibility of existential claims in such 
a way that the attempt to talk about them in the way we talk about ordinary facts yields 
nonsense. Instead, we should say something like “objects neither are nor aren’t” or “objects 
neither exist nor don’t exist.” Crucially, this line of thought is closely tied to the thought that 
objects are in some sense necessary, as the substance of the world is necessary. So this form 
of expression is hardly alien to analytical thought. But then we can start to get a grip on the 
idea that whatever necessity we grasp through the intuitive, non-conceptual insight in question 
could equally well be expressed in related terms: “reality or the world-whole neither is nor is 
not.”  
None of this is to say that we have already given the explanation we were after. For in 
all these other cases, we have a prior grip on the features of the thing in question which make 
it appropriate to deny that the relevant predicates or their complements apply to that thing (cf. 
the example of the standard meter, highest being as the ground of possibilia, or a Tractarian 
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theory of simples). In the case of the puzzle of existence, we are not in a position to identify 
the feature(s) of reality or any constituents of it that could account for its existence, if any, 
which should make the claim to necessity an appropriate expression of that insight, whether it 
comes in the first form “It has to be” or in the second form “It neither is nor isn’t.” Only by 
actually having the insight in question can we be in a position to grasp why these should be the 
appropriate expression.   
Now, what do I mean more precisely when I say that the proper answer to the question 
of existence should come in the form of an ineffable intuitive, non-conceptual insight 
revelatory of some necessity, either the necessary existence of the world-whole or some 
element of it? I mean that one cannot articulate in conceptual terms what this necessity consists 
in, which is what it would be possible to do if we could uncover or discover a concept that 
answers to the pure idea of Reason of absolutely necessary existence, as Kant maintains, i.e. if 
we could infer the existence of reality or any given thing in it from a given concept through 
which these are represented or thought. Thus, when we say that the intuitive insight should 
reveal the necessary existence of reality or any element of it which accounts for its existence 
such as a necessary being, we are not saying that it should reveal their absolute necessity since 
this latter concept involves an essential reference to concepts. Absolute necessity is by 
definition, what characterizes a thing whose existence can be inferred only from its distinctive 
concept. Yet, when we posit a non-conceptual insight as the proper answer to the question of 
existence we are by the nature of the case forfeiting the use of this particular notion of necessity 
as it involves conceptual thought. So we must say, instead, that there is some necessity that 
would be revealed through such an insight.  
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A few words on why I have chosen to qualify the insight in question as “intuitive” are 
in order here. There is a tradition of thought, to which Kant is a notable heir, according to 
which there is a certain type of intellect or form of understanding, to be contrasted with the 
human discursive understanding, which grasps reality as one “synthetic whole.” It is an 
intellect whose insight into reality as a whole is non-conceptual, in such a way that it represents 
the whole of reality as somehow prior to its parts whereas a discursive understanding grasps 
the whole as something that arises out of the parts and the forces and relations between them 
(Ak 5: 406-8). Conceptual thought does, after all, by definition, parse reality into parts. This 
idea emerges in Kant in the form of the concept of an intuitive understanding, prominent in his 
discussion of the positive concept of a noumenon and in his Third Critique. Notably, Kant 
associates this idea with divine cognition, as the intuitive understanding is supposed to be pure 
spontaneity and thus productive of its objects of thought, which are marks of a divine mind 
(CPR, B 145).  
But these views can certainly be dissociated from the idea of an intuitive insight into 
reality. We can readily see this once we remind ourselves that we are prepared to apply the 
idea to actual human phenomena, at least the historical phenomenon of mysticism. The mystic 
in myriad traditions, which seem to share certain core features, is said to obtain insight into 
reality as a whole, “the One,” which the mystic grasps through non-conceptual means. The 
mode of revelation of “the One” bears enough of the marks of the concept of an intuitive 
intellect or what in the western philosophical tradition is taken as an intuitive insight in order 
for us to be comfortable to apply the latter concept to at least possible human experience. None 
of this, naturally, requires us to take any position on whether mystical insight or experience 
should be taken to afford knowledge of reality as it is in itself or whether mystics’ claims 
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should be believed in the sense of taken as evidence of any kind. The important point is just 
that whatever mode of insight into reality they are described as having shares enough of the 
features of what in the philosophical tradition is considered intuitive insight in order for us to 
see the possibility of divorcing the idea of intuitive insight from the concept of a strictly divine 
mind. It is thus appropriate to qualify the relevant insight in question, given what it is supposed 
to relate to, i.e. reality taken as a whole, as intuitive.  
It is here that I would like to introduce a helpful distinction we could extract from 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus – the saying vs.  showing distinction. There is one interpretation of 
the Tractatus, according to which there are two types of truth. There are the familiar truths we 
can express in language, truths about objects in the world and there are ineffable truths which 
are truths about the form or logical structure of the world and the form it must share with our 
linguistic and mental representations in order for the latter to be possible at all. But this is not 
a happy interpretation. The theory of language articulated in that work hardly leaves any room 
for truths, or the correlate notion “facts,” about the world which would be ineffable. Instead 
“what shows itself” such as “the form of the world” or “the form of language” is necessarily 
something that cannot be described in propositional terms or with any such notion as “truth” 
or “fact,” which are at home only in the context of thought about what is the case in the world. 
The distinction between saying and showing is in turn intimately connected with the theme of 
nonsense, which is also a central pillar of that work. What results from the attempt to express 
the ineffable, thus outstripping the limits of meaningful thought and language, is not a special 
kind of sense outside these limits but sheer nonsense, according to Wittgenstein. 
Similarly, I would like to suggest, we should think of the puzzle of existence as a puzzle 
whose solution can only be something that shows itself. We can be shown the answer to the 
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puzzle but we cannot say it, so that when we are shown “the answer,” the contingency of reality 
is revealed as illusory after all, only this is not something we can come to grasp conceptually. 
Crucially, I would like to dissociate myself from the other aspect of the saying and showing 
distinction – the preoccupation with nonsense. It would be a mistake to think of the central 
claim that we can be shown the necessity of reality or the world-whole as unintelligible 
nonsense because we can make intelligible to ourselves how and why this claim should follow 
given our understanding of the sources and nature of the puzzle in the first place. There is no 
illusion in our grasping the Kantian line of thought about the requirements of thinking the 
Unconditioned under the form of the “absolutely necessary” and the old, traditional line of 
thinking, according to which the solution to the puzzle must appeal to some necessary being. 
We can give an explanation of why and how the answer should be elusive to us in principle 
but also why this type of answer should be uniquely appropriate and precisely what would 
satisfy us here, if only it were available.  
One may object, nonetheless, that what the foregoing discussion really amounts to is a 
kind of indirect reductio ad absurdum of the entire puzzle and its purported solution in terms 
of absolutely necessary existence. If the puzzle implicates the central idea of an absolutely 
necessary existence, as the only possible solution that would satisfy us, and we have seen good 
reasons to think that this idea is in principle problematic so that we cannot form any conception 
of what type of concept would be able satisfy the conditions of absolutely necessary existence 
and ground an ontological derivation, then shouldn’t we conclude, instead, that the puzzle and 
the kind of solution it requires are incoherent after all? If we cannot meet the demand for 
explanation in conceptual terms, by construction, so to speak, given what we mean by 
“absolutely necessary existence,” i.e. existence that follows from mere concepts, but we cannot 
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get this in principle, should we not conclude that the entire demand is incoherent? Instead of 
arguing that there must be in an answer, after all, only one that comes in a non-conceptual 
form, should we not take these reflections to reveal not the need for a radically different type 
of answer but rather the need to reject an incoherent explanatory demand that cannot be 
satisfied? Alternatively, why not conclude that the answer to the puzzle of existence is 
unknowable and the considerations brought forth above at most demonstrate a deep-seated 
epistemic limitation on our part?83 What reasons could we have to prefer the solution I 
propose? 
Before I consider the reasons against dismissing the problem of existence as incoherent, 
I want to address the proposal that the proper conclusion to draw from the foregoing discussion 
is that we are faced with a merely epistemic limitation. The idea here is that what reflection on 
the ontological argument shows is just that we do not possess any concept that can ground a 
purely analytic derivation of the existence of its object, as even the best candidate for such a 
concept, the concept of God, does not permit such a derivation. But this still leaves open the 
possibility that there could be such a concept. It may be that we are in principle incapable of 
grasping a concept of this kind or just haven’t discovered one yet.  
The most basic reason for resisting this conclusion is that the interpretation of what the 
ontological argument demonstrates behind this alternative proposal is implausible. I think 
Kant’s treatment of the ontological argument is justified by a very general observation on the 
nature of concepts and our very idea of representing reality. It is part of our basic idea of what 
it is to represent reality that it should be possible for our conceptual representations to be 
                                                          
83 I owe this objection to Carla Merino-Rajme.  
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misapplied or to misrepresent how things are. The possibility that a given concept of ours can 
lack instantiation is just a specific application of this general idea. So it is not a matter of some 
contingency in our conceptual practices that we have not yet come across the special type of 
concept which allows for analytical existential claims. It follows from the very nature of 
conceptual representation that we cannot simply read off how the world is from how we merely 
represent it and what things exist is naturally tied to how the world is.  
I think the strongest possible grounds we could adduce for the present proposal in light 
of doubts about the coherence of the problem of existence is that the entire puzzle and its proper 
solution are expressions of Reason’s need for ultimate explanation and stem from Reason’s 
unavoidable concern with the Unconditioned, so that it is definitive of human Reason to 
assume the idea of the Unconditioned to be coherent and moreover to possess what Kant calls 
“objective validity,” i.e. it can be applied to reality. Notably, it is not just that the concept of 
the “absolutely necessary” is an unavoidable pure idea of Reason. If this were the only 
consideration, it would be open to us, in broadly Kantian terms, to re-interpret the nature of 
this pure idea in regulative terms. In other words, it would be open to us to conclude, not that 
the Unconditioned must be met in reality, but, instead, that it is expressive of a subjective 
principle that guides Reason in its attempt to attain systematic and unified knowledge of reality. 
This is, after all, the strategy which Kant recommends to curb pure reason’s pretensions to 
know reality as it is in itself in the case of all other pure ideas of Reason such as the idea of a 
world-whole, the idea of the soul and the idea of God as the ground of the possibility of all 
reality or all real predicates. But this route is unavailable to us in the case of the pure idea of 
“absolutely necessary existence.” It is not clear how one could give a re-interpretation of the 
idea in regulative terms. All other ideas of pure reason could be seen to have a particular 
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function relative to Reason’s ultimate goal for systematic unity of knowledge. They guide us 
in the pursuit of ever more general principles or conditions under which to subsume existing 
ones that unify and systematize our thought and knowledge about the world. But it is not clear 
what regulative use the indeterminate idea of absolutely necessary existence should be thought 
to have which is not accounted for merely in terms of the frequent association of this idea with 
related ones such as the idea of “the All of reality.” Only the three ideas of the world-whole, 
the soul, and God, are given a regulative use in Kant’s system and this is no accident. Even 
though the idea of absolutely necessary existence is supposed to be intimately related to the 
idea of God, they are nonetheless importantly distinct. As Kant is concerned to argue within 
the context of his discussion of the ontological argument, one cannot just assume the idea of 
absolutely necessary existence to be part of or contained in the idea of the most real being, the 
ens realissimum. This is one key point behind his criticism of the ontological argument. 
Notice that it would not help to say that a pure idea of necessary existence would after 
all admit of a regulative use since scientific investigation is marked by strong reliance on modal 
notions insofar as we seek ever more encompassing laws of nature that are naturally deemed 
to render less general laws and principles necessary and particular events and phenomena 
physically necessary. The idea here would be that more general laws would make the obtaining 
of certain less general laws and principles and particular states of affairs necessary. But this 
observation is of little help in the present context since the modal notion in question is quite 
distinct. It concerns first and foremost not just any old necessity but necessity of “existence” 
(hence not alethic modality) and, moreover, it concerns the possibility of comprehending this 
necessity in purely a priori terms. For some thing X to be absolutely necessary just is for it to 
be possible for us to infer X’s existence from its mere concept, i.e. the concept of an X. It is 
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not clear how there could be any use for this particular idea within our systematic scientific 
investigation of the world.  
But now, if the foregoing remarks are correct, we find ourselves in the following 
predicament. It seems as if we cannot give a regulative re-interpretation of this pure idea of 
Reason to which we are unavoidably led in the search of the Unconditioned. But it also seems 
that we can know a priori, given the extended Kantian argument given above, that this idea 
would be in principle inapplicable to reality insofar as no concept we can come up with would 
satisfy this idea. But what function could this pure idea have in the first place and why would 
Reason unavoidably lead us to it?  
In effect, the gist of the current proposal is that we recognize a third possibility here. 
The function of this distinctive idea of Reason could be to reveal Reason’s own limits and 
point beyond them so that reflection on the idea should lead us to question whether there is 
anything beyond the limits of Reason. Given that Reason is compelled by its nature to assume 
that the Unconditioned is given in reality but, also, given that in self-conscious reflection and 
through its distinctive project of self-knowledge Reason can discover that it cannot in principle 
grasp the Unconditioned, there is a real need to make a choice. Either the idea of the 
Unconditioned must be given up entirely since it only seems to give rise to incoherent notions 
and demands such as the idea of an absolute totality or the demand to produce ultimate 
explanation in terms of an absolutely necessary being, or the idea should be preserved but some 
radical solution would be needed. I think we should choose the radical solution. The way to 
preserve the integrity of Reason is to first to recognize the idea of the Unconditioned as fully 
coherent, even though indeterminate, thereby acknowledging the need for a real answer to the 
question of existence, which gives expression to this idea, and then to posit an answer that 
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outstrips Reason’s limits. It is to posit the possibility of an answer that takes the form of 
grasping the Unconditioned only not by way of reason.  
The choice of “positing” is not accidental. It stems from the observation that Reason is 
indeed confronted with a choice since it is always possible to dismiss the entire idea of the 
Unconditioned as incoherent. I want to suggest that the form the radical solution should take 
is one of a theoretical postulate, constructed on the model of a Kantian practical postulate, that 
it is possible in principle to obtain a non-conceptual insight into the Unconditioned, an insight 
into the unconditionally necessary existence of the world-whole or any element thereof, as the 
only proper response to the puzzle of existence.  
How close should the analogy between the practical postulates and the proposed 
theoretical postulate be? Within Kant’s system, the practical postulates of God, freedom, and 
immortality stand for certain ideas we have to assume to be objectively valid, i.e. genuinely 
applicable to reality, as necessary conditions for us to attain various necessary goals as moral 
agents. For instance, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are necessary 
conditions for attaining the highest good, i.e. the reconciliation of morality and happiness, a 
state in which everyone would be accorded happiness in accord with their moral character and 
there would be ultimate justice. In order for us to strive to attain this state and realize the highest 
good, we need to assume the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. There are thus 
clear practical goals, which are moreover necessary for Reason in its practical nature, with 
reference to which the postulates are justified.  
What necessary goals of theoretical Reason could be served by positing the possibility 
of such an insight into the Unconditioned? Notice that we cannot take the relevant goal of 
Reason to be the systematic unity and completion of our scientific knowledge. It is not 
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plausible to suppose that unless we assumed the possibility of insight into the Unconditioned 
beyond Reason’s limits, a non-conceptual insight, we would not be engaged in a coherent 
scientific project, even if the latter is understood with reference to the goal of complete and 
systematic unity of scientific knowledge, a necessary goal of Reason in itself. Rather, the goal 
in question is the systematic unity and completion of all knowledge, not just scientific 
knowledge, which includes, crucially, Reason’s self-knowledge. In other words, the goal is the 
unity of Reason itself, the unity of all knowledge attained by Reason. The assumption that the 
idea of the Unconditioned is coherent generates a demand to answer the question of existence 
and the legitimacy of the expectation that such an answer should be possible, while Reason’s 
self-conscious reflection yields the result that such answer cannot be given in conceptual terms 
and is thus seemingly impossible to give by Reason’s own lights. This points to a crucial 
disunity within Reason. The only viable solution to this predicament, I want to suggest, is to 
posit the possibility of an answer that outstrips Reason, i.e. an intuitive, non-conceptual insight 
into the Unconditioned or into a necessity that Reason cannot grasp. Hence, the question of 
existence holds the seeds of another critique of Reason and its scope and limits, a critique 
whose result should be, if the argument of this paper is correct, a theoretical postulate that 
secures the unity of Reason in light of the threat of disintegration. We have to postulate that it 
is in principle possible for us to attain a different type of insight into reality or into the necessity 
that accounts for its existence - a non-conceptual, intuitive insight or so reflection on the pure 
idea of the Unconditioned in one of its key forms, i.e. the concept of absolutely necessary 
existence, seems to suggest. It is thus that we are able to discern the proper response to the 
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puzzle of existence, the answer the question itself suggests, once we see how the puzzle is first 
and foremost the ultimate expression of Reason’s search for the Unconditioned.84
                                                          
84 This type of answer to the puzzle of existence bears an important similarity with A.W. Moore’s treatment of 
the concept of the Infinite, the true Cantorian infinite, which poses seemingly insuperable difficulties for 
conceptualization. The concept is not coherent as it implicates the inconsistent totalities such the set of all 
sets or the set of all ordinals, both problematic concepts with which we wish to capture the thought that there 
is one subject matter to our mathematical investigations, either a hierarchy of sets or ordinals, or that this 
subject matter is somehow “complete.” Since we cannot really think the unity of the set-theoretical hierarchy, 
for instance, what we should do, rather than reject this important concept of the true infinite, is recognize the 
possibility that we could be shown the Infinite. In other words, Moore finds a certain paradox attending 
thought about the mathematical infinite, i.e. that we are both driven to affirm and deny that there is a set of 
all sets or a set of all ordinals. The solution to the paradox is to recognize, instead, that we are shown that 
there is such a set. Now, this is not to say that it is true that there is such a set because there is not and the 
claim that there is nonsensical. Rather, when we self-consciously reflect on set-theory’s subject matter, we are 
given an ineffable insight its unity. It is just that our attempt to express what we are shown, when we 
contemplate the subject matter of set theory, say, yields nonsense (Moore p. 197-200). Even though Moore 
also makes crucial use of the saying vs. showing distinction from the Tractatus, he goes further than I do in this 
paper, in adopting the Tractarian commitment to nonsense as the only thing that results from an expression of 
the ineffable insight into the infinite. My own position, when it comes to the puzzle of existence, as articulated 
above, is that both the question of existence and the attempt to give expression to the ineffable insight that 
constitutes its answer are fully meaningful. It is just that when we say that reality “has to be” or “must be” or, 
alternatively, that it “neither is nor isn’t” as an expression of its necessary existence or of the necessary 
existence of some element of it that accounts for that necessity, we cannot really comprehend the necessity in 
question. So, we have, in effect, not a nonsensical expression of an ineffable insight, but, instead, an 
indeterminate answer to the question that indicates an ineffable insight it is trying to express, at least insofar 
as the concept of “necessary existence” is indeterminate, i.e. we cannot give it further content by identifying 
some way in which we can comprehend how it is that something can answer to the Kantian idea of absolutely 
necessary existence, i.e. how we can derive this existence from a concept under which we think either reality 
as a whole or some element thereof so that it would count as “necessarily existing.” 
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